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IN the preface (dated Stanford Univer
sity, California, April, 1894) to the first
edition of this little book, I described it
as
&quot; an outgrowth of lectures delivered
from time to time on various aspects of
the subject with which it deals,&quot; and
explained that the writing of it had been
undertaken
&quot; to meet what seems to me
to be a very healthy popular demand.&quot;
I went on to speak of the growth
of public interest in the theory of
Evolution in general, and in the writings
of Herbert Spencer in particular, and of
&quot; the desire, often of late expressed to
me by thoughtful and inquiring persons
of broad outlook but limited leisure, to
know more of Mr. Spencer and his work,
of the relative and historic relations of
his philosophy, and especially of its sig
nificance in connection with those ques
tions with which we are all of us directly
concerned the questions of conduct,
society, and religion.&quot;
I then described the purpose of my
book in the paragraphs which I here
reproduce
:
&quot; But here arises a difficulty. Mr.
Spencer s writings are and must be repel
lent to many would-be readers on
account of their vast range and encyclo
pedic character. The comparatively
unpractised and totally unguided student,
set face to face with a whole shelf full
of ponderous volumes, covering with
great minuteness of detail an immense
area of speculation and research, and
couched in a singularly condensed and
not very attractive style, is apt to pause
before committing himself to a long and
perilous journey over untried country a
journey probably fraught with unforeseen
dangers, and for which he may well feel
himself imperfectly prepared. Did he
but possess some outline-map, however
scanty, of the region to be traversed;
did he but know something, to begin
with, of the principal natural features
likely to be encountered on the way, the
whole undertaking would appear to him
in a far more favourable light. He would
then at least realise to some extent the
direction he was to take, and feel the
better equipped to grapple with whatever
adventures might await him in his long
and arduous course.
&quot; In the hope of furnishing some suchPREFACE
outline-map or hand-guide the following
pages are written. My object is, there
fore, a very unambitious one. I do no
propose to trace over the arguments o
summarise the conclusions of the Spen
cerian philosophy. Still less do I fee
called upon to enter into any discussion
of its more debatable aspects. Nor
beyond all things, is it my intention to
offer a substitute for the Synthetic System
itself. Those who would really under
stand Mr. Spencer s ideas must them
selves go to his writings ; no short cut
can be pointed out that can be other than
unsatisfactory ; no patent method can be
devised that will relieve the student of
the need for a first-hand study of Mr.
Spencer s own arguments, or even render
such first-hand study a very light and easy
task. But experience on the platform
and in private conversations has shown
me that something may be done to
smooth the way for the untrained and
unwary feet. The sympathetic inquirer
may be put into direct contact with the
vital germ, or essential principle, of
Mr. Spencer s thought; he may be
led to realise how that thought took
shape; he may be introduced to its
genetic history; he may be placed in
the position to understand its relation to
modern tendencies in science and philo
sophy, and to appreciate the direction of
its influence upon the practical problems
of the every-day world. Guidance may
thus be furnished of a helpful character,
and the approach to the Synthetic Philo
sophy made much less thorny and toil
some than it would otherwise be.
&quot; If the present introduction succeeds
to any extent in this humble labour of
usefulness if it serves to bring others
under the more immediate influence of
a teacher to whom my own personal debt
is so great its existence will be amply
justified.&quot;
I have good reason to believe that, in
the ten years which have passed since
its publication, its existence has been
justified in the ways suggested; and it is
in the hope of still further widening its
field of usefulness that I have gladly
consented to the present cheap edition.
I am anxious to have it understood,
however, that this is not by any means a
mere reprint of the original work. I
have revised it carefully throughout ; I
have endeavoured in several places, by
additions and changes, to make my
exposition fuller and completer than it
was; and I have brought the whole book
up to date. The greatest alterations
mve been made in the first half. The
Diographical chapter has been entirely
re-written ; and in this I have dealt with
Spencer s life and personality more freely
han I felt it proper to do while he was
till alive. Chapters II. and III. have
.Iso been much changed ; a good deal
of fresh matter has been introduced
;
and several sections have been written
[uite anew. I hope, and believe, that inPREFACE
this way I have made the book at once
more interesting and more helpful.
At the same time, it must be dis
tinctly borne in mind that I have in no
wise changed its plan or enlarged its
scope, as set forth in the paragraphs
quoted from the original preface. I was
a very thorough-going Spencerian when
the volume was first written. That was,
as I have said, ten years ago ; and my
attitude, in various respects, is far less
discipular now. Yet I think, considering
the purpose I had in view in writing it,
it would be undesirable to confuse
my work by blending criticism with
exposition. My aim is still, therefore,
to set forth and illustrate Spencer s
thought, not to pass judgment upon
it, though in places (as notably in
the closing chapter) I have not hesitated
to travel beyond Spencer himself, and to
point out what seem to me to be some
of the natural implications of his teach
ing. As an Introduction, in the most
modest sense of the word, the book was
first published. As an Introduction, in
that same most modest sense, it must
still be regarded.
Hampstead, August, 1904.
WILLIAM HENRY HUDSON.An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Herbert Spencer
CHAPTER I.
HERBERT SPENCER : A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
&quot;Ix has seemed to me that a natural
history of myself would be a useful
accompaniment to the books which it
has been the chief occupation of my
life to write.&quot; In this opening sentence
of the preface to his Autobiography,
Herbert Spencer explained and justified
the publication of the two massive
volumes in which, with admirable frank
ness and extraordinary wealth of detail,
he traced his career, analysed his char
acter, and set forth the dominating
purposes of his work. As I pointed out
at the time of the appearance of this
remarkable piece of self-portraiture,
1
Spencer was entirely right in emphasising
its practical utility for the student of his
philosophy, who will, indeed, find it be
yond question the best possible introduc
tion to the Synthetic System itself. Here
we shall merely be adopting his own view
of the intimacy and significance of the
connection between the man and his
work if, on the threshold of our examina
tion of his writings, we pause to take a
brief survey of his life. From the purely
personal standpoint, it is true, such a
1
Independent Review, July, 1904.
record may very probably seem deficient
in those more dramatic elements of in
terest for which we are accustomed to
look in the history of any man who has
left a profound impress upon the civilisa
tion of his age. Spencer s biography is,
in fact, essentially the biography of the
thinker ; it is little more than the story
of his preparation for his great life-work,
of the growth and consolidation of his
ideas, of the inception of his philosophic
system, and of the gradual progress of
this, through difficulties all but insuper
able, stage by stage, to its long-delayed
completion. But, apart from the fact
that it may serve to some extent to
satisfy a natural curiosity concerning the
life and character of a man whose writings
have marked an epoch in the develop
ment of the world s thought, our sketch
should prove of special value in one
important respect. By relating the Syn
thetic Philosophy directly to the career
and personality of its author, it should
enable us to appreciate a feature of it
which otherwise we should be very
likely to overlook the grandeur of that
colossal achievement upon the moral
side. A10 HERBERT SPENCER: A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
I.
Born in Derby, on April 2;th, 1820,
and the only child of his parents to
survive infancy, Herbert Spencer came
of a stock long marked by intellectual
integrity, fearlessness, and independence;




&quot; of nature being, as ancestral
records show, a well-defined and per
sistent family trait, which, clearly ex
hibited in several lines of progenitors,
was extremely pronounced among the
Spencers in the generation immediately
preceding his own. His father, William
George Spencer, was a man of strong
individuality, great inventive powers, and
an unconventionally of habit so decided
that
&quot; he would never take off his hat to
anyone, no matter of what rank,&quot; or
&quot;address anyone as Esquire or Reverend&quot;
1
He was by profession a teacher, holding
views, however, of the aims and methods
of education greatly in advance of the
average scholastic theories of his time.
In opposition to the then common prac
tice of burdening the childish memory
with large numbers of unconnected facts,
he maintained that the first business of
education was rather to train the faculties
of observation and reason in such
manner that the unfolding mind should
learn not only to acquire, but also to
organise, knowledge for itself. Hence
he regarded it as of more importance to
foster originality and the free play of
thought, to excite interest, and to
strengthen the reflective powers, than to
store the memories of his pupils with
any quantity of merely bookish erudition.
These points are particularly worthy of
attention, since it was under the imme
diate influence of the elder Spencer that
1
Autobiography, i., 47.
the boy s mind began to develop. Un
like most men of genius, the Philosopher
of Evolution appears to have owed little
or nothing, either through inheritance or
by training, to his mother; while in
countless ways, in both intellect and
character, he showed himself his father s
son. There can, I think, be no question
that his own early environment, and the
power of his father s teaching and ex
ample, had not a little to do with the
formulation of some of his own well-
known views on education.
It has been frequently said that it was
owing very largely to the child s pre
carious health that he was permitted to
grow into boyhood without subjection
to the mental coercion and cramming
then so much in vogue. The truth of
the matter is that he was not specially
delicate in early years, and that his
father s course of procedure was dictated
wholly by fear of the physical and mental
consequences which might result from
application of the forcing system, to
which he was totally opposed. So little
pressure was, indeed, brought to bear
upon him that, measured by the standard
of mere acquisition, he was a very back
ward child. He was seven years old
before he could read ; and after that he
does not seem to have exhibited much
of that inherent fondness for books which
is a common characteristic of the alert
and thoughtful boy. Ir is not unamus-
ing to find that the first volume which
prompted him to read of his own accord
was good, moral, prosy old Sandford and
Merton a work which, I suspect, has now
quite outgrown its popularity, but which
for a long time contrived, in some most
unaccountable way, to hold the affections
of large portions of the English-speaking
youth ; and that when, somewhat later,
lie began to seek gratification for hisHERBERT SPENCER: A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ii
awakening taste for fiction by stealth,
for his father did not approve of novels
The Castle of Otranto and the romances
of Mrs. Radcliffe were among the books
which he read secretly, after being sent
to bed. But already, as always, his chief
interest lay in the world of nature rather
than in that of literature. To watch the
growth of a plant or the habits of an
insect gave him greater pleasure, even
then, than could be yielded by any
printed page.
&quot; Most children,&quot; he re
marks, &quot;are instinctively naturalists,&quot;
1
though their enthusiasm too often wanes
from lack of opportunity or encourage
ment. The elder Spencer, wiser than
most parents in such matters, was careful
to cultivate his son s early-shown love of
natural history.
Though between the ages of seven and
thirteen Herbert was sent pretty regularly
to day-school (where, it is suggestive to
learn, his insubordination of temper led to
&quot; chronic disobedience
&quot;), his real educa
tion was undoubtedly that which he re-
tceived from his father at home. There,
apart from direct instruction given
which, while in many respects exceed
ingly narrow, was, on the whole, of a
kind calculated to feed and strengthen
such a mind the general conditions
were distinctly favourable to mental and
moral growth. Into the house came
regularly, week by week and month by
month, the more advanced of the medical,
scientific, and literary periodicals, and
into these the boy was permitted to delve
at his will. More important than his
varied and somewhat capricious reading,
however, were the table conversations
to which he early became an attentive
listener, and in which he was presently
allowed to bear his part. George Spencer
1
Autobiography, i., 71.
and his brothers all men of powerful
intellects and pronounced views, and all
Radicals in politics and broad-minded
in their theology were accustomed,
during their family gatherings, to discuss,
with absolute freedom of thought and
expression, all the paramount issues of
the day, scientific and social, ethical and
religious; and young Spencer was thus
habituated from his earliest boyhood to
the treatment as open questions of the
grave matters which were then upper
most in the minds of thoughtful people.
At a time when most children are being
taught, beyond all things else, the value
of authority and the sanctity of tradition,
he was already inured to the freest and
keenest atmosphere of discussion, and to
the bold and direct criticism, in face of
the settled opinions of the majority, of
even the most time-honoured beliefs.
This inevitably strengthened his natural
self-reliance, still further quickened his
critical powers, stimulated his tendency
towards independent inquiry into things,
and increased his hatred of having
opinions imposed upon him ready-made
and from the outside.
During this period his religious expe
riences were curious enough to call for
passing remark. Both his father and
his mother had been brought up Metho
dists; but while the latter remained an
adherent of her old faith, the former,
urged by a constantly growing dislike of
much in the Methodist system and
teaching, had forsaken that body to
become a regular attendant at the
Friends Meeting House, drawn to the
Society, not by any sympathy with its
tenets, but by its individualism and
complete freedom from ecclesiastical
government. As he did not care to
assume such control of the child s
spiritual interests as would ignore the12 HERBERT SPENCER: A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
mother s claim, a compromise was tacitly
agreed to, and for some three years,
Sunday after Sunday, Herbert went in
the morning to the Meeting and in the
evening lo the Methodist Chapel.
&quot;
I
do not know that any marked effect on
me followed,&quot; Spencer writes in com
ment, &quot;further, perhaps, than that the
alternation tended to enlarge my views
by presenting me with differences of
opinion and usage.&quot;
1 We may surmise,
however, that the indirect tendency of
such an experience would be towards the
undermining of the authority of theolo
gical dogma in every form.
It would .be interesting, did space
permit, to pause here to consider the
striking contrast presented by the early
trainings of the two most acute and
original thinkers in the domain of philo
sophy produced by England during the
past century the subject of this sketch
and John Stuart Mill. Mill, it will be
remembered, was also educated under
his father s immediate supervision ; was
also surrounded in childhood by men
of strong character and independent
thought ; and early learned to disregard
tradition and to turn the lens of criticism
upon the world s most cherished creeds.
But here the analogy practically ends.
Mill s mind was forced as in a hothouse;
Spencer s was allowed to develop in the
open air, and with the least possible
pressure from without. Mill, precocious
in all the learning of the schools, read
Latin and Greek at an age when Spencer
could scarcely spell out his own lan
guage. Mill was brought up to regard
the whole vast system of popular theo
logy as a mere congeries of idle and
ridiculous fables ; while Spencer grew
up in personal relationship with Evan-
1
Autobiographyt i., 83, 84.
gelical Christianity in two of its most
diverse forms. And, finally, Mill was
taught to look upon all the problems of
social and political science in a doctri
naire spirit, and as susceptible of rapid and
entire resettlement
; while Spencer was
rather encouraged to regard every pos
sible question on every possible subject
as an open one, to be approached from
many points of view, and investigated
under many different lights. The con
trast thus presented might be elaborated
in detail, with results which, to those
interested in pedagogy, could hardly fail
to be instructive ; but it would lead us
too far out of our proper way to do more
than touch upon it here. One special
difference may, however, be accentuated.
Mill s early training, unlike Spencer s,
was almost exclusively in books. The
regret which he expressed in his Auto
biography, that he had never known the
discipline of any practical scientific
work, has certainly deep significance,
coming from such a source.
II.
At the age of thirteen, a complete
change in the course of his education
seeming desirable, Herbert was sent
from home and placed under the charge
of his uncle, the Rev. Thomas Spencer,
at that time perpetual curate of Hinton
Charterhouse, near Bath. Thomas, like
the rest of the Spencer family, was a man
of strongly-marked individuality, and,
though an adherent of the Evangelical
school, was so strange a specimen of his
class that he was commonly regarded as
hopelessly eccentric, if not indeed a trifle
mad. A Radical at a period when
nearly the whole Established Church
was in bondage to the High Tory
party; a teetotaller when the temperanceHERBERT SPENCER; A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
movement was condemned by the reli
gious world at large as a subtle form of
Atheism
; a Chartist, an avowed Free
Trader, and (with a single exception
&quot;the only clergyman out of fifteer
thousand who contended that the peopl
of England, mostly poor, should not b,
compelled to buy corn at
artificial!]
enhanced prices to enrich English land
lords&quot;;
1 a vigorous and indefatigable
lecturer and writer upon all matters
touching the physical, moral, and socia
welfare of the people ; he was certainly
a man marked out with sufficient clear
ness from the rank and file of the eccle
siastics of his day. My own father, who
knew him well in the forties, often in
my hearing bore testimony to his great
earnestness and devotion qualities
which, indeed, led him into such ex
cesses of labour for the causes he had at
heart that, never of robust constitution,
he broke down ultimately from over
work, and died at the comparatively
early age of fifty-seven.
At Hinton, Herbert now spent three
quiet, but, from the point of view of
intellectual and moral development, by
no means uneventful, years; for the
course of study pursued was more
regular and systematic, and the discipline
more rigorous, than had been the case
at home. His successes and his failures
in the subjects taken up continued to
be alike significant. To get a lesson by
heart was still almost intolerable, and
he rarely recited anything correct!}
which had been learned by rote; but, on the other hand, he soon exhibited
astonishing quickness and grasp in all
matters demanding observation, thought, and reasoning power. In Greek, Latin




time was daily given, very little progress
was made; a chief cause of his dislike





faculties were called into play as
in mathematics and mechanics his
advance was rapid and continuous. An
incident which he himself has placed
on record, and which occurred when he
was between thirteen and fourteen, well
illustrates the salient qualities of his
mind and character his penetration,
fearless self-confidence, and disregard of
all commonly-accepted authority, whether
of book or teacher. While reading
Arnott s Physics with his uncle, he
boldly challenged the doctrine of inertia,
as there expounded; and when his
uncle came to Arnott s rescue, the
objection was firmly adhered to in the
teeth of an official opposition which
would have reduced most boys to
silence. With a mind so clear, alert,
and independent, it is not surprising
that he should have taken a keen
delight in breaking away from the
travelled roads to strike out new mathe
matical problems for himself, and
elaborate original solutions for old
ones.
The design for a time entertained by Thomas Spencer, himself an academic
honours man, and to a certain extent an
advocate of classical culture, of sending
Herbert to Cambridge was gradually
relinquished, as the uncle came to
realise the lad s unfitness for a university
career ; and Spencer thus adds another
o the long list of English leaders of
bought who owe nothing directly to
either of our ancient institutions of
earning. That by foregoing a university
1
Aittobiography, i., 108, 109.HERBERT SPENCER: A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
curriculum he sacrificed something,
more especially perhaps upon the social
side, will be generally conceded ; but it
may, I think, fairly be urged that what
he lost was, on the whole, trifling and
unimportant in comparison with what
he gained. The Cambridge of sixty
years ago was an antique, aristocratic,
exclusive, and highly conservative seat
of humanistic learning ; saturated by
the intellectual traditions of the renais
sance; dominated by ancient methods
and ideals; and wholly out of touch
with the conditions and requirements
of the modern world. A few years
spent in such a place in enforced atten
tion to certain prescribed studies which,
as then and there pursued, would have
been totally deficient in seminal power,
and to which, for his part, he would
have brought no fertilising enthusiasm,
could have contributed nothing to the
growth of his mind or character
; and
while the influence of an environment
steeped in the dogmatism of obsolete
schools of thought could hardly have
turned him aside permanently from his
natural course of development, it would
almost certainly have made more diffi
cult his line of approach to the great
work to which his life was to be devoted.
That Spencer suffered, and in some
directions very seriously, from want of
what is specifically called
&quot;culture,&quot; I
should be one of the first to admit
;
and Mr. Macpherson is doubtless right
in suggesting that, in a practical way,
his road would have been smoothed for
him by academic standing and connec
tions, since he would not then have
been obliged to live down
&quot; the insidious
opposition of university cliques, who
could not bear to see a new thinker of
commanding power step forward into
the intellectual arena without the hall
mark of university culture.&quot;
1
Yet, con
sidering all the conditions, and realising
how disastrous it would have been had
he, on entering manhood, been hampered,
to how slight an extent soever, by here
ditary leading-strings, theological or
pedantic, we can hardly be too thankful
that Spencer remained a free lance.
This much must at least be added.
Not only did Spencer himself never see
any reason to regret the course pursued,
but even his uncle, the strongest advocate
of the benefits of a Cambridge training,
lived to acknowledge that that course
was probably the wise one. 3
III.
Be this as it may, however, to Cam
bridge he did not go, but on leaving
Hinton returned instead to his father s
house, where he spent what was to all
appearances an idle and profitless year.
Yet, while little in the way of regular
study was accomplished, the mind was
by no means lying fallow, for the old
pastime of independent research in the
field of mathematics and mechanics was
resumed; one result of which was the
striking out of a curious original theorem
in descriptive geometry, afterwards pub
lished, along with his own demonstration,
1 Herbert Spencer ; The Man and his Work,
P- 13-
2
Spencer s pronounced opposition to the
ordinary classical curriculum is one of the most
widely-known characteristics of his general
teaching. Systematically expressed in his
Education, it will be found cropping up in un
expected forms and places in almost all his other
writings. It should be noted that it is largely
based upon his belief that the common scholastic
routine, with its superstitious veneration of the
past, and entire devotion to merely bookish
learning, inevitably leads to intellectual subjec
tion ; and that it is, therefore, one aspect of his
general revolt against the tyranny of authority.HERBERT SPENCER: A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
in the Civil Engineer and Archi
tect s Journal. Then came his first
experiment in practical work, as assistant
in a school in which he had spent some
little time as a boy. Mr. Spencer senior
had a very high idea of the duties,
responsibilities, and inherent dignity of
his calling; at a time when there was
still point in the popular saying that a
man who had failed in everything else
could buy a birch and turn schoolmaster,
he realised to the full the teacher s vast
importance in moulding the destinies of
the coming generation ; and, in face of a
public opinion which persisted in treat
ing the educator as belonging as naturally
to the lower grades as the warrior to the
upper grades of society, he felt strongly
(as Carlyle afterwards phrased it) that
there is a deeper and truer glory in train
ing men s minds than in blowing their
bodies to pieces with gunpowder. Hold
ing these views, he would naturally have
been well satisfied to see his son adopt
his own profession ; and the measure of
success which attended this early and
brief trial was sufficient to prove that
Herbert possessed the required qualifica
tions. With a rare faculty for luminous
exposition, he combined the power the
importance of which every practical
teacher will recognise of stimulating
interest in the subjects dealt with; while
his moral qualities showed to no less
advantage. As a boy it had been
remarked of him that, though he strongly
resented any act of tyranny on the part
of a master, and rose impatiently against
anything in the shape of bullying from
his older school-mates, he was always a
favourite with the younger children,
because his behaviour towards them was
marked by the same respect as he him
self demanded from those above him.
In his new position he was quick to
recognise and careful to make the fullest
allowance for the individualities of his
pupils ; and thus went far to realise that
fine ideal of the relations between teacher
and taught which he afterwards so strenu
ously insisted upon in the book on edu-
tion.
But, all this notwithstanding, the
experiment came to nothing not appa
rently from any particular objection on
young Spencer s part to the career of a
teacher, but simply because his attention
was unexpectedly taken off in another
direction. In the autumn of 1837 an
offer came from the resident engineer of
the London division of the London and
Birmingham Railway then in process
of construction, which was at once
accepted ; the bias of his interests and the
line of his studies alike pointing to the
profession of civil engineering as one in
which he would have good chances of
success. He now passed nearly a year
in the ordinary routine of engineering
work partly in carrying on surveys,
partly in making drawings ; and at the
end of that time transferred himself to
the Birmingham and Gloucester Rail
way, where a further period of eighteen
months was spent in a fairly satisfactory
way. During the latter engagement his
progress in practical engineering was in
dicated by various papers on technical
subjects in the Civil Engineerand Archi
tect
1
sJournal; while the invention of a
little instrument, which he called the
velocimeter, for calculating the speed of
locomotive engines, bore testimony to
the continued activity of his mind, more
especially, as usual, in the direction of
original work.
It now seemed, indeed, as if his course m life had at length been marked out for
him. From that time onward, for the
space of some ten years, he continuedi6 HERBERT SPENCER; A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
to be intermittently engaged in engineer
ing pursuits periods of considerable
activity alternating, however, with lengthy
intervals, during which professional work
remained at an almost entire standstill.
But by-and-bye, after several premonitory
recessions in the tide of commercial
prosperity, the railway mania ebbed
away, leaving Spencer, along with count
less other young men, stranded high and
dry upon the shore. The crisis was a
serious one
; for those and their name
was legion who had been attracted to
the work during the season of temporary
excitement now found themselves com
mitted to a profession which offered but
little outlook as a career, and was
seriously overstocked. Thus, at the age
of twenty-eight, Spencer found himself
but little advanced towards a practical
settlement in life, for, from any merely
worldly point of view, the labours of the
past few years had been almost thrown
away. In no very hopeful frame ofmind,
therefore, as may well be imagined, he had
now once more to beat a retreat to his
family home in Derby, there to cast
about him with a view to deciding upon
his next step.
Regarded in the light of the man s
later work, however, these years had not
been altogether fruitless. In his not
infrequent intervals of leisure, he had
done a good deal of miscellaneous
reading, and not a little thinking, and
the result was that the expansion of his
mind, which was presently to be so
rapid, had already well begun. Science
of all kinds continued to occupy the
largest share of his attention; one
book, in particular, deserving to be
singled out for the marked, though
indirect, influence which it exerted upon
his thought. This was Sir Charles Lyell s
ihen recently published Principles of
Geology. It was in this volume, whicn
he read with deep interest at the age of
twenty, that though the idea was not
altogether new to him he first found a
clear statement of that general doctrine
of the &quot;progressive development of
organic structure,&quot;
1 which in those pre-
Darwinian days went somewhat vaguely
by the name of the &quot;Development Hypo
thesis.&quot; It is a matter of common know
ledge that, with a courage and candour
rare even among scientific men, Lyell in
after years yielded to the arguments of
the evolutionists, and, as he himself
phrased it, &quot;read his recantation.&quot; But
in the original form of the work, then
in Spencer s hands, the writer made
common cause with the uniformitarians
against the theory of
&quot; innate progressive
development&quot; expounded by Lamarck
and his disciples ; and thus it happened
that Spencer s first real acquaintance with
the conception of Evolution was made
in a volume in which it was examined in
detail, and thrown aside as valueless.
Spencer, none the less, was more struck
by the doctrine than by the arguments
directed against it, and by no means
the first convert who has been made by
the attacks of the enemy accepted the
Lamarckian view so far as to believe in
the evolution of species, while rejecting
all the great Frenchman s accompanying
theories save that of the adaptation
of organisms to their environment by
the transmission of acquired char
acters. From that time on he has to be
reckoned an ardent supporter of the
general idea of organic development.
There can be no doubt that the ready
acceptance on his part of a theory which
was then held to be so radical and
1 Prof. Sedgwick s Anniversary Address to
the Geological Society ; 1831.HERBERT SPENCER: A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
startling, and which, as we now see clearly
enough, rested in those days upon founda
tions altogether too uncertain to satisfy
the rigidly scientific inquirer, was mainly
due to the singularly well-prepared con
dition of his own mind. His own state
ment, indeed, puts the matter beyond
question the theory, he says, was i
harmony
&quot; with that general idea of th
order of nature towards which I had,
throughout life, been growing. Super
naturalism, in whatever form, had neve
commended itself. From boyhood ther
was in me a need to see, in a more o
less distinct way, how phenomena, no
matter of what kind, are to be naturally
explained. Hence, when my attention
was drawn to the question whethe
organic forms have been speciallycreated
or whether they have arisen by progres
sive modifications, physically caused and
inherited, I adopted the last supposition
inadequate as was the evidence, anc
great as were the difficulties in the way.
Its congruity with the course of pro
cedure throughout things at large gave
it an irresistible attraction
; and my
belief in it never afterwards wavered,
much as I was in after years ridiculed for
entertaining it. The incident,&quot; Spencer
adds, with his characteristic fondness for
interpreting individual case in the light
of comprehensive principle, &quot;illustrates
the general truth that the acceptance of
this or that particular belief is in part a
question of the type of mind.&quot;
By reference to the same consideration
we may doubtless explain the further
fact that, with the maturing and consoli
dation of his thought about this time,
there went the gradual dropping of the
current creed. The whole case on this
head has probably been summed up
when we say that the miraculous element
upon which that creed then laid the
principal stress was fatally out of keeping
with the entire character of his mind.
There are many men (and, owing to what
Mr. Lecky called the &quot;declining sense of
the miraculous,&quot; their number is daily
growing greater) to whom the so-called
supernatural basis of all popular theo
logies is just as immediately repugnant
as it was immediately attractive to even
the most acute and thoughtful minds
during the ages of faith. Where they
naturally and instinctively sought a
metaphysical interpretation for all pheno
mena, we just as naturally and instinc
tively recoil from such an interpretation.
By the operation, generation after gene
ration, of a thousand subtle influences
the whole atmosphere of life has been
altered ; the measures of judgment and
the standards of probability have alike
been changed ; and the result is that the
supernaturalism which held sway in the
past is rapidly dying, not under stress of
argument, but simply from inanition;
not because it has been disproved, but
because the thoughts of men have passed
on whither it cannot follow. Without,
therefore, attempting to settle the whole
question of miracles on purely d priori
grounds than which no course could well
be more unsatisfactory many a man
Dorn and nurtured in the secular and
sceptical environment of the present day
necessarily finds that question resolve
tself into one of relative antecedent
probability, as between two possible ex
planations a temporary aberration from
hat which verified experience has
evealed to us as the undeviating course
of nature, and an error in human testi
mony or interpretation ; and since, first,
we do not personally know anything of
lat disturbance in the normal order of
hings which is called mira^
1 -
and,
econdly, the constant tendency of alli8 HERBERT SPENCER: A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
historic and scientific interpretation is t
bring every such supposed disturbanc
into the category of law ; while, on th
other hand, every passing day yield
abundant examples of the untrustworthy
character of even the best-intentionec
and most carefully-styled evidence ; it i
clear that the balance of probability mus
in every case be as infinity to one agains
the alleged miracle.
I am not, let me insist, undertaking
to support the popular thesis that




established course of nature,&quot; or, more
correctly, one not to be accounted fo
by our limited knowledge of that course
could not conceivably happen, anc
therefore never has happened. As Pro
fessor Huxley once pointed out, such a
proposition, however attractive it might
have looked in the days of Hume, would
not now commend itself to any mine
trained in scientific methods of investi
gation. What I do maintain is that, in
any circumstances, the occurrence of a
miracle, and still more, therefore, of a
long series of miracles, must be held as
antecedently so improbable that the
fullest, clearest, and most unmistakeably
detailed evidence must be required in its
favour to counterbalance the enormous
presumption against it furnished by the
generalised experiences of mankind.
The question, therefore, assumes the
form as to whether, from the very nature
of the case, such evidence is or can be
forthcoming in regard to any miracle
alleged to have been performed under
such conditions as those existing, for
instance, in the early days of Christianity.
Here the principle of relative probability
must be allowed its fullest weight ; and
the greater the antecedent improbability,
the stronger must be the argument
advanced to overthrow it. A body of
evidence which might suffice to convince
us that a sick man made a most
astonishing recovery from an illness
need not, therefore, be held to justify
a belief that a dead man was raised from
the grave.
But to return to the attitude which
Spencer, about this time it would seem,
took up towards the orthodox creed.
That attitude was simply the result of a
gradual development of thought, the
religious ideas in which he had been
bred slowly and almost insensibly losing
their hold upon him. He never passed
the current theology under systematic
examination
; never undertook any
regular inquiry into the evidence for and
against it; never formally rejected it.
To his nature, emotional and intellectual,
it had been alien from the very first.
1
It had never become absorbed into his
thought, because there was nothing in
his mental constitution with which it
could cohere, no place in which it would
fit without upsetting and destroying the
whole system of his belief. Thus, with
the consolidation of such belief, it was
merely dropped.
But Spencer, during this period of
practical failure and rapid mental expan
sion, had done more than by study and
thought to lay up a store of material for
future use. He had delivered himself
of his first message to the world. At
twenty we find him writing, with all a
youth s engaging self-confidence, of his
desire
&quot; to make public some of my
deas upon the state of the world and
eligion, together with a few remarks on
education.&quot; Two years later in the
ummer of 1842 he began the publica-
ion, in a paper called the Nonconformist^
1
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of a series of letters on
&quot; The Proper
Sphere of Government.&quot; These were
subsequently revised, and made their
appearance in pamphlet form in the
course of the following year. Merely
noting that, in this first discussion of a
question on which he was to have so
much to say by-and-bye, Spencer already
insists on
&quot; the limitation of State action
to the maintenance of equitable relations
among citizens,&quot; we will postpone to
another chapter any discussion of the
relations of this little work to the order
of the writer s thought. Here our con
cern is only with its place in his life ;
and in this respect it has its importance.
Teaching had been abandoned for civil
engineering, and this in its turn had
abandoned him; and the outlook, in
consequence, seemed gloomy enough.
But one thing his little adventure into
the world of literature had done for him
it had suggested the possibility, now
that other careers had failed and the
question of what to do next had become
an urgent one, of turning his pen to
account. Some five years after the pub
lication of the
&quot;
Letters,&quot; he paid a visit
to London, partly on business connected
with financial losses sustained by his
uncle Thomas, but chiefly with the view
of looking about for something to do ;
and out of this ultimately came the
opportunity of a fresh start in life. At
the end of 1848 he was appointed sub
editor of the Economist, and imme
diately established himself in the metro
polis. The position, which he held till
1853, was by no means an ideal one for
him
; but it possessed two considerable
advantages. It yielded a regular income,
which, though small, was sufficient to
meet his modest bachelor needs ; and it
allowed him a rather unusual margin of
leisure for private study and work.
IV.
It was during such leisure hours, in
the course of the next two years, that
Spencer wrote his first important work,
Social Statics : The Conditions Essential
to Human Happiness Specified, and the
First of them Developed. Published in
1850, when he was just thirty, this
volume contained an extremely fresh
and original treatment of social pro
blems upon the fundamental principle
that
&quot;
Every man is free to do whatso
ever he wills, provided he does not
infringe the equal freedom of any other
man
&quot;; was startling enough in many of
the inferences drawn from this principle ;
and, as will be gleaned, pronouncedly
individualistic in its whole tone and
tendency; but, as is sufficiently well
known, Spencer afterwards grew dis
satisfied both with its metaphysical impli
cations, and with some of its conclusions,
and at one time made an effort to with
draw it from circulation. At the period
of publication, however, it aroused some
little interest, and, while of course never
appealing to a very wide circle of readers,
was on the whole well received by the
critics more favourably, indeed, than
any of his later books ; a fact which he
notes as illustrative of the worthlessness of
ordinary criticism.
1 That which it did for
him personally was to bring him rather
prominently into public notice, and to
introduce him, as a rising author, to the
literary and scientific world of the time.
It was then that he formed his intimate
friendship with the Brays and the
Hennells, of Coventry ; with the versa
tile George Henry Lewes, currently
known as the ugliest man and the best
talker in London; and with that wonderful
1
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woman who was then sub-editing the
Westminster Review, and had obtained a
certain standing as
&quot; the translatress of
Strauss,&quot; but who was a few years later
to take England by storm with the
Scenes of Clerical Life and Adam Bede.
When, in September, 1851, George
Eliot wrote to Mr. Bray that she had
recently met &quot;a Mr. Herbert Spencer,
who has just brought out a large work
on Social Statics, which Lewes pro
nounces the best he has ever seen on
the subject,&quot; she described the begin
ning of an association, full of mutual
reverence and esteem, which was to
last till death ended it by the removal of
the great novelist herself. More than
this, however : Social Statics gave
Spencer himself a practical and unmis-
takeable revelation of his own powers,
and pointed out to him more clearly
than anything had done before the lines
which his subsequent reading and think
ing might most profitably pursue. It is
surprising, therefore, to learn that, not
withstanding the success he had won,
his misgivings concerning the future
continued to be so great that he still
more or less seriously entertained the
idea of emigrating to New Zealand. His
method of dealing with this project was
highly characteristic. &quot;Averse to un-
methodic ways of judging,&quot; he drew up
&quot;a rough numerical valuation of the
several ends in life which might be
respectively better achieved, these by
staying at home, and those by emigra
ting &quot;; and then,
&quot;
adding up the
numbers on each side,&quot; arrived at totals
which he regarded as yielding
&quot; more
trustworthy ideas of the relative advan
tages than mere unaided contemplation.&quot;
The result came out in a way to set all
doubts at rest advantages on the side
of England, no
; on the side of New
Zealand, 301
I
1 We all know what
happens when we undertake to decide
upon a course of action by tossing a
penny ; and Spencer, fortunately for the
world, disregarded his unimpeachable
calculation and stayed at home.
The most practical result of Social
Statics was the connection which through
it he now formed with the Westminster
Review, a magazine of many years
standing, then recently purchased and
established on a new basis for the pro
mulgation of advanced views of social,
scientific, and religious questions, by an
enterprising publisher named John Chap
man. It was in the pages of this review
that he began the publication of those
elaborate essays which, though now
mainly interesting as auxiliary to his
great work, and as marking out the lines
of his approach to and preparation for it,
were enough at the time to call attention
to the rise of a new force in the philo
sophic world. Here, as we have to deal
with these essays from the outside only
as events in the man s life it will be
sufficient if we say of them that their
success enabled him after a while to
drift out of the semi-journalistic and
routine work in which he had been en
gaged on the Economist, and to devote
his whole time and energy to what was
now beginning slowly to assume the
character of a chosen undertaking.
For some seven years after this, with
an interval of eighteen months of enforced
idleness of which more anon he con
tinued to be pretty regularly engaged
with magazine work of this kind, anil,
in addition, produced, in 1855, a bulky
volume on psychology, afterwards incor
porated into his more extended treatise
on the same subject in the Synthetic
1
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System. In this work the problems of
mind were throughout approached and
discussed from the evolutionary point of
view, which was, indeed, the point of
view from which, as the essays show us,
every question, of whatever class, was
now regarded. All this kept him busy
till 1860. But in the meantime a change,
destined to be fraught with results of a
permanently disastrous character, had
come into his life. Overwork upon the
Psychology had brought on a nervous
breakdown so serious that, for fully a
year and a half, he was forced to lay
aside the pen and suspend his labours
altogether. Partial restoration followed
this prolonged rest; but it was partial
restoration only. From that time onward
to the end he was a martyr to dyspepsia
and insomnia, and to the hypochondria
which was the distressing, though quite
natural, result of a shattered nervous
system.
The year 1860, to the verge of which
we have now followed him, marks the
great crisis in Spencer s life ; and, beyond
this, is for ever memorable in the history
of modern thought, for it was this year
which witnessed the publication of the
prospectus of his philosophic system.
In the light of this new and enormous
enterprise, on the threshold of which
he now stood, all his previous output,
remarkable as in itself that had been,
dwindles to the proportions of mere
experiment and preparation. The time
had now come for achievement. A
full outline-plan of the proposed work
was given to the public, and Spencer
laid his hand to a task which he knew
would mean the production of ten stout
volumes, close-packed with thought, and
of no very saleable character, and which
he calculated would occupy twenty years
of regular and unremitting toil.
Let us turn for a moment to his
circumstances and general outlook at
the time, that we may be in a position
the more fully to appreciate all that was
implied by self-committal to such an
undertaking. Marvellous in itself, that
undertaking grows still more marvellous
when we come to realise the conditions
of its inception and execution. In the
first place, Spencer s financial prospects
were not in any way satisfactory.
Possessed at the outset of but small
personal resources, he had frittered away
the greater part of these in devotion to
studies which had brought him but
little practical recompense. He had,
indeed, derived something of an income
from his pen; but his articles had
demanded too much thought and labour
to make their production remunerative.
A small sum ofmoneywhich had been left
him by his uncle, the clergyman, now dead,
had been wholly or largely swallowed up
by the publication of two volumes which
had so little to commend them in the
popular market that their value as an
investment had been worse than nothing
at all
; while a further drain of no incon
siderable kind had been made upon his
purse by eighteen months of idleness,
and all the added expenses consequent
upon deranged health. Beyond, and
worse than all this, there was the fact
that his breakdown had left him in so
impaired a condition that three hours a
day was all that he could safely rely
upon for the carrying forward of his
work. Finally, as a commercial enter
prise, the proposed undertaking offered
nothing of an encouraging character.
Few enough could, in the very nature
of things, be induced to lend it their
support, for the public to which appeal was
to be made was necessarily very limited
;
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partial interest or half-aroused sympathy,
there were many who deprecated the
self-imposed task as too vast, compre
hensive, and ambitious for adequate
accomplishment within the limits of a
single life, and as even foolhardy in the
uncertain state of his health. Such
obstacles might well have proved enough
to deter the most courageous and
indomitable of men, and one cannot be
astonished that, when at length the con
cluding division of his vast scheme was
reached, Spencer himself, looking back
over his six-and-thirty years of toil,
should have been surprised at his
&quot;audacity in undertaking it, and still
more surprised by its completion.&quot;
1
Whatever may be said about the
Synthetic Philosophy as a coherent body
of doctrine, however much we may
individually disagree with its central
principles and their application in his
hands to the solution of the fundamental
problems of life, there is thus a personal
grandeur about the gigantic work upon
which it is a pleasure and an inspiration
to dwell. As a monument of quiet
courage and perseverance, of self-sacrifice
and entire consecration to the pursuit of
a great ideal, it stands almost without
rival in the history of the world s grandest
achievements. Spencer s place is for all
time among those heroes of moral effort,
struggle, and conquest whose memory
more and more, it is to be hoped, men
will delight to honour.
V.
From this time on the history of the
man is, for the outside world, practi
cally merged in the history of his work ;
the dates of importance are those of the
publication of the various instalments of
1 Preface to The Principles ofSociology, vol. iii.
the projected series ; all else in his life
assumes something of an episodical
character. He had estimated, as I have
said, that, allowing two years for each
volume, the completion of his system
would take twenty years. Reckoning
from the issue of the first part of First
Principles, in October, 1860, to that of
the last division of the Sociology in the
autumn of 1896, it actually occupied just
thirty-six years. Difficulties of many
kinds he had anticipated at the outset ;
but the event proved that he had not
made sufficient allowance for them. For
a time the practical support yielded to
him by the reading public was so small
that he came within measurable distance
of abandoning his labours altogether ; a
course he would almost certainly have
taken had not the sudden death of his
father added something unexpectedly to
his means. After this interruptions
occurred with increasing frequency in
various unlooked-for ways. He was
forced to pause in the methodical unfold
ing of his plan to explain, re-state, clear
up misconceptions, and unfortunately
1
It is a pleasure to recall the service rendered
and the sympathy shown at this period of dis
couragement by friends and well-wishers. On
the other side of the Atlantic, Professor Youmans,
one of his most devoted adherents, succeeded in
raising among Spencer s admirers a sum of
$7,000, which was invested in his name in
American securities ; and brought to England,
together with the certificates of the shares, a
gold watch, which he presented to him as a
tribute of their gratitude and admiration. The
money Spencer accepted as a public trust to be
applied to the purposes of the Descriptive
Sociology ; the watch he valued to the end as
one of his most cherished possessions. At
home, John Stuart Mill, with rare public spirit
and generosity, offered to assume the financial
responsibility of the undertaking by guarantee
ing the publishers against loss a proposal which
Spencer could not indeed entertain, but which
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(for in this always distracting and gene
rally unprofitable way he consumed much
valuable time) to reply to adverse criti
cisms. His energies were drawn off into
other, though in most cases directly sub
sidiary, lines of work. The supervision
of the compilation of the Descriptive





Series&quot; of his book on The Study of
Sociology; the publication of a number
of timely essays (such as those composing
The Man versus the State), rendered
necessary, as he felt very strongly, by the
political conditions and tendencies of the
hour; all these things valuable as in
themselves they were delayed the pro
secution of the larger design. And,
worse than all, his physical powers, as
years went on, continued steadily to
decline. His calculation of a working
day of three hours, moderate as to most
men this would have seemed, presently
turned out to be altogether extravagant.
Only by the most careful husbanding of
his energies was sustained labour pos
sible to him at all. During the later
years of his work absolute inaction was
often forced upon him as the sole means
of recuperating his over-taxed strength ;
while through many a prolonged period
of sleeplessness and utter prostration the
dictation of a paragraph or two each
morning represented the extreme reach
of his productive capacity. That in such
circumstances the Synthetic Philosophy
with its grand total of 6,000 closely-
printed pages should ever have been
pushed to completion must be regarded
as a fact not easily paralleled in the
history of philosophy or letters.
During these years his outer life was
quiet and uneventful. Never married,
and, after the death of his mother in
1867, without near relatives, he lived till
1886 in boarding-houses in London,
thus, under medical advice, escaping the
evils of a solitary domestic existence.
His home for nearly a quarter of a cen
tury was at 37 and 38, Queen s Gardens,
Lancaster Gate, where I myself first knew
him
; though at the same time he had,
at 2, Leinster Place, near by, an inde
pendent room, which he used as a library
and study. It was there that, during the
first year of my secretarial association
with him, most of his work was done ;
his habit being to walk over about
half-past nine, dictate as long as he felt
able in order to economise his strength,
he had made it a practice to dictate
everything, even his letters and then
leave for the day. At that period he
spent several hours of the afternoon and
evening pretty regularly at the Athe
naeum Club, returning to Queen s Gar
dens, however, in time to listen to some
music, of which he was always extremely
fond, and in which he found his princi
pal solace as increasing ill-health made
other distractions impossible. Into
general society he never went much, and
less and less as years passed on; his
abstention being prompted, not by any
natural fondness for seclusion, but by the
nervous evils often real, sometimes
imaginary which social excitement
entailed, and the consequent interrup
tion of his work. Of external events,
during this long period, the most impor
tant was his visit to the United States in
1882.
In the summer of 1886 he went for a
long visit to Brighton (always a favourite
place of resort with him), and, after
various experiments (including a home
of his own in London), finally took a
house there on the East Cliff, facing the
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sea,
&quot; with the intention,&quot; as he wrote
me at the time, &quot;of living here for the
rest of my
life.&quot; This intention was
fulfilled. Little by little he lapsed into
complete invalidism, and, with the com
pletion of the work for which he had
practically lived, ceased to have much
desire for the continuance of an existence
the great purpose of which was accom
plished, and which now was year by
year becoming an increasing burden.
Yet the end, to which he had long
calmly looked forward, came very slowly;
for, despite his half a century of nervous
trouble, his constitution was still marked
by wonderful resisting power. When it
did come it was very peaceful. During
the afternoon of December 7th, 1903,
he fell gradually into unconsciousness,
and so passed quietly away in the early
morning of the following day.
In accordance with his directions, his
remains were cremated at Golder s
Hill Crematorium, where Mr. Leonard
Courtney delivered a brief but impres
sive address. As my friend, Mr. Hector
Macpherson, and I walked away together
afterwards, with the last words of the
orator s tender farewell lingering in our
ears, that sense of the utter indifference
of cosmic things to our human losses
and sorrows, which seldom fails to affect
one at such a time, came upon us with
singular force. The sun was shining
brightly over the placid winter land
scape ; the air was crisp and clear.
&quot;Nothing in Nature s aspect intimated
That a great man was dead !
&quot;
The last time I saw Spencer was in
his bedroom at Brighton, and amid the
details of our conversation, every one of
which is naturally fresh in my memory,
there is one that I specially recall. Just
back from America, I told him of the
deep interest I found everywhere taken
there in his work, and spoke of the
immense range of his influence upon the
world s thought.
1 His reply was :
&quot; I
am satisfied ; I am satisfied !
&quot; Yet his
satisfaction was offset by disappointment.
The completion of his Philosophy had
been so long delayed that it brought
him but little of the exhilaration that
might have been anticipated ; his chief
pleasure was in the simple sense of
emancipation from long-continued toil.
2
And worse than weariness and this
apathy of disillusion was the realisation
of the fact that precisely that part of his
gospel upon which he himself set the
greatest value had apparently been
preached in vain. His practical teach
ings on one important matter were com
monly unheeded, even where they were
not openly flouted ; the socialism which
he had made it one of his chief purposes
to resist was, in spite of all his efforts,
yearly gaining ground; signs of reaction
were everywhere manifest in religion,
politics, and society ; militarism and
imperialism were rampant ; and the
great nations of the world, dominated by
1 No other philosophic works have, I suppose,
been translated into so many languages as his.
Versions of at any rate a great part of the
Synthetic Philosophy exist in French, German,
Italian, and Russian. But of all his writings,
the book on education has apparently been
most widely influential. It has appeared in
among other tongues modern Greek, Sanskrit,
and Arabic ; and education in Mexico and the
South American States has been greatly
moulded by it. In 1901 Spencer wrote me that
he had learned some time before this from the
Chinese Ambassador that two translations of his
writings were in progress in China one into
the Northern and the other into the Southern
dialect. I once saw it stated, on the authority
of a missionary, that the influence of the Spen-
cerian philosophy was the chief obstacle to the
spread of evangelical Christianity among the
cultured classes of Japan.
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a sordid ;ind materialistic spirit, were
moving further and further away from
what he had always proclaimed to be
the true principles of sanity and
righteousness. All these things filled
him with sorrow and alarm. In earlier
life he would doubtless have found en
couragement in the thought that,
deplorable as such reactionary tenden
cies are, they will not permanently inter
rupt the world s true progress. But it is
hard for a man of eighty to derive much
comfort from reading &quot;what the cen
turies say against the hours.&quot;
VI.
Spencer s was a simple and trans
parent nature, and the salient features
of his character may be easily marked
out.
A man of absolute independence of
thought and judgment, and defiant of
authority and tradition in every form,
he was a born nonconformist in the
extremes! sense of the word. A maker
of many books, yet in no sense a book
man, with a range of knowledge often
described as encyclopedic, yet always
impatient as a reader even on subjects
directly connected with his own lines of
work
; he cared little too little, as he
afterwards came to acknowledge
1 for
what others had thought and done
; and,
heedless of great names and established
doctrines, pushed his own way resolutely
along the paths of investigation in which
he is now recognised to have been a
pioneer. This trait was associated on
the moral side with splendid fearlessness
and courage. Throughout life he spoke
out what he thought without calculation
of consequences. He never once
paused to consider the expediency of
1
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any view ; he readily espoused the most
unpopular causes
; was wholly indifferent
to the obloquy called forth by his
heretical opinions of men and things ;
held tenaciously to what he believed to
be true and right ; and did not flinch
even if, as a result, he found himself in
a minority of one.
His fertility of mind was as astonishing
as his independence. This is shown by
almost every page of his Synthetic
Philosophy^ but remains equally clear
if we leave that work entirely out of
consideration. For, in all sorts of matters
lying wholly outside the range of his
more special interests, his originality
and inventiveness were constantly
revealed. We have seen how, as a
boy, he made his own solutions of
problems in geometry. In early life he
devised all kinds of contrivances for all
kinds of purposes for rationalising
writing, for example, for a philosophic
language ; for a new nomenclature of
colours, based on the plan of the
mariner s compass; and the list of his
inventions which includes a scheme for
aerial locomotion, a binding pin for loose
music, a fishing-rod joint, an invalid
bed, a new escapement for watches, and
improvements in planing machinery,
in dressing artificial flies, and in the
printing press is too long to be repro




of enormous power, which worked




imagination&quot; the Synthetic Philosophy
is merely the greatest product.
In personal life Spencer impressed
most people who met him but casually
as rather cold, remote, and difficult of
access ; and it was only as one came to
know him well that one succeeded in26 HERBERT SPENCER: A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
breaking through his reserve, and came
to see and appreciate the more sympa
thetic aspects of his character. He
was never, indeed, very easy to get on
with. What he himself calls his
&quot; abnormal tendency to criticism
&quot; was
too much in the ascendant ; sleepless
ness and nervous dyspepsia, with the
hypochondria which these engendered,
made him occasionally irritable and
sharp of tongue ; and, having little
tolerance for the prejudices and conven
tions of everyday life, he often seemed
harsh in his judgments, and some
times even needlessly censorious. More
over, his emotional nature was kept
under undue restraint by an intellect
which sat in perpetual judgment upon
it ; the free play of feeling was repressed ;
and a certain consequent dryness and
want of flexibility made one regret that
among the sacrifices forced upon him
by his life-work was that of those
normal human relationships and respon
sibilities which would have done much
to expand his feelings and give warmth
and colour to the daily routine. But
these limitations must never be allowed
to blind us to his splendid positive
qualities. His uprightness, purity, and
scrupulous honesty, even in the pettiest
details, his conscientiousness, integrity,
and single-hearted devotion to truth,
filled all who knew him with admira
tion ; and it is hardly too much to say
that his moral greatness did not fall
short of his intellectual greatness.
Justice, as I have often said elsewhere,
and as Spencer himself declares in the
Autobiography^ was the predominant
sentiment with him, as it is the pre
dominant note of his ethical system ;
and if in his strict adherence to this
supreme principle he might sometimes
have seemed exacting in the demands
which he made upon others, it has
always to be remembered that, unlike
many professed teachers, he did not
lower his standards when he came to
apply them to himself. In our study of
the writings of any great master it is
always a satisfaction to feel assured that
he strove, consistently and courageously,
to live by his own creed. This was
emphatically the case with Herbert
Spencer.
1
1 For a more detailed account of Spencer s
personality and character I may refer the reader
to two articles of my own
&quot; Herbert Spencer
:
A Character Study&quot; (Fortnightly Review,
January, 1904), and
&quot; Herbert Spencer s Auto
biography&quot; (Independent Review, July, 1904).SPENCER S EARLIER WORK
CHAPTER II.
SPENCER S EARLIER WORK PREPARATION FOR
THE SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY-SPENCER AND
THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION
THERE is no safer or more satisfactor
approach to the study of any system o
philosophy than by way of its evolution
If we want to put ourselves into a posi
tion to understand the attitude taken up
by any great thinker towards the world
and its problems if we want to catch
the personal note in his utterances, and
to appreciate the relation of his own
ideas to the intellectual movements of
his time we cannot do better than to
make ourselves acquainted with the
history of the development and con
solidation of the great foundation prin
ciples of his thought. The general
question, What was the nature of his
teaching? may thus properly be pre
ceded by one still more general, How
came it to be what it was ? To con
sider this latter question in relation to
the System of Synthetic Philosophy is
the purpose of the present chapter ; in
fulfilling which we shall not only lead
up, by a kind of easy gradation, to that
system itself, but shall also be able to
reach some definite conclusions respect
ing Spencer s historic connection with
the modern doctrine of evolution at
large a matter, as we shall see, of no
small interest and importance.
I.
In the first place, then, we have to
review the growth and solidification of
Spencer s thought or, in other words,
to trace the growth, as exhibited in
his earlier writings, of that concep
tion of evolution which was to constitute
the foundation and backbone of the
Synthetic Philosophy. Let us begin &quot;by
making ourselves acquainted with the
starting-point of his mental development
that is, with the general theory of things
which was current during his early years,
and under the influence of which, in
common with all his contemporaries, he
grew to maturity.
JThe^period of Spencer s youth and
ripening manhood was a period of transi
tion in scientific and philosophic thought.
On the ushering in of the century the
old cosmology still held sway with
unabated vigour, along with all those
time-worn dogmas concerning human
life and destiny which had grown up
with it during ages of ignorance and
superstition, and with which its own
existence was now inextricably bound
up. What that cosmology and what
those dogmas meant is a matter of such
common history that we need not linger
over them here. Suffice it to say that
the almost unquestioned doctrines of
ipecial creation, fixed types, and a
recent origin of the universe lay at the
bottom of them all, and that it was in
he light of those doctrines that the world,
nan, and society were all interpreted.28 SPENCER S EARLIER WORK
But before the century had got far
upon its way signs began to manifest
themselves of an approaching change in
the higher regions of thought. The
special-creation hypothesis sad the
postulate of the world s recent origi
and rapid manufacture had served wel
enough so long as their field had
remained uninvaded by the results o
investigation so long as they had no
been confronted with definite facts. In
perfect keeping with what little had been
known of the universe in the darknes
of the Middle Ages, they now required
that nothing should be added to tha
knowledge to hold their place secure
But this could no longer be. The time
came when investigation grew active, anc
definite facts, which could not be
ignored, and which yet were irreverent
enough to refuse to fit into the most
sacred and deeply-cherished theories,
began to accumulate with almost bewil
dering rapidity. The result was that the
old conception of things began, little by
little, to fall into disrepute, and the theo
logical edifice of ages was shaken at its
very foundations. Science showed, with
a conclusiveness which remained un
touched by all the special pleading with
which her arguments and revelations were
assailed, that the popular assumptions
about the age of the world were abso
lutely untenable; that the commence
ment of life, and even of human life,
upon our globe, so far from taking us
back only a few paltry thousands of years,
lay millions of ages behind us
; and that
such vague memorials of our race as
have survived to us in sacred book and
popular legend are as nothing compared
with that tremendous mass of human
experiences which will never find their
historian. Worse than all, turning full
upon the doctrine of special manufac
ture, she opened up the grand geologic
record, and read thence, as from the
pages of a mighty volume, the long,
stupendous story of those vast cosmic
changes which, through aeons of un-
reckoned time, have slowly moulded and
fashioned the world into the condition
in which we find it to-day.
That these revelations were of the
most vital interest to all thinking men
need hardly be said ; nor is it necessary
now to dwell on the feverish panic of
the theologians, who hurried into the
field with all their heavy artillery, promi
nent amid which was the great-gun argu
ment, which had already done tremen
dous service on many another such
occasion, that the very existence of
Christianity was bound up with the story
of the creation as narrated in the first
chapters of the Hebrew Scriptures.
1
What is here of moment is to notice the
general effect of the new discoveries
upon the scientific mind. That effect
was at the outset almost entirely nega
tive. The old theories had been des
troyed, but as yet there was nothing to
take their place ; the theological inter
pretation of the world s history was seen
to be absurdly insufficient and unreason
able, but for the time being no scientific
1 How fierce and obstinate was the opposition
offered to the doctrine of evolution from this
tandpoint we of the present day find it no easy
matter to imagine. Even such a man as Hugh
Miller imported theological considerations into his
cientific discussions, and, when other reasoning
ailed him, fell back upon the declaration that
cceptance of evolution meant nullification of
the central truths of Christianity. It has been
reserved for a later generation, passing into a
fresh phase in the history of evolutionary thought,
to find out that there is, after all, no conflict
between the old ideas and the new a conve
nient discovery now that the new ideas can no
longer be rejected.SPENCER S EARLIER WORK
interpretation to take its place appeared
to be forthcoming. Hence followed a
kind of intellectual interregnum, during
which everything was vague, shifting,
tentative. Meanwhile, however, things
were by no means standing still. The
unceasing activity of investigators in
the special sciences resulted in vast
accumulations of well-established facts,
and thus yielded the materials in the
absence of which nothing of real or
permanent value could have been accom
plished. And at the same time (largely,
indeed, as a consequence of this extension
upon all sides of the scientific domain)
there was ever growing and deepening
a conception of unbroken causation in
cosmic changes, of the universality of
law, and the unity of Nature and of
natural processes a conception in no
small degree led up to by such discoveries
as those of the undulatory theory of light
and heat, and of the correlation of all
the forces known to exact science.
1
Thus, in spite of the temporary suspense
and hesitation, no time was being lost.
As we can now see, the way was being
slowly prepared for a great scientific
generalisation a generalisation which,
1 This tendency towards unification was,
indeed, an outgrowth from the philosophy of the
eighteenth century, and was at bottom merely one expression of that general simplification of
life and thought which, as Mr. Morley has
pointed out,
&quot; was the keynote of the revolu
tionary time.&quot; (See his Kousseau, vol. i., pp
.
4, 5 ; and Introduction to the Poetical Works of
Wordsworth, p. Ixi.) It was the widespread
desire for synthesis, indeed, which gave rise to
the systematic work of Buffon and Linnteus, and
even to the great Encyclopedia itself. It is
interesting to notice what Goldsmith, voicing
the average conservative layman s opinion of his
day, has to say about Montesquieu, one of the
early leaders of this particular movement in
speculation (Inquiry into the Present State of
Polite Learning, chapter vi. ).
overthrowing all the old positions once
and for all, was in the sequel to alter
fundamentally the whole current of
thought, as regards not only the outer
organic world and its phenomena, but
also the practical problems of life and
society, of morality and religion.
II.
Such, in the briefest possible summary,
was the general intellectual character of
the period at which Spencer was pre
paring himself for the labours of his life.
Even this sketch, imperfect as it neces
sarily is, will help us to understand the
growth of his own ideas, and their rela
tion to the changing thought of the
day.
We have to go back to the year 1842,
and to the series of letters on The Proper
Sphere of Government^ with which, then
hardly more than a boy, he entered,
as we have seen, upon his literary
career.
With the pronounced individualism of
this little work, which was doubtless the
natural result of his home environment,
though he may have owed something
indirectly to the teachings of Humboldt,
we have here no immediate concern.
The pamphlet is significant for us from
quite another point of view. In the
attempt which is made in it to establish
the nature, scope, and limits that is, the
fundamental principles of civil govern
ment, there is everywhere implied a
belief in the ultimate dependence of
social organisation upon natural causes
and natural laws. In other words, society
is from first to last regarded not as a
manufacture, but as a growth a view
which, though familiar enough in our
own day, at all events in its theoretic
aspects, was then little known, even as a
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the entire argument there run the concep
tions of gradual changes naturally neces
sitated, and of the possibility of a better
and better adjustment of man, physically,
intellectually, and morally, to the needs
imposed by the conditions of social life.
As Spencer himself wrote, many years
later, &quot;In these letters will be found,
along with many crude ideas,&quot; a
&quot; belief
in the conformity of social phenomena to
invariable laws,&quot; and &quot;in human pro
gression as determined by such laws.&quot;
1
All this revealed, even at so early a stage
of mental growth, a well-defined tendency
to regard the complicated and entangled
phenomena of society from a strictly
scientific point of view as phenomena
exhibiting relations of cause and effect,
and thus to be included in the realm of
natural law. But it meant something
more than this. The distinct and con
scious acceptance of the doctrine that
society is a thing not artificially pieced
together, but of slow and natural growth,
implied dissatisfaction with the current
ideas of progress as an irregular and
fortuitous process, and bore testimony to
at least a vague germinal belief in a social
development or evolution.
The questions thus raised and briefly
dealt with came in for more thorough
and extended treatment a few years
later in Spencer s first considerable work,
Social Statics. The conception of this
volume had entered his mind not long
after the appearance of the Letters in
pamphlet form ; for, owing to the rapid
growth of his ideas, he soon became aware
of the inadequacy of his handling of the
vast problems there opened up.
&quot; The
writing of Social Statics&quot; he afterwards
said, &quot;arose from a dissatisfaction with the
1 Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy
of M. Comte (Essays, ii., 137, note).
basis on which the doctrines set forth in
these letters were placed.&quot;
1 Even the
briefest comparison of the two books is
sufficient to show the enormous strides
which his mind had taken during the
seven critical years which divide them.
In Social Statics almost everything is
made to turn upon the doctrine pre
viously hardly more than hinted at
that from the very beginning of social
life down to the present time there has
been going on, and that still there is
going on, a process of slow, but none
the less certain, adjustment of the natures
of men to society, and of the social
organisation to the natures of its con
stituent units; this adjustment being
the result of a perpetual interaction
between units and aggregate which ever
tends to bring them into more perfect
adaptation the one to the other. Such
adaptation, it is further contended, is
produced by the direct action of circum
stances upon the natures of men, and
by the preservation and accumulation
by inheritance from generation to genera
tion of the modifications thus initiated ;
though another process comes in for
passing recognition the process of the
dying out of those individuals who fail
to adapt themselves to the changing
conditions of their environment
; which
process may be conversely stated as the
survival of those only who so far change
as to fit themselves to the necessities
imposed upon them by the totality of
their surroundings. Here, it will be
seen, is a faint and partial adumbration
of the doctrine of the survival of the
fittest in the struggle for existence.
Moreover, another important point is
emphasised that all our social evils
1 Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy
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.id imperfections are due to want of
complete adjustment between men and
the conditions of social life are, indeed,
nothing more than the temporary jarrings
and wrenchings of a machine the parts
of which are not yet brought into
thorough working order. Yet, as the
process of adaptation is still continuing,
and is in the nature of things tending
ever to produce between units and
aggregate a state of more perfect equi
librium, the inevitable if optimistic
corollary is, that the evil which we
deplore will in the end work itself out
altogether, and that eventually all fric
tion will entirely disappear
: a prophecy,
which seems to point to a realisation of
the gorgeous dreams of revolutionary
speculators like Condorcet and Godwin,
far as the arguments upon which it is
based differ from their own. ^Finally,
all these special changes in man and in
society are regarded as phases only of a
process of universal development or
unfolding, which is everywhere con
ducing, in obedience to an inherent
metaphysical tendency, to the produc
tion in man, as throughout the whole of
the animate creation, of more complete
individuation and higher and higher
types.
~~&quot;\Ve thus see that, unlike Darwin and
Wallace, Spencer approached the ques
tion of general evolution not from the
organic, but from the super-organic
point of view by the way of ethical
~ancT sociological investigations. His
first conception of development was in
the limited shape of progress of
development, that is, of man indi
vidually and in society ; though this
whole question pf progress was from the
outset regarded from the side of
natural law. But his was not the mind
to rest content with these vague and
partial glimpses of a stupendous truth.
Before long he began to work his way
round, through researches of quite a
different character, towards the affiliation
of these special and disjointed facts and
inferences upon other facts and infer
ences of wider sweep and meaning.
His labours upon Social Statics had
led him to a realisation of the important
truth that beneath all the much-debated
questions of morality and society lie
the fundamental facts of biology and
psychology ; and that any really scientific
or efficient treatment of man as a moral
being or social unit must depend upon
a thorough exploration of the problems
of life and mind. Full of these ideas,
he tunu-d with increased enthusiasm to
biological and psychological studies;
and to the prosecution of various lines
of research in connection with these two
subjects, a large part, though by no
means the whole, of his energies was for
some time devoted.
The ten years which followed the
years between 1850 and 1860 (it is well
to notice the dates, because, as we shall
presently see, they have their own im
portance) were years ogrejlactivity
an activity to be measured not so much
by their productiveness, though that
was sufficiently remarkable, as by the
amazing growth and organisation of
ideas which took place in them. During
this period some twenty-five exhaustive
articles from Spencer s pen were pub
lished in the leading organs of liberal
thought ; and in these articles, if we take
them in the order of their appearance,
we can trace a gradual closing in from
all sides upon the great generalisations
which were by-and-bye to fall into their
places as integral parts of a coherent
system of thought. As a matter of fact,
these years may be regarded, from the- P ^*TIONFORTHB SYNTHE7 _




aS years of sPecial and methodical
raimng; and these essays, diverse as
they are m form and matter, as separate and tentative contributions towards the
toeatjnent
of various isolated phenomena which were
ultimately to be taken up in their inter-relations and dealt with in the mass. It would be impossible here to
ubject these essays one by one to any thmghke close
analysis, even if it WoU fd
materially further our present purpose to do so.
Butafewwordsmustbedevoted
their general drift and character; and
should one or two of them be made tte
subjects of special mention, it will no be because these are to be considered e most significant in
themselves, but
simp y because they are the most inpor- ant for the object which at the monfem
-I have m view.
Probably the points which would most
strike anyone reading these essays for the first time would be their strong grasp upon deep-lying pr
inciples ^/^
rtraordmary originality. On every page
they reveal, be the subject what it may an astonishing independence of though and an absolute freedom from all trace of traditional methods and ideas It was this freshness of treatment and firm ness of touch which perhaps mo
attracted the attention of thought?u readers when they were first published-! for the most part anonymously-in the
pages of the various English maga^i ndre
But, turning back to&quot; the
day and
re-reading them in their mutual
relations, we must be impresse by something beyond the depth clear
ness, and vigour of mind to wLch they everywhere bear witness; and that some&quot;
2bt tn
CSSemial Unity f th-
ought, the oneness of idea which is
throughout seen to underlie and inform
are
the moot questions of physiology
nsvprir&amp;gt;l/-&amp;gt;rr., . J o]
Hogy; or with the intrir
ciples of a correct literarv fv i ^
changes of the s!d:7e7
; rWUh
1
&quot;&quot;timed and hasty poluic
*; or with curiosities of social
behaviour: all these si
systematically approached Irom on
point of view; all are made to cJe -bout and find interpretation in one dominant hypothesis. And what is this
j
.
t is this great cardinal
rine which is thus made to weld
together subjects so diverse that on
any merely superficial examination they would never be supposed to possess
anything m common? It need
&quot;hardly be sa,d that it is the doctrine of
development or evolution-a doctrine which manifests itself in every succeeding
essay with
continually increasing distinct
ness, and which is thus shown to be taklnl
year after year a stronger and stronger hold upon the author s mind and
-







the histoncal sketch prefiW to
.
&quot; Orw* of Species, as
presenting the
general argument for the developmental as
against the special-creation interpretation
rf the universe with remarkable cogency and skill. But, while reasons were here
Briefly
but clearly stated for a belief in
the gradual development of all organisms not excluding man, it must be remem
bered that the essay does not contain
any indication of factors adequate to the
production of the alleged effects. OnePREPARATION FOR THE SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY
process only is recognised that o
direct modification by the condition
of life ; and as with this process alone i
is obviously impossible to account for
all the facts of the organic world, the
way was left open for supporters of the
older doctrine to make good a temporary
escape.
But this noteworthy little paper, though
it contained a kind of systematised pro
fession of faith, was only, after all, a
starting-point for a long and thorough
investigation of various aspects of the
subject with which it was concerned.
Its leading ideas, as I have said, came
little by little to suffuse all his work, and
in the years that followed they underwent
consolidation and reached an expression
at once more definite and more complete. Was it a question of deducing a theory
of population from the general law of
animal fertility? Then we find distinct
recognition of an advance from lower
to higher brought about by excessive




slowly-increasing means of support.
Did the discussion turn upon the elabora
tion on a scientific basis of a true philo
sophy of style ? Then, along with the
application to the special phenomena of
expression of the general law of &quot;the
line of least
resistance,&quot; there is further
reached the generalisation set down as
applying to all products both of man
and of Nature of the two fundamental
processes of evolution, the process of
differentiation and the process of integra
tion; since it is shown that a highly-
ieveloped style will be not a series of
like parts simply placed in juxtaposition,
but one whole made up of unlike parts
that are mutually dependent.&quot; Are the
33
Philosophy ofStyle. First published in
the Westminster Review, October, 1852.
right and wrong objects and methods of
education brought up for consideration?
Then the answer given is firmly estab
lished upon the doctrine of a gradual
unfolding of the mental faculties in
obedience to natural law; such unfolding
taking the form of a double-sided change
from the simple to the complex, and
from the indefinite to the definite. So
is it with all other subjects whatsoever.
In the essay on Manners and Fashion,
for example, emphasis is laid upon the
truths that the various forms of restraint
exercised by society as an aggregate over
its individual members such restraints
being now clearly differentiated into
ecclesiastical, political, and ceremonial
are all natural developments from one
primordial form
; and that the divergence
of each from the others and of all from
such primordial form takes place &quot;in
conformity with the laws of evolution of
all organised bodies.&quot; And once again
a similar line of argument is followed in
he extremely suggestive articles on the
Genesis of Science and the Origin and
Function of Music. Finally, in the
elaborate essay on Progress: Its Law
and Cause, evolutionary principles are
enunciated with the utmost distinctness.
The law of progresses shown to consist
in the transformation of the homogeneous
into the heterogeneous (an imperfect
statement afterwards completed by the
addition of a factor for the time being
overlooked
1
); and this process is illus
trated by examples taken from all orders
of phenomena, while the cause of the
transformation is found in the law of
the multiplication of effects, afterwards
worked out fully in FirstPrJud^Us^J
1 This additional factor being, as we shall
presently see, increase in coherence. A change
must consist in increasing heterogeneity and
increasing coherence, to constitute evolution.
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In this essay, too, as in that on the
Development Hypothesis, the general law
of evolution is presented as holding
good in the production of species and
varieties, though here again direct
adaptation to the conditions of existence
is the only factor recognised as playing
a part in the stupendous drama of un
folding life.
III.
I have said enough, I think, to show
how active was the period with which we
have just been dealing active alike in
original production, in the absorption of
fresh material, and in the organisation
of new ideas. But these five-and-twenty
essays do not represent the whole of
Spencer s labours during this time. His
studies in psychology, of which the essays
ofThe UniversalPostulate(\^&amp;gt;^^) and The
Art of Education (1854) were the imme
diate results, took more systematic form
about the date of the publication of the
latter paper ; and in 1855 the first edition
of his Principles of Psychology made its
appearance. As this work was subse
quently included as a portion of the two
volumes on the Principles of Psychology
in the Synthetic System, any analysis of
its contents does not fall within the
scope of the present chapter. One
remark may, however, be appropriately
made ere we pass on. Ignoring for the
moment the immense developments of
psychology during the past half-century,
and taking the purely historic point of
view, it is well that we should remind our
selves how enormously this book was in
advance of the whole thought of the time
not the common thought only, but the
cultivated thought as well.
1 It was in the
1 How true this was may be strikingly shown
by a consideration of the attitude taken up
towards the evolutionary psychology by John
fullest sense of the term an epoch-making
book, because it placed the study of
mind upon an entirely new basis, and,
by applying to it that hypothesis of evo
lution which, for the time being, even
the biologists refused to accept, indi
cated a fresh method of inquiry which
in the long run has entirely revolutionised
the subject. Hitherto, mental philo
sophy had concerned itself only with the
facts of adult human consciousness.
Spencer, breaking away from all the
traditions of the schools, started out
on an original course of investigation,
in the wide sweep of which ha took
in not only the mental growth of chil
dren and savages, but also the pheno
mena of intelligence as displayed by
the whole range of the animate world
down to the lowest creatures. To
quote his own words,
&quot; Life in its multi
tudinous and infinitely varied embodi
ments has arisen out of the lowest and
Stuart Mill. The bias of this distinguished
thinker in favour of the experiential philosophy
was so strong that he hesitated to accept the
compromise which the developmental view
offered to effect between the special doctrines of
his own school of pure empiricism and those of
the intuitionists. Yet he came at length to
recognise how large a step
in advance tb,e evolu-
tibnists had really made. Dr. Carpenter, refer
ring to Mill s gradual change of front, quotes
from a letter addressed to him on the sub
ject by Mill himself, part of which runs as
follows: &quot;There is also considerable evidence
that such acquired facilities of passing into
certain modes of cerebral action can in many
cases be transmitted more or less completely by
inheritance. The limits of this transmission and
the conditions on which it depends are a subject
now fairly before the scientific world ; and we
shall doubtless in time know much more about
them than we do now. But so far as my imper
fect knowledge of the subject extends, I take
much the same view of it that you do, at least in
principle.&quot; (See Cm^cn\.ci\Pnncij&amp;gt;UsofMental
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simplest beginnings by steps as gradua
as those which evolved an homogeneous
germ into a complete organism.
Clearly, then, the whole conception of
the work is evolutionary. As Spencer
many years afterwards wrote of it, the
development hypothesis, though not dis
tinctly proclaimed till towards the close,
is tacitly implied on almost every page.
1
It is not, I think, needful to pause,
after even such a rapid summary of the
activities of these ten memorable years,
to say anything about the extraordinary
perversion of judgment which has led
critics from whom, having regard to their
position and general culture, something




to refer to their author as having
&quot; the
weakness of omniscience
&quot; and a desire
to discourse on all kinds of subjects. We
are now in a fair position to realise how
much, or rather how little, these curiosi
ties of oracular criticism are really worth.
So far from Spencer s various essay
during this decade being merely example
of journalistic versatility (as such esti
mates would imply), we have seen how
they are united and held together by
that thread of common principle and
common purpose which runs through them all. Casual and unrelated as they
may appear to superficial readers, they
may, broadly speaking, be regarded as
separate and methodical studies in pre
paration for a complete working out in
general and in detail of the doctrine
they all illustrate the doctrine of uni
versal evolution.
Here one important point has to be
emphasised. The real significance of
Spencer s versatility is missed if we fail to




of all sorts of different topics, from the
Nebular Hypothesis to manners, fashions,
architectural types, music, dancing, and
the characteristics of style, he made
substantial contributions to the discus
sion of nearly all of them. Specialists in
almost every field acknowledge their
indebtedness to him, and find it neces
sary, even when it is only to express dis
agreement, to take his speculations into
consideration, and define their own posi
tion in regard to them. This is not, of
course, because Spencer himself wrote as
a specialist upon all these various themes.
Comprehensive as his erudition was, this
would have been impossible. The ex
planation must rather be sought in his
extraordinary penetration, and even more
particularly (as I have elsewhere shown
1
)
in his marvellous powers of generalisa
tion. It seemed as if in his hands facts
apparently the most alien entered into
wholly unexpected relationships; as if
the phenomena under study, whatever
he line of inquiry might be, grouped
themselves of their own accord into such
patterns as to make recognition of the
laws they exemplified inevitable.
IV.
The foregoing survey of Spencer s
earlier and more miscellaneous writings
should have interest and value because
both of the light that it throws upon his
mental growth and of the help it may
presently give us in the study of his later
systematic work. But, beyond this, I
have had, in taking it, a more special
object in view. For it is only by refer
ence to such a record that we can under
stand Spencer s historic position in
modern thought that is, his true rela-
ion to the great doctrine of evolution.
1
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On this question I want to make
myself as clear as possible, because it
is one in reference to which there has
long been and is still current a great
deal of misconception, even among the
generally well informed. Vagueness and
instability in the meaning of certain words
in common use have been in this case, as
often elsewhere, a main cause of confusion
in ideas ; another instance being thus
furnished of the truth of Bacon s dictum
that, while we fondly suppose that we
govern our vocabulary, it not infrequently
happens that, as a matter of fact, our
vocabulary governs us. In the common
speech of the day the word
&quot; Darwinism
&quot;
is almost invariably employed as if it
were absolutely synonymous with the
word
&quot;
evolution&quot;; the one is treated as
being at all points not only coextensive,
but also cointensive with the other.
Two notable results of this indiscrimina
tion are : first, that Darwin is habitually
regarded as the author of the modern
doctrine of evolution at large; and,
secondly, that this doctrine has, ever
since the publication of his Origin of
Species, become so intimately bound up
with the special views therein contained
that by the soundness or unsoundness
of his arguments the whole theory of
evolution is supposed to stand or fall.
That all this has given rise to much
deplorable confusion in the discussion
of evolutionary questions in general, I
do not now pause to show. Here we
are concerned merely with the entirely
unjust and erroneous estimate of the
historical significance of Spencer s work,
and consequently of the relations of
Spencer himself to the greatest of
modern generalisations, which originated
from, or which at least has been largely
kept alive by, the misconception of which
I speak.
To what extent this unjust and erro
neous estimate has taken root, even in
more cultivated thought, may be shown
briefly and conclusively by one or two
quotations. For example, we find the
Saturday Review remarking, in the
course of an article on Professor
Tyndall s famous Belfast Address, now
some thirty years since, that &quot;what
Darwin has done for physiology [!]
Spencer would do for psychology, by
applying to the nervous system particu
larly the principles which his teacher had
already enunciated for the physical
system generally.&quot; In much the same
strain, and obviously under the same
impression that Spencer s ideas were all
obtained at second-hand,
1 and are, in
fact, little more than precarious infer
ences from other people s discoveries,
an American writer of some eminence,
Colonel Higginson, once declared :
&quot;
It
seems rather absurd to attribute to him
[Spencer] as a scientific achievement
any vast enlargement or further generali
sation of the modern scientific doctrine
of evolution.&quot; Once more, sketching
1 There lias perhaps never been so original a.
thinker as Spencer, who has had such a hard
struggle to get or keep possession of the credit
due to his own ideas. Not only is he thus
reduced to the position of a mere aide-de-camp
to Darwin, but many of his critics are never
weary in insisting, in spite of all disproof of their
assertions, upon his vital indebtedness to Auguste
Comte. Even his educational theories have
repeatedly been traced back to R&amp;lt; msseau s mile,
though, as he himself informed me, he had never
even heard of that work at the time his own book
on education was written (see my ftousseau
and Naturalism in Life and J hought, p. 206,
note). The singularly distorted current ideas of
his general relation to evolution, above animad
verted upon, may be partly the results of the
anonymity of his earlier publications ; and all
wrong-headedness is marvellously tenacious of
life.SPENCER AND THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION 3?
the college life of his friend, the late
lamented Professor Clifford, with whose
untimely death so many brilliant





was eagerly assimilating the ideas which
had become established as an assured
possession of science by Mr. Darwin,
and were being applied to the systematic
groupingand gathering together ofhuman
knowledge by Mr. Herbert Spencer.&quot;
Similarly, a professed historian of philo
sophy M. Lefevre refers to Spencer
as
&quot;relying on the marvellous conjec
tures of Darwin.&quot; And, finally (not to
weary by needlessly multiplying quota
tions), a man from whom, on account of
his own contributions to psychology and
wide knowledge of English thought, a
more correct judgment might surely have
been looked for the late M. Taine thu
summed up his view of Spencer s work
&quot; Mr. Spencer possesses the rare meri
of having extended to the sum of pheno
mena to the whole history of Nature
and of mind the two master-thoughts
which for the past thirty years have been
giving new form to the positive sciences,
the one being Mayer and Joule s Con
servation of Energy, the other Darwin s
Natural Selection.&quot;
Now, all this, to the extent to which
expressly or by implication it relegates
Spencer to the position merely of an
adapter, enlarger, or populariser of other
men s thoughts, is entirely false and un
founded, as the rapid survey of his
earlier writings which we have just taken
makes absolutely clear. So far from
its seeming &quot;rather absurd&quot; to credit
Spencer with any great personal con
tribution to the formulation of the
doctrine of evolution so far from his
being in any sense of the term a pupil
or unattached follower of Darwin ; we
have seen that he had worked his own
way independently, from a different
starting-point and through an entirely
dissimilar course of investigation, to a
conception of evolution as a universal
process underlying all phenomena, before
Darwin himself had made public his
special study of the operation of one of
the factors of evolution in the limited
sphere of the organic world. A simple
comparison of dates will serve to set
this matter at rest. The first edition
of the Origin of Species was pub
lished in the latter part of 1859. The
essay on the Development Hypothesis, in
which the transformation theory was
stoutly maintained, appeared in 1852 ;
in 1855 or four years before the advent
of Darwin s book there came the first
edition of the Principles of Psychology, in
which the laws of evolution (already con
ceived as universal) were traced out in
their operations in the domain of mind
;
and this was followed in 1857 by the essay
on Progress : Its Law and Cause, which
contains a statement of the doctrine of
evolution in its chief outlines, and an
inductive and deductive development of
that doctrine in its application to all
classes of phenomena. Spencer s inde
pendence of Darwin is thus placed
beyond possibility of question.
Let it not be imagined that I am
endeavouring in the slightest degree to
underestimate the special value of
Darwin s work. Yielding him the fullest
meed of praise for the immense part
which he played in the development of
scientific thought, I am aiming only to
show, as simple justice requires to be
shown, and as, with the fine modesty
which characterised him, he himself
endeavoured to show, that it is histori
cally incorrect to speak of him as the
ather of the modern doctrine of XSPENCER AND THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION
evolution. What Darwin did was to amas
an enormous number of facts from
almost every department of biologica
science, and by the persistent labour
patient examination, and searching
thought of many studious years, to
establish, once and for all, not the reality
of evolution, nor even the laws and con
ditions of evolution, but the operation oi
one of the main factors of evolution
a factor which, though it had till his
time entirely eluded the scientific mind,
was yet required to render comprehen
sible a vast array of phenomena other
wise without interpretation. How near
Spencer s own investigations had led him
to a realisation of the process of natural
selection, or, as he afterwards called it,
the survival of the fittest in the struggle
for existence, we have already been able
to remark
; and he himself took occasion
to point this out when, in the course of
his later work, he came to deal more
systematically with the whole problem of
animal fertility and its practical implica
tions.
1 But the factors mainly relied
1 See Principles of Biology, 373, note.
The whole of this very interesting note should
he studied carefully, not only hecause it makes
clear the scientific relations of Spencer and
Darwin, but also for the foreshadowing which it
contains of a reaction against that exclusive
recognition of natural selection which soon
became typical of biological students at large.
The fundamental fact of evolution being now
universally accepted, scientists of the present
day are divided into two hostile camps upon the
question of the processes of evolution : one party,
often described as the neo-Darwinian, holding to
natural .^election, and to that alone ; the other,
antithetically called the neo-Lamarcki:in, main
taining that other factors have to be taken into
account. The controversy, which mainly turns
upon the problem as to whether or not acquired
characters are inheritable, is now for the most
part immediately connected with the writings of
Professor Weismann, in which an elaborate
upon by him, in common with all pre-
Darwinian developmentalists, were the
direct action of the environment and
the inheritance, with increase, of func
tionally-produced modifications ; and as
these processes, whatever may be their
individual importance, are obviously
incapable of throwing light upon a
large part indeed, the larger part of
the facts which pressed for explanation,
the theory of evolution could not for
the time being hope for inductive estab
lishment. Darwin s book put the whole
question upon a new foundation, by
exhibiting a process which did account
for the hitherto unmanageable facts ;
and undoubtedly it was thus to a large
extent effectual in bringing the general
theory into open court as an entertain-
able hypothesis. But while all this is
freely conceded while the greatness of
Darwin s work in itself, and its import
ance as a contribution to scientific
thought, are acknowledged without hesi
tation, it has still to be remembered that
that work was special and limited in
attempt is made to prove that, of all alleged
evolutionary factors, natural selection is alone
demanded by facts and supported by evidence.
Spencer himself remained firm to the position
adopted in the note just referred to, his contri
butions to the discussion being the essays on
The Factors of Organic Evolution (lSS6); A
Counter-Criticism (iSSS) ; Tlte
I&amp;gt;iad^na&amp;gt;y oj
Natural Selection (1893) ; and A Rejoinder to
Professor IVcismann (1893). It may be interest-
ng to add that, when he came to write of the
appearance of the Origin of Species, Spencer
could not remember whether he was vexed at
he time by the thought that in 1852 he had
ailed to carry further the idea then expressed,
: that among human beings the survival of those
who are the select of their generation is a cause
of development.&quot; On the whole, he did not
doubt that, if any such feelings arose, they were
overwhelmed by gratification on seeing the
heory of organic evolution at length fully justi-
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character, and that with the general
doctrine of evolution at large it had
itself nothing whatever to do. The
laws of evolution as a universal process
a matter which the aims and objects
of Darwin s work did not lead him to
touch were worked out by Spencer
irrespectively of the special pro
cess of natural selection; and when
Darwin s book appeared, that process
fell into its place in his general system,
quite naturally, as a single manifes
tation of a far wider law the law of
equilibration, and therefore as a supple
mentary, and not in any way as a dis
turbing, element. Thus it appears that
if any one man is to be looked upon as
the immediate progenitor of a doctrine
which, in common phraseology, may be
said to have been to some extent in the
air a &quot;truth of science, waiting to be
caught
&quot;
that man is not he who first
elucidated one factor of its process in
one domain of phenomena the biolo
gical; but rather he who first seized upon
it as a comprehensive law, underlying all
the phenomena of the universe. In a
word, it is not Charles Darwin, but
Herbert Spencer.
We have thus followed the general
course of Spencer s thought through
what, in the light of his subsequent
work, must be regarded as the period of
experiment and preparation. We now
turn from these earlier writings to that
colossal undertaking to which the greater
part of the energies of his after-life was
to be devoted the System of Synthetic
Philosophy.
CHAPTER III.
THE SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY-FIRST PRINCI
PLESTHE PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY AND OF
PSYCHOLOGY.
I.
EARLY in the course of the composition
of the Principles of Psychology in their
original form that is, in 1854 Spencer
had reached that conception of evolu
tion as a universal process which he
subsequently worked out in detail in the
essay on Progress : Its Law and Cause.
The writing of this article, which first
saw the light in the Westminster Revleiv
for April, 1857, doubtless helped in
large measure to systematise and co
ordinate the various ideas that were then
lying scattered in his mind. It was in
the following year, while he was engaged
in preparing a long essay in defence of
the Nebular Hypothesis, that there
dawned upon him the possibility of
dealing in a more methodical and con
nected manner than he had hitherto
found practicable with those foundation-
principles of evolution which he had
been gradually formulating during theTHE SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY
miscellaneous studies of the past eight
or nine years. Instead of treating the
diverse phenomena of life and society in
a fragmentary manner, why should he
not consider them after some orderly
plan and in their mutual relationships
?
The idea took root, developed rapidly,
and before long assumed the proportion;
of an elaborate scheme, in which all
orders of concrete phenomena were to
fall into their places as illustrations of
the fundamental process of evolution.
Thus the conception of evolution now
presented itself to him as the basis of a
system of thought under which was to
be generalised the complete history of
the knowable universe, and by virtue of
which all knowledge was to be unified
by the affiliation of its various branches
upon the ultimate laws underlying them
all. Such was the origin of the Synthetic
Philosophy.
Though a rough sketch of the main
outlines of the system as they occurred
to him at the time was mapped out
almost immediately,
1
it was not till the
following year, 1859 a year otherwise
made memorable by the publication of
Darwin s book that a detailed plan of
the various connected works in which
these conceptions were to be developed
was finally drawn up ; and not till March,
1860, that it was made public in the
form of a prospectus. Spencer s original
intention was to issue the proposed work
to subscribers in periodical parts. This
course was persevered in till the publica
tion of the forty-fourth division, in 1876,
completing the first volume of the Prin
ciples of Sociology. It was then discon
tinued, and from that date onward the
publication was in volume form only.
The following is a reprint, slightly
1 See Autobiography, ii., 115, 16.
condensed by the omission of some
explanatory matter not now of any
special interest, of the programme as
originally given to the world :
FIRST PRINCIPLES.
PARTI. The Unknowable. Carrying- a
step further the doctrine put into shape by
Hamilton and Mansel
; pointing out the
various directions in which science leads to
the same conclusions ; and showing that in
this united belief in an Absolute that tran
scends not only human knowledge, but
human conception, lies the only possible
reconciliation of Science and Religion.
II. Laws of the Knowable. A state
ment of the ultimate principles discernible
throughout all manifestations of the Abso
lutethose highest generalisations now
being disclosed by Science which are
severally true not ofone class ofphenomena,
but of all classes of phenomena ; and which
are thus the keys to all classes of pheno
mena.
[In logical order should here come the
application of these First Principles to
Inorganic Nature. But this great division
it is proposed to pass over; partly because,
even without it, the scheme is too exten
sive
; partly because the interpretation of
Organic Nature after the proposed method
is of more immediate importance. The
second work of the series will therefore
be]
THE PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY.
Vol. I.
PARTl. The Data of Biology. Includ
ing those general truths of physics and
chemistry with which rational biology must
set out.
II. The Inductions of Biology. A
statement of the leading generalisations
which naturalists, physiologists, and com
parative anatomists have established.
III. The Evolution of Life. Concern-
;ng the speculation commonly known as
the Development Hypothesis its d priori
ind d posteriori evidences.
Vol.11.
IV. Morphological Development.
Pointing out the relations that are every
where traceable between organic forms and
^he average of the various forces to which
:hey are subject; and seeking in the cumu-
ative effects of such forces a theory of the
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V. Physiological Development. The
progressive differentiation of functions
similarly traced ; and similarly interpreted
as consequent upon the exposure of different
parts of organisms to different sets of co
ditions.
VI. The Laws of Multiplication. Gen
ralisations respecting the rates of repro
duction of the various classes of plants an
animals
; followed by an attempt to sho
the dependence of these variations upo
certain necessary causes.
THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
Vol. I.
PART I. The Data of Psychology
Treating of the general connections o
mind and life, and their relations to othe
modes of the Unknowable.
II. The Inductions of Psychology. A
digest of such generalisations respecting mental phenomena as have already been
empirically established.
III. General Synthesis. A republica
lion, with additional chapters, of the same
part in the already published Principles of
Psychology.
IV. Special Synthesis. A republica
tion, with extensive revisions and additions
of the same part, etc., etc.
V. Physical Synthesis. An attempt to
show the manner in which the succession
of states of consciousness conforms to a
certain fundamental law of nervous action
that follows from the First Principles laid
down at the outset.
Vol. II.
VI. Special Analysis. As at present
published, but further elaborated by some
additional chapters.
VII General Analysis. As at present
published, with several explanations and
additions.
VIII. Corollaries. Consisting in part of a number of derivative principles which
form a necessary introduction to Sociology.
THK PRINCIPLES OK SOCIOLOGY.
Vol. I.
PART I. The Data of Sociology. A
statement of the several sets of factors
entering into social phenomena human
ideas and feelings considered in their
necessary order of evolution
; surrounding natural conditions
; and those ever-compli
cating conditions to which Society itself
gives origin.
II. The Inductions of Sociology. General facts, structural and functional,
as gathered from a survey of societies and
their changes ; in other words, the empirical
generalisations that are arrived at by com
paring different societies and successive
phases of the same society.
III. Political Organisation. The evolu
tion of governments, general and local,
as determined by natural causes; their
several types and metamorphoses ; their
increasing complexity and specialisation ; and the progressive limitation of their
functions.
Vol. II.
IV. Ecclesiastical Organisation. Trac
ing the differentiation of religious govern ment from secular
; its successive compli
cations and the multiplication of sects ;
the growth and continued modification of
religious ideas, as caused by advancing
knowledge and changing moral character ; and the gradual reconciliation of these
ideas with the truths of abstract science.
V. Ceremonial Organisation. The
natural history of that third kind of
government which, having a common root
with the others, and slowly becoming
separate from and supplementary to them,
serves to regulate the minor actions of life.
VI. Industrial Organisation. The
development of productive and distributive
agencies considered, like the foregoing, n its necessary causes ; comprehending not only the progressive division of labour
and the increasing complexity of each
ndustrial agency, but also the successive
orms of industrial government as passing
hrongh like phases with political govern-
nent.*
In their published form these three divisions
re entitled respectively
: Political Institutions ;
Ecclesiastical Institutions ; Ceremonial Institu-
ions; and the last named is properly made to
ike precedence of the other two. A part on
Domestic Institutions is inserted (as Part III.)
fter the Inductions, and this of course disturbs
he subsequent numbering of the divisions, as
well as, to some extent, the volume arrangement j
he first two volumes, as outlined, having ex
panded into three.
This division and the whole of Vol. III.
ere skipped by Spencer when, led by increas-
gly poor health to the belief that the entire
heme could never be carried out, he decided
all hazards to push on with the far more
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Vol. III.
VII. Lingual Progress. The evolution
of languages regarded as a psychological
process determined by social conditions.
VIII. Intellectual Progress. Treated
from the same point of view : including
the growth of classifications
; the evolution
of science out of common knowledge ; the
advance from qualitative to quantitative
prevision, from the indefinite to the
definite, and from the concrete to the
abstract.
IX. /Esthetic Progress. The fine arts
similarly dealt with : tracing their gradual
differentiation from primitive institutions
and from each other
; their increasing
varieties of development ; and their ad
vance in realityofexpression and superiority
of aim.
X. Moral Progress. Exhibiting the
genesis of the slow emotional modifications
which human nature undergoes in its adap
tation to the social state.
XI. The Consensus. Treating of the
necessary interdependence of structures
and of functions in each type of society and
in the successive phases of social develop
ment.
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY.
Vol. I.
PARTI. The Data of Morality. Gene
ralisations furnished by biology, psycho
logy, and sociology, which underlie a true
theory of right living ; in other words, the
elements of that equilibrium between con
stitution and conditions of existence which
is at once the moral ideal and the limit
towards which we are progressing.
II. The Inductions of Morality. Those
empirically established rules of human
action which are registered as essential
laws by all civilised nations: that is to say,
the generalisations of expediency.
III. Personal Morals. The principles
of private conduct physical, intellectual,
moral, and religious that follow from the
conditions to complete individual life
; or,
important volumes on Ethics. The Sociologywa.*
ultimately completed by the publication of
divisions on Professional Institutions and Indus
trial Institutions ; but in these the matter was
less thoroughly organised than in preceding
parts, and in places signs of haste and weariness
were quite apparent. Vol. III., as originally
planned, had by this time been dropped from
the scheme.
what is the same thing, those modes of
private action which must result from the




1 The mutual limitations
of men s actions, necessitated by their
coexistence as units of a society limita
tions the perfect observance of which con
stitutes that state of equilibrium forming
the goal of political progress.
V. Negative Beneficence. Those secon
dary limitations, similarly necessitated,
which, though less important and not cog
nisable by law, are yet requisite to prevent
mutual destruction of happiness in various
indirect ways
: in other words, those minor
self-restraints, dictated by what may be
called passive sympathy.
VI. Positive Beneficence. Compre
hending all modes of conduct, dictated by
active sympathy, which imply pleasure in
giving pleasure modes of conduct that
social adaptation has induced and must
render ever more general ; and which, in
becoming universal, must fill to the full the
possible measure of human happiness.
I reproduce this historic document
here for two reasons. First, it is
important for the student of Spencer
to have under his eye for reference and
guidance such a general programme of
the scope and aim of the system as a
whole, and of the concatenation of its
various parts. And, secondly, it is
instructive to observe with what fidelity
Spencer, in working out his system,
adhered to his original plan. Any
one who compares the above pro
spectus with the contents of the ten
volumes in which the Synthetic Phi
losophy was finally embodied, can
1 This part is practically co-extensive with
Social Statics. Among various points of differ
ence in the treatment of the same questions
Between the earlier and the later work, one
specially calls for remark. In Justice the super-
naturalistic elements of Social Statics have dis
appeared, and the whole discussion is ba.^cd
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hardly fail to be astonished by the
remarkable correspondence between the
original design and the completed edifice.
Here and there changes will be noted
in the order of the divisions ; there are
several considerable additions to the
scheme ; and, more important than all,
the parts which were to have composed




adhered to his prospectus with a fidelity
which shows how fully he must have
had the whole vast territory mapped out
in his mind before he sat down to
commit himself to the penning of a
single line.
II.
The philosophic system of which we
have thus before us an abstract or
syllabus differs from all other compre
hensive bodies of thought with which in
its external characteristics it might be
compared, alike in its method and its
scope. In approaching the study of the
Synthetic Philosophy we must try first to
understand its uniqueness in both of
these respects.
1 That the Sociology none the less actually
comprises three volumes is due to the expansion
of the first two. There can, I think, be little
reason to regret that Spencer abandoned his
original intention of dealing with linguistic,
intellectual, and esthetic progress. Great as
will be our gain when these subjects are syste
matically treated on the basis of evolution,
Spencer himself was prepared neither by
sympathy nor by training to do full justice to
them ; and though without question he would
have said many things about them which would
have been illuminating and suggestive, his dis
cussion of them must necessarily, on the whole,
have been unsatisfactory. Meanwhile, the gaps
left are to some extent filled by certain of his
essays notably those on The Genesis ofScience,
The Origin and Function of Music, and The
Philosophy of Style.
In the early days of philosophic specu
lation it was sufficient if, in the building
up of his elaborate structure of doctrine,
the thinker succeeded in making the
various parts of his system coherent and
harmonious among themselves. So long
as they would hang together without
internal friction or disorder, so long as
in this way they would, verbally con
sidered, produce the impression of
organic unity, nothing more was required.
How far they might or might not be
congruous with the actual laws and
processes of the universe was a question
which, in the then condition of know
ledge, was of comparatively small im
portance. Thus the Platos of old days,
and the Hegels of more recent times,
could start from whatever datum they
chose to postulate, and spin their poetic
webs of fanciful metaphysics without
troubling themselves very seriously to
consider whether the facts of the world
were for or against them. In the former
case, well and good ; in the latter, tant
pis pour les faits : in either event their
work went on uninterrupted and untram
melled.
1 Wherever they looked out on
the universe they saw nothing but a
reflection of their own whims and
theories ; reminding us of Coleridge s
brilliant metaphor of Jack Robinson
between two mirrors, prolonged into an
endless succession of Jack Robinsons.
But Science, in opening up the arcana
1 In Lord Bolingbroke s Letter to Alexander
Pope there is a passage even more appro
priate to certain later philosophers than to those
he himself had in view when penning it : &quot;Rather
than creep up slowly, d posteriori, to a little
general knowledge, they soar at once as far and
as high as imagination can carry them. From
thence they descend again, armed with systems
and arguments d. priori ; and, regardless how
these agree or clash with the phenomena of
Nature, they impose them on mankind.&quot;44 THE SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY
of the universe, has passed all such
methods under summary condemnation.
The fabled German is said, in the
familiar story, to have evolved a camel
out of the depths of his inner conscious
ness ; and the monstrosity which he
boldly offered to the world would have
done well enough so long as no real
camel had been examined and studied.
But the importation of a genuine animal
into the matter at once changes the
attitude and increases the responsibilities
of the would-be naturalist. His descrip
tion of the camel must now not only
possess the qualities of internal balance
and abstract credibility, but must also
meet the additional requirement of
resemblance to the actual camel of
zoology. The parable hardly needs a
gloss. For this simply means that all
philosophy worthy of the name must
henceforth build upon foundations firmly
laid in scientific truth. Any system that
neglects science as its corner-stone stands
self-condemned, and does not merit
serious attention.
Now, the first characteristic mark of
the Spencerian philosophy is that its
vast superstructure is reared not inde
pendently of science, still less in spite
of science, but out of the very materials
that science itself has furnished. It is
a body of doctrine which is not only
verbally intelligible and logically har
monious within itself, but at every point
challenges the supreme test of direct
comparison with fact. Spencer pro
ceeds in his task of organising know
ledge by first examining separately the
various concrete sciences in quest of the
highest truth or truths that these will
each yield; then, setting together the
generalisations thus reached, he formu
lates from these the still wider generali
sation in which they all merge. Close
analysis of this widest generalisation
then reveals the ultimate axiom a datum
which, as referable to nothing beyond
or behind itself, must be taken, so to
speak, upon its own credentials, and
accepted both as the final result of our
inductive inquiry, and, in turn, as the
foundation or the starting-point of any
attempt at the synthetic, or deductive,
reconstruction of philosophy.
1 Induc
tion, then, is the method pursued from
the first ; the established truths of science
are directly investigated ; and by generali
sation after generalisation each tried
and verified again and again by reference
to all orders of concrete facts we are
led at last to a generalisation which
comprises them all, beyond which we
cannot venture without losing ourselves
in mere speculation, and in which, there
fore, we have to rest. I shall endeavour
in a moment to indicate the course of
inquiry and thought which Spencer
followed in thus working his way to the
first principles of his philosophy. But
here let me point out at once that,
though this method of induction was
rigidly adhered to, until its final results
were obtained, those results were not
allowed to remain in inductive form.
This would have been to leave the
system incomplete, for, while the pro
cesses of universal evolution would have
jeen set forth, no rationale of those pro
cesses would have been suggested. As
we shall presently see more clearly, the
1 It is well not to lose sight of the fact that
he most rigid method of induction dues not
relieve us of the obligation of postulating
,n unproved and unprovable principle. We
must fasten the final link of our chain
somewhere, if we have to introduce the foot of
Jove for the purpose. Otherwise, our philosophy
is without a basis, like the old Hindu theory of
the universe. See the essay on
&quot; Mill versus
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very purpose of philosophy demand
that the laws of the universe reveale
by induction shall be re-stated deduc
lively. This re-statement Spence
undertakes in detail, exhibiting the law
revealed by his most comprehensivi
generalisations as necessaryconsequence
of the ultimate datum to which they a
last bring us. Hence the logical com
pleteness of the Spencerian philosophy
It presents us on the one side with an
empirical account of the laws and pro
cesses of the knowable universe, anc
then, translating these into deductive
terms, it furnishes us with a rationa
history of the knowable universe as well.
What further has to be said about the
building of the Synthetic Philosophy
may be conveniently postponed until we
come to consider the evolution of its
fundamental principles. To clear the
way for this, we have, first of all, how
ever, to deal with another point. What




&quot;? What are the
scope and limitations of his own work ?
Or, to phrase the question differently,
what is it that, in the development of
his system, he really undertakes to do ?
The older philosophers demanded an
explanation of existence ; the problem for
which they sought a solution was ontolo-
gical theproblem of the nature of things ;
and, not content with the study of the
phenomenal universe, they endeavoured
to sound the mystery of absolute being.
What is the primary cause of the cosmos ?
What is its final cause the end for
which it exists? These, and such as
these, were the questions which genera
tions of metaphysicians busied them
selves to answer. With what result?
With the result that failure followed
every effort, and that every scheme,
no matter how carefully planned, how
ingeniously developed, how attractive
and plausible, was sooner or later
forced to take its place among the
curiosities of misapplied effort in the
intellectual lumber-heap of the world.
The futility of all the study devoted in
the past to these perennially fascinating
but perennially elusive questions the
absurdities that each fresh speculator
will freely acknowledge as the character
istics of every system but his own the
total inadequacy of each new master-
word to roll back for us the eternal gates
that shut from human knowledge the
final mystery of life : all these things
in themselves sufficed to lead some
of the clearest and sanest intellects of
earlier days to an appreciation of the
truth that the old-world riddle remains
unsolved simply because it is insoluble.
1
Renewed efforts to read the enigma of
the Sphinx can only result, therefore,
in the same disappointment. What
has never been accomplished in the
the past will never be accomplished in
the future, merely because, in its very
essence, the task is hopeless. Modern
psychology shows us the reason of the
inevitable failure by making clear the
conditions under which all our thinking
must be done conditions which, when
Goethe among the first to appreciate to
he full the philosophic consequences of the
imitations of human faculty again and again
nsisted that our business is with the laws and
:onditions of the phenomenal universe, and not
vith the ultimate mystery that lies behind them.
&quot; Wie? Wann? undWo?
Die Cotter blieben stumm.
Du halte dich ans Weil,
Und frage nicht Warum !&quot;
ilsewhere he writes to this effect :
&quot; Man is
orn not to solve the problem of the universe,
ut to find out where the problem begins, and
icn to restrain himself within the limits of the
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once duly recognised, reveal beyond the
shadow of doubt or the possibility ol
question why it has been, is, and ever
must be, futile for the human intelligence
to attempt to rise from the relative and
the phenomenal into the consideration
of that absolute and noumenal existence
of which these are but the manifestations.
Now, by philosophy to begin with a
negative statement of the matter
Spencer does not understand an effort
to solve the ultimate problem of the
universe. He postulates two categories
the Unknowable and the Knowable
;
and to the former of these, the proper
domain of religion, he relegates, as
lying beyond the scope of our inquiry, all
those questions concerning the primary
and final cause of the universe its
whence, its why, and its wherefore with
which all metaphysics have been prin
cipally concerned. What, then, is left
us? The answer is simple. The true
subject-matter of philosophy is not the
problem of absolute cause and end, but
of secondary causes and ends not
noumenal and unconditioned existence,
but the manifestations of the noumenal
in and through the conditioned and
phenomenal. What we demand from
philosophy, therefore, is not an expla
nation of the universe in terms of
Being as distinguished from appearance ;
but a complete co-ordination, or syste
matic organisation, of those cosmical
laws by which we symbolise the pro
cesses of the universe, and the interrela
tions of the various phenomena of which
the universe, as revealed to us under the
conditions of our intelligence, is actually
composed. The old antithesis between
common knowledge and what we call
science on the one hand, and philosophy
on the other, thus disappears. They are
not essentially unlike
; their differences
are differences in degree of generality
and unification.
&quot; As each widest
generalisation of science comprehends
and consolidates the narrower generali
sations of its own division, so the generali
sations of philosophy comprehend and
consolidate the widest generalisations of
science. It is, therefore, a knowledge the
extreme opposite in kind to that which
experience first accumulates. It is the
final productof that process which begins
with a mere colligation of crude obser
vations, goes on establishing proposi
tions that are broader and more separated
from particular cases, and ends in uni
versal propositions. Or, to bring the
definition to its simplest and clearest
form : Knowledge of the lowest kind is
ununified knowledge; science is par-




Such, then, are the methods and scope
of the Synthetic Philosophy. We pro
ceed now to the briefest possible state
ment of its foundation principles, merely
premising that readers who are not
specially interested in the more technical
side of philosophic discussion may do
well to pass on at once to the exposition
of the doctrine of evolution in the next
section.
If philosophy is to undertake the
complete unification of knowledge, it is
clear that it must establish some ultimate
proposition which includes and consoli
dates all the results of experience. It
is impossible for us here to follow
Spencer, step by step, in the long and
subtle argument by which this ultimate
proposition is reached. In such broad
statement as alone is compatible with
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the purposes we have now in view, the
main stages of the inquiry may be just
indicated, and no more. Philosophy,
then, in the nature of things must start
with certain assumptions, justifying them,
as it goes on with its work, by exhibiting
their congruity with all other dicta of
consciousness. This is a proposition
from which manifestly we cannot dissent
without committing ourselves to abso
lute nihilism. Yet involved in it
there is one primordial datum the
assumption (without which all thought
would be impossible) that in the mani
festations of the unknowable in and
through the phenomenal universe con-
gruities and incongruities exist and are
cognisable by us. Setting out from this
assumption, Spencer goes on to show
that in the last analysis all classes of
likeness and unlikeness merge in one
great difference the difference between
object and subject. The profoundest
distinction among the manifestations of
the unknowable we recognise by group
ing them into self and not-self.* His
postulates, therefore, are &quot;an unknow
able power ; the existence of knowable
likenesses and differences among the
manifestations of that power ; and a
resulting segregation of those manifesta
tions into those of subject and object.&quot;
2
These are postulates which common
sense asserts, which in every step science
takes for granted, and which no meta
physician has ever succeeded in destroy
ing ; and from these philosophy has to
proceed to the achievement of its pur
pose as above set forth.
Pushing the argument through a con
sideration of space, time, matter, motion,
force, the indestructibility of matter, and
1 First Principles, 44.
3
Ibid, 45.
the continuity of force, Spencer at length
reaches his ultimate dictum the per
sistence of force ; by which
&quot; we really
mean the persistence of some Cause
which transcends our knowledge and
conception.&quot;
1 This dictum that the
Force of the Universe is constant, since
it
&quot; can neither arise out of nothing, nor
lapse into nothing,&quot; and can, therefore,
be neither added to nor destroyed
is shown to possess the highest kind
of axiomatic certitude for two reasons :
it constitutes the required foundation
for all other general truths ; and it
is a psychological necessity that is, it
remains stable and unresolvable the one
inexpugnable, yet inexplicable, element of
consciousness. Of such persistence of
forceunderthe forms of matterand motion
all phenomena are necessary results.
Eliminate this conception, and conscious
ness collapses.
&quot; The sole truth which
transcends experience by underlying it
is thus the Persistence of Force. This,
being the basis of experience, must be
the basis of any scientific organisation of
experiences. To this an ultimate analysis




The first deduction drawn from this
ultimate universal truth is that of the
persistence of relations among forces, or
what is commonly known as the unifor
mity of law, whence we pass to two
important corollaries the transforma
tion and equivalence of forces (correla
tion) and the undulatory character, or
rhythm of motion. The first of these
follows naturally from the truth that,
however much forces may change their
form, the force of the universe remains
constant; the latter is just as clearly a
1 First Principles, 62.
2
Ibid, 62.THE SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY
necessary result of the antagonism of
opposing forces. Both these prin
ciples are shown to hold good through
out the whole range of phenomena,
from the physical and chemical






they have that character of universality




truths which unify concrete phenomena
belonging to all divisions of nature, and
so must be components of that com
plete coherent conception of things
which philosophy seeks.&quot;
1 But none
the less they are truths of the ana
lytical order, and
&quot; no number of ana
lytical truths will make up that synthesis
of thought which alone can be an
interpretation of the synthesis of
things.&quot;
2
The problem now before us will be set
in a clearer light if we remember the
relation, already noted, between the par
tially unified knowledge which we call
science and the completely unified
knowledge which is the aim of philo
sophy. The various sciences advance
from the resolution of their phenomena
into the action of certain factors to the
larger question
: How from such com
bined actions result the given pheno
mena in all their complexity? They
thus arrive at special syntheses. But
such syntheses, up to the most general,
are more or less independent of one
another ; the syntheses of biology, for
example, remain within the domain of
biology, the syntheses of psychology
within that of psychology. The busi
ness of philosophy is now to establish a
universal synthesis, comprehending and
consolidating such special syntheses.




Having seen that matter is indestruc
tible, motion continuous, and force per
sistent having seen that forces are
everywhere undergoing transformation,
and that motion, always following the
line of least resistance, is invariably
rhythmic, it remains to discover the
similarly invariable formula expressing
the combined consequencesof the actions
thus separately formulated.&quot;
1
It is from this fresh point of departure
that Spencer proceeds to reduce to syste
matic and comprehensive expression the
laws of that continuous redistribution
of matter and motion which is going on
throughout the universe in general and
in detail. All sensible existences, and
the aggregates which they form, have
their history, and this history covers the
entire period between their emergence
from the imperceptible and their final
disappearance again into the imper
ceptible. The redistribution of matter
and motion which brings about this
passage from the imperceptible, through
the various stages of the perceptible,
and back into the imperceptible, com
prises two antagonistic processes
: one
characterised by the integration of matter
and the dissipation of motion ; the other
by the absorption of motion and the
disintegration of matter. The former
produces consolidation and definiteness ;
the latter, diffusion and incoherence.
These two universal antagonistic pro
cesses are evolution and dissolution.
The entire universe is in a state of con
tinual change, and it is in terms of these
processes that all changes, great and
small, inorganic, organic, physical, vital,
psychical, social, have to be interpreted.
This brings us face to face with the
whole question of the universal trans-
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formation of things, and of the ultimat
uniformities which that transformation
reveals. Our next business will be to
understand what we mean by evolution
IV.
What, then, is evolution ?
A broad answer has already been given
to this question. As dissolution is dis
integration, so evolution is integration.
But this definition takes note only oi
the primary element in the evolutionary
process. While evolution must always
mean an integration of matter and con
comitant dissipation of motion, or, in
other words, an increase in definiteness
and coherence, it will commonly imply
much more than this. We must, there
fore, examine the secondary changes by
which this primary change is habitually
complicated before our theory of evolu
tion can be complete. Indeed, these
secondary changes are so much the
most conspicuous characteristics of the
evolutionary process that, as we shall
. see, it is from these that Spencer himself
started, and with these that he remained
for a long while pre-occupied. Our best
plan will now be to follow him rapidly
along the line of thought by which his
full statement of the law of evolution
was gradually reached. Points otherwise
obscure will thus be robbed of much of
their difficulty, and a good deal of sub
sequent elucidation will be spared.
We have noted that Spencer s earliest
speculations were of a humanitarian
character, and that his way of approach
to the study of general evolution lay
through that limited phase of develop
ment which we call progress. The
theory of progress had been handed
down to the thinkers of the nineteenth
century by their forerunners of the
eighteenth, and despite the absurdities
and extravagances that had long vitiated
it despite the vagueness and the
crudity that it bore with it as an heredi
tary taint, the kernel of vital truth which
it enfolded rendered it a fertile contri
bution to thought. Spencer s earliest
writings are dominated by this idea of
individual and social advance ; but it
was altogether foreign to his intellectual
character to interest himself in the
working out of a conception that was not
at bottom susceptible of definite inter
pretation. It is all very well to talk
about progress; but what is progress?
This was the special form of the question
to which for a number of years he was
gradually feeling his way to an answer.
Already in Social Statics he had
reached what then seemed to him an
adequate reply. Asserting the neces
sity of progress (here metaphysically asso
ciated with a pre-ordained order),
1 he
borrows from Coleridge the theory which
Coleridge in turn had derived from
German speculation, that life is &quot;a ten
dency towards individuation.&quot; It is in
the fulfilment of this tendency, says
Spencer, that all progress will be found
to consist. Throughout the whole ani
mate world we discover it at work in
the production of higher and higher
&quot;orms of organisation and structure, and
n man its fullest manifestation is
reached.
&quot;
By virtue of his complexity
of structure he is furthest removed from
:he inorganic world in which there is
east individuality. Again, his intelli-
;ence and adaptability commonly enable
lim to maintain life to old age to
1 This is one of the many points at which this
emarkable book presents itself as a connecting
ink between eighteenth-century theories of
irogress, with their express or implicit teleology,
nd the purely naturalistic interpretation of
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complete the cycle of his existence ; that
is, to fill out the limits of this individuality
to the full. Again, he is self-conscious
;
that is, he recognises his own individu
ality. And even the change observ
able in human affairs is still towards a
greater development of individuality
may still be described as a tendency to
individuation.
&quot; x
Translated into more philosophical
language, this tendency to individuation
is found to embrace two closely inter
related processes. Obviously, increasing
complexity is one of these; not so ob
viously, this increase of complexity must
have increase of unity as its natural ac
companiment. Universal specialisation,
with its resulting advance in heterogeneity,
is only possible if, while all things are
becoming more and more characteristi
cally marked off from one another, they
are at the same time becoming gradually
more and more interdependent. The
line of growth is
&quot; at once towards com
plete separateness and complete union.&quot;3
Differentiation without concomitant uni
fication would lead to chaos and con
fusion
; differentiation along with con
comitant unification produces that en
largement of the organic harmony which
we call progress.
This double aspect of the matter is
clearly recognised in Social Statics
J&amp;gt; and
was never entirely lost sight of in
Spencer s subsequent speculations.
* Yet,
as was not unnatural, it was the more
striking and conspicuous element in
progress that for some time alone ab
sorbed his attention. Allowing the
1 Social Statics, chap, xxx., 12.
Ibid, chap. xxx.,13.
3 Chap, xxx., 13, 14.
4 In the essays on the Philosophy of Style and
the Genesis of Science, for example, the doctrine
of increasing unification is clearly stated.
doctrine of unification to drop practically
out of his thought, he fixed his mind
upon the factor of increasing differentia
tion, which, detached from all other
considerations, he attempted, in the
essay on Progress
: Its Law and Cause,
to expand into a complete theory of
universal development.
In this course he was materially
assisted by German speculations on the
evolution of the individual organism.
1
&quot; The investigations of Wolff, Goethe,
and Von Baer,&quot; he writes in the early
part of the just-named article,
&quot; have
established the truth that the series of
changes gone through during the develop
ment of a seed into a tree, or an ovum
into an animal, constitute an advance
from homogeneity of structure to hetero
geneity of structure. In its primary
stage every germ consists of a substance
that is uniform throughout, both in
texture and chemical composition. The
first step is the appearance of a difference
between two parts of this substance ; or,
as the phenomenon is called in physiolo
gical language, a differentiation By
endless such differentiations there is
finally produced that complex combina
tion of tissues and organs constituting
the adult animal or plant. This is the
history of all organisms whatever. It is
settled beyond dispute that organic pro
gress consists in a change from the
homogeneous to the heterogeneous.
Now, we propose to show that this
law of organic progress is the law of all
progress From the earliest traceable
cosmical changes down to the latest
results of civilisation, we shall find that
the transformation of the homogeneous
1 These he became acquainted with in 1852
that is, after the publication of Social Statics.
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into the heterogeneous is that in which
progress essentially consists.&quot;
A full half of the essay in question is
devoted to an inductive establishment o
this thesis
; the other half being taken
up with the affiliation of this universa
process upon the law of the multiplication
of effects, to which we shall come directly.
The statement set forth, therefore, i
that evolution consists wholly in increase
of complexity is a change from a condi
tion of homogeneity to a condition ol
heterogeneity, brought about by ever-
increasing differentiations. So certain
had Spencer now become that this was
not only a law of evolution, but the
law of evolution, that he incorporated
the formula in the first edition of his
First Principles*
Further thought, however, led him to
see that this was an imperfect view of
the case. An important truth, of which
he had just caught a glimpse in Social
Statics, had now to be reinstated in his
plan. The mere change in the direction
of increasing heterogeneity or complexity
could not, as he came presently to realise,
be held to constitute evolution, since
there are many such changes which
make, not for evolution, but for destruc
tion. An injury to an organism renders
that organism more multiform in its
composition; a cancer in the system
produces marked increase in hetero
geneity ; a revolution in the social state
makes the state far less homogeneous;
&quot; In that essay [on Progress] as also in the
first edition of this work, I fell into the error of
supposing that the transformation of the homo
geneous into the heterogeneous constitutes evo
lution ; whereas it constitutes the secondary
redistribution accompanying the primary redis
tribution in that evolution which we distinguish
as compound or rather it constitutes the
most conspicuous part of this secondary redistri
bution&quot;- (First Principles, 119, note).
but we look upon none of these changes
as changes in the line of progress or
evolution. On the contrary, we see at
once that they tend in the opposite
direction in the direction of dissolution
;
for, let them go on long enough and far
enough, and dissolution will be the in
evitable result. It is clear, then, that
we must seek for another law to con
dition this of progressive differentiation.
When is it that the transformation from
the homogeneous to the heterogeneous
means evolution, and when is it that it
means the reverse ? The answer to this
question will be found in a return to our
half-realised but now partly-forgotten
principle of unification. Add this to the
previously-enunciated doctrine of increas
ing heterogeneity, and the complete for
mula is reached. The differentiation of
an organism into many specialised parts
is one requirement of the developmental
process; the other requirement is seen
to be fulfilled when, and only when,
these various specialised parts become
more and more interdependent. Along
with advance towards increasing hetero
geneity there must also be an advance
towards completer organic unity. Apply
this new statement of the law to the
cases above referred to, and it will be
seen immediately that the want before
felt is now made good. A cancer in the
system, a revolution in the state, while
they increase the complexity, break up
or jeopardise the unity, of organisation.
Evolution, therefore, as we have before
said, is always integration, as dissolution
s disintegration.
Thus we have followed Spencer to
:he establishment of his world-famous
brmula of evolution in its completed
shape. Abstract and concise as it is in
tatement, it will now be found to present
no insuperable difficulty, for we haveTHE SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY
reached it by a route that has made each
part of it separately clear. Evolution,
! then, is to be defined as a ^continuous
change from indefinite incoherent homo
geneity to definite coherent heterogeneity
of structure and function, through suc
cessive differentiations and integrations.*
The world at large has a horror of
abstract statements, and there is in the
air a vague, but none the less influential,
belief that because long and unfamiliar
words are often used to disguise paucity
of thought, paucity of thought must
always be predicated where they are
employed. It is not surprising, there
fore, that many people are more inclined
to ridicule this formula than to attempt
to understand it ; it is surprising only
when we find men of philosophic culti
vation following the same vulgar course.
Professor Goldwin Smith it was, I
believe, who years ago remarked that
the universe must have heaved a sigh of
relief when this explanation of her pro
cesses was given to an astonished
world through the cerebration of a dis
tinguished thinker. Perhaps we may
be allowed to smile at the epigram
without losing one particle of our faith
in the doctrine which it is sometimes
supposed to bring into disrepute. But of
1 In a purely introductory volume like the
present, I have thought it best to give this
definition in the simplest form compatible with
complete statement In its most fully developed
shape it runs : EvoJi^ion is an integration^ of
matter and concomitant dissipation of motion;
during which the matter passes from an indefinite
incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent
heterogeneity ; and during which the retained
motion undergoes a parallel transformation
(First Principles, 145). Practically speaking,
what we mainly have to keep in mind is that
evolution is a double-sided process multiformity
in unity, or specialisation along with mutual
dependence.
all the efforts hitherto made to meet a
great principle with the weapons of
verbal wit, that of Mr. Kirkman, the
well-known mathematician, holds an easy
supremacy. Taking the formula as it
stood in the edition of First Principles
of 1862 the statement there given
differing slightly from that adopted later
he undertakes to translate it &quot;into
plain English,&quot; and the following jargon
of uncouth phraseology is the result :
&quot; Evolution is a change from a nohowish,
untalkaboutable, all-alikeness to a some-
howish and in-general talkaboutable, not-
all-alikeness, by continuous something-
elseifications and sticktogetherations.&quot;
For myself, I can only say that I regret
that Spencer ever saw fit to take this
amusing exhibition of intellectual gym
nastics seriously, as he did in the
appendix to the fourth edition of First
Principles. As a joke it is well enough ;
but a man who knows so little about the
needs of language that he puts it forth
in place of argument, and appears to
think that he has thereby made short
work of the principle that the formula
embodies, is surely not worth powder
and shot. Provided that Mr. Kirkman s
translation is absolutely accurate (which
in one or two points may be taken as
doubtful), and provided, further, that
the English compounds which he offers
in place of the Greek and Latin equiva
lents can be made to bear the same high
degree of generality that the original
words convey, then all that it is neces
sary to say is that the principle remains
just as true in the one form of statement







it pleases him best to do so ; it none the
less remains a fact that the double change
towards diversity in unity is that inTHE SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY 53
which all evolution will be found to
consist. Translate the whole formula
into Hottentot or Cherokee if you like ;
the truth for which it stands will not be
made a whit less true.
V.
But with the formulation of this all-
pervading process we reach only the
starting-point of a fresh investigation.
Philosophy the complete unification of
knowledge demands the re-statement
of the law of evolution in deductive
form. Such being the transformation
exhibited by all classes of concrete
phenomena, we have to ask : Why this
continuous metamorphosis? We have
formulated the ultimate uniformities of
that metamorphosis the laws to which,
as we symbolically say, it everywhere
conforms. We must now seek the
rationale of the universal changes induc
tively set forth must undertake to
interpret them as necessary consequences
of some deeper law, in the same way as
Kepler s empirical generalisations may
be interpreted as necessary consequences
of the law of gravitation.
In thus undertaking to present the phe
nomena of evolution in synthetic order,
Spencer starts from the law of the insta
bility of the homogeneous, itself a corol
lary from the persistence of force. The
condition of homogeneity is a condition
of unstable equilibrium, because in any
finite homogeneous aggregate the different
parts are unequally exposed to incident
forces. Moreover,
&quot;
every mass or part
of a mass, on which a force falls, sub
divides, aiad differentiates that force,
which thereupon proceeds to work a
variety of changes&quot;; and while every,
caufte thus produces more Jthan _one_
effecjt, with the result that complexity:
*****^^T^ i ii
&quot; &quot;^^^
continually increases, and with con
tinually-increasing rapidity, the process
of segregation, &quot;tending ever to sub
divide unlike units and to bring together
like units,&quot; serves at the same time &quot;to
sharpen or make definite differentiations
otherwise caused.&quot; Thus we have three
comprehensive laws the instability of
the homogeneous, the multiplication of
effects, and segregation by which to
account for the continual changes which
we call evolution ; we now see not only
that these universal changes do take
place, but also why they must take place.
Nor is this all. These three laws are in
turn exhibited as deductions from the
deepest of all truths as inevitable results
of the persistence of force under the
forms of matter and motion. In this way
the circle of induction and deduction is
made complete.
While the foregoing outline has had
for its main purpose the exposition of
the fundamental principles of the
Synthetic Philosophy, it should also have
helped, as we anticipated that it would,
to make clear the method pursued by
Spencer in the working out of his system.
But as this is a point upon which we
cannot well be too explicit, I shall com
plete this survey by following his own
account (given to me in a letter after the
publication of the first edition of this
little book) of the course of thought by
which he was led to the formulation of
the ideas above summarised. This will,
indeed, involve some little repetition,
but not enough, considering the some
what abstruse nature of the subject, to
give cause for regret.
The simple nucleus of his philosophic
system, he told me, first made its appear
ance in Social Statics, where, in the
.chapter entitled &quot;General Considera
tions,&quot; mention is made of the biological
truth that low types of animals are54 THE SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY
relatively homogeneous are composed of
many like parts not mutually dependent ;
while higher animals are relatively hetero
geneous are composed of parts that are
unlike and are mutually dependent.
This, he wrote,
&quot; was an induction which
I had reached in the course of biological
studies mainly, I fancy, while attend
ing Professor Owen s lectures on the
vertebrate skeleton.&quot; With this was
joined the statement that the same is
true of societies,
&quot; which begin with many
like parts not mutually dependent, and
end with many unlike parts that are
mutually dependent.&quot; This, again, was
an induction. &quot;And then in the joining
of these came the induction that the
individual organism and the social
organism followed this law.&quot; Thus the
radical conception of the entire system
took shape before Spencer became ac
quainted with Von Baer s law, which, as
we have seen, did not occur till two
years later. Yet this law, though apply
ing to the unfolding of the individual
organism only, had its use. In furnish
ing the expression,
&quot; from homogeneity
to heterogeneity,&quot; it presented a con
venient intellectual implement, for, &quot;by
its brevity and its applicability to all
orders of phenomena, it served for think
ing much better than the preceding
generalisation, which contained the same
essential thought.&quot; The essays which
followed Social Statics were marked by
the establishment of various separate in
ductions, in which other groups of pheno
mena were brought under this large prin
ciple ; while in the first edition of the Psy
chology not only was this principle shown
to comprehend mental phenomena, but
there was also recognised the primary law
of evolution integration and increase in
defmiteness. What followed may best
be given in Spencer s own words I
Then it was that there suddenly arose in
me the conception that the law which I
had separately recognised in various groups
of phenomena was a universal law applying
to the whole cosmos : the many small in
ductions were merged in the large induc
tion. And only after this largest induction
had been formed did there arise the ques
tion Why? Only then did I see that the
universal cause for the universal transforma
tions was the multiplication of effects, and
that they might be deduced from the law
of the multiplication of effects. The same
thing happened at later stages. The
generalisation which immediately preceded
the publication of the essay on Progress :
Its Law and Cause the instability of the
homogeneous was also an induction. So
was the direction of motion and the rhythm
of motion. Then, having arrived at these
tterivative causes of the universal trans
formation, it presently dawned upon me
(in consequence of the recent promulgation
of the doctrine of the conservation of
force) that all these derivative causes were
sequences from that universal cause. The
question had, I believe, arisen Why these
several derivative laws ? and that came as
an answer. Only then did there arise the
idea of developing the whole of the uni
versal transformation from the persistence
of force. So you see that the process
began by being inductive, and ended by
being deductive; and this is the peculiarity
of the method followed. On the one hand,
I was never content with any truth remain
ing in the inductive form. On the other
hand, I was never content with allowing a
deductive interpretation to go unverified
by reference to the facts.
The body of philosophy wrought by
this two-fold method into a firmly-knit
logical whole may thus be described as




One supremely important point must
here be noted, to prevent possible mis
apprehensions.
It is a common error to suppose that
1 The work was originally announced simply
as A System of Philosophy. The distinctive
title was adopted in 1867.FIRST PRINCIPLES 55
evolution is continuous and uninter
rupted that its course may be sym
bolised by a straight line. A wavy line
would, roughly speaking, be its more
correct expression. An immediate corol
lary from Spencer s first principle of the
persistence of force is, as we have seen,
the law of the rhythm of motion. Were
there only a single body in space, a
single force would impel that body at a
uniform rate to all eternity along an un-
deviating course ; but in that case no
variety would ever arise, and no evolu
tion would be possible. As it is, the
processes of evolution and dissolution
are continually in conflict, locally and
generally ; and since throughout the
whole universe motion is rhythmical or
undulatory, evolution necessarily implies
dissolution. This is true of all pheno
mena, from the minutest changes cog
nisable by science to the latest transfor
mation of societies studied by the
economist and the historian.
1
1
Diagrammatically, making allowance for the
rhythm of all motion and the consequent alterna
tion of evolution and dissolution (progress and
retrogression), the history of the universe in
general and detail may be approximately pre
sented in this way
:
it being understood that, while each of the
smallest lines is supposed itself to be made up of
undulations and so on in a diminishing scale, the
whole diagram as here given is likewise only a
limb of a larger rhythm, and this again of a still
larger rhythm, ad ittfinitum. In other words,
as the minute undulations, a, b, c, d, e,f, g, etc.,
are components of the larger undulations A, B, C,
etc., and these again of the still larger undula
tions AA, BB, CC, etc., these still larger undu
lations A A, BB, CC, themselves go to make up
vaster sweeps of rhythm, and so forth, to any
Evolution, then, as we have always to
bear in mind, does not sum up the entire
history of the universe, but only its as
cending history. All existence passes
through a cycle of change, and sooner or
later dissolution asserts itself to undo the
work that evolution has done. Indi
viduals die, organisms disintegrate, socie
ties collapse, races and civilisations are
extinguished ; and in the life and death
of a gnat we thus find a tiny symbol of
the pulsations that produce the birth and
decay of worlds. Thus we have through
out to recognise the ascending and the
descending scale, and to understand
that the one is the necessary comple
ment of the other. The flood of new
light that this consideration lets in upon
the problems of psychology and sociology
is only now just beginning to be appre
ciated ;
z but the mind staggers before its
extent. All this reminds us of De Morgan s
verses :
&quot; Great fleas have little fleas upon their backs
to bite em,
And little fleas have lesser fleas, and so ad
infmitum ;
And the great fleas themselves, in turn, have
greater fleas to go on,
And these again have greater still, and greater
still, and so on.&quot;
1 The law of rhythm, when once fully recog
nised by the student of human affairs, will intro
duce important changes into the philosophy of
history. In other practical directions its in
fluence promises to be at least as significant.
Dealing with various illustrations of it, as fur
nished by individual and social life, Spencer
wrote :
&quot; Nor are there wanting evidences of
mental undulations greater in length than any
of these [which he had just been considering]
undulations which take weeks, or months, or
years, to complete themselves. We continually
hear of moods which recur at intervals. Very
many persons have their epochs of vivacity and
depression. There are periods of industry follow
ing periods of idleness, and times at which par
ticular subjects or tastes are cultivated with zeal,FIRST PRINCIPLES
larger possible implications. If the doc
trine of rhythm of the alternation of
evolution and dissolution holds good
of every detail of the universe, it must
hold good no less of the universe taken
as a whole. We pause a moment upon
the conception of eternal change-
eternal in the past, eternal in the future
to which this doctrine unavoidably
leads. &quot;Apparently the universally-co
existent forces of attraction and repulsion,
which, as we have seen, necessitate
rhythm in all minor changes throughout
the universe, also necessitate rhythm in
the totality of its changes produce now
an immeasurable period during which
the attractive forces, predominating,
cause universal concentration, and then
an immeasurable period during which
alternating with times at which theyare neglected.
Respecting which slow oscillations, the only
qualification to be made is that, being affected
by numerous influences, they are comparatively
irregular
&quot;
(First Principles, 86). The follow
ing striking passage from Dr. O. W. Holmes s
Over the Teacups (chap, viii.) reads almost like




think if patients and physicians were in the habit
of recognising the fact I am going to mention,
both would be gainers It is a mistake to
suppose that the normal course of health is repre
sented by a straight horizontal line. Indepen
dently of the well-known causes which raise or
depress the standard of vitality, there seems to
be I think I may venture to say there is a
rhythmic undulation in the flow of the vital
force. The dynamo which furnishes the work
ing powers of consciousness and action has its
annual, its monthly, its diurnal waves even its
momentary ripples in the current it furnishes.
There are greater and lesser curves in the move
ment of every day s life a series of ascending
and descending movements ; a periodicity de
pending on the very nature of the force at work
in the living organism. Thus we have our good
seasons and our bad seasons, our good days and
our bad days, life climbing and descending in
long or short undulations, which I have called
the curve of health.&quot;
the repulsive forces, predominating, cause
universal diffusion alternate eras of evo
lution and dissolution. And thus there
is suggested the conception of a past
during which there have been successive
evolutions analogous to that which is
now going on ; and a future during which
successive other such evolutions may go
on ever the same in principle, but
never the same in concrete result.&quot;
1
VII.
We may supplement this brief survey
of some of the main doctrines of Hrst
Principles by the following summary of
his philosophy which Spencer himself
drew up a number of years ago for publi
cation in Appleton s American Cyclo-
pcsdia^ and which is here reproduced
from that work:
1. Throughout the universe, in general
and in detail, there is an unceasing redis
tribution of matter and motion.
2. This redistribution constitutes ^volu
tion where there is a predominant integra
tion of matter and dissipation of motion,
and constitutes dissolution where there is
a predominant absorption of motion and
disintegration of matter.
3. Evolution is simple when the process
of integration, or theTormation of a coherent
aggregate, proceeds uncomplicated by other
processes.
4. Evolution is corujiuujTd when along
with this primarychange from an incoherent
to a coherent state there go on secondary
changes, due to differences in the circum
stances of the different parts of the aggre
gate.
5. These secondary changes constitute a
transformation of the homogeneous into
the heterogeneous a transformation which,
like the first, is exhibited in the universe as
a whole and in all (or nearly all) its details
in the aggregate of stars and nebulae ; in
the planetary system ; in the earth as an
inorganic mass
; in each organism, &quot;vegetal
or animal (Von Baer s law) ; in the aggre
gate of organisms throughout geologic
1 First Principles, 1 8.}.FIRST PRINCIPLES
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time
; in the mind
; in society ; in all pro
ducts of social activity.
6. The process ofLJritegratioii, acting
locally as well as generally, combines wit!
the process of differentiation to rencTeFfrik
change, not simply fro.ru homogeneity to
heterogeneity, but from an indefinite homo
geneity^to a definite heterogeneity; and
this trait of increasing defmiteness, whicl
accompanies the trait of increasing hetero
geneity, is, like it, exhibited in the totality
of things, and in all its divisions and sub
divisions down to the minutest.
7. Along with this redistribution of the
matter composing any evolving aggregate were goes on a redistribution of theretainec
motion^ of i ts com ponelnFTn~reIatioirto~oiie
another ; this also becomes, step by step, more definitely heterogeneous.
8. In the absC of a. homogeneity that
is infinite and absolute, this redistribution,
of which evolution is one phase, is inevit
able. The causes which necessitate it are:
9- The
instability of the homoL-eneoj)^ which is consequent upon the different
exposures of the different parts of any
limited aggregate to incident forces. TJie,
transformations hence resulting are com
plicated by
10. The multiplication of_effects
: every mass and parrot a mass on which a force
falls subdivides and differentiates that force, which thereupon proceeds to work a variety of changes; and each of these becomes the
parent of similarly multiplying changes
:
the multiplication ofthese becoming greater
in proportion as the aggregate becomes
more heterogeneous. And these two
causes of increasing differentiations are
furthered by
11. Segregation, which is a process
tending ever to separate unlike units, and
to bring together like units, so serving
continually to sharpen or make definite
differentiations otherwise caused.
12. Equilibration is the final result of
these transformations which an evolving
aggregate undergoes. The changes go on
until there is reached an&quot; equilibrium
between the forces which all parts of the
aggregate are exposed to, and the forces
these parts oppose to them. Equilibration
may pass through a transition stage of
balanced motions(as in a planetary system), or of balanced functions (as in a living
body), on the way to ultimate equilibrium ; but the state of rest in inorganir bodies, or
death in organic bodies, is the necessary limit of the changes constituting evolution.
13. Dissolution is the counterchange which sooner or later every evolved
aggregate undergoes. Remaining exposed
to surrounding forces that are unequili-
brated, each aggregate is ever liable to be
dissipated by the increase, gradual or
sudden, of its contained motion
; and its
dissipation, quickly undergone by bodies
lately animate, and slowly undergone by
inanimate masses, remains to be under
gone at an indefinitely remote period by
each planetary and stellar mass, which,
since an indefinitely remote period in the
past, has been slowly evolving
: the cycle
of its transformations being thus com
pleted.
14. This rhythm of evolution and dis
solution, completing itself during short
periods in small aggregates, and in the
vast aggregates distributed through space
completing itself in periods which are
immeasurable by human thought, is, so far
as we can see, universal and eternal : each
alternating phase of the process predomi
natingnow in this region of space, and
now in that as local conditions deter
mine.
15. All these phenomena, from their
great features down to their minutest
details, are necessary results of the per
sistence of force under its forms of matter
and motion. Given these in their known
distributions through space, and their
quantities being unchangeable, either by
increase or decrease, there inevitably result
the continuous redistributions distinguish
able as evolution and dissolution, as well
as all those special traits above enumerated.
16. That which persists, unchanging in
quantity, but ever-changing in form, under
these sensible appearances which the
universe presents to us, transcends human
cnowledge and conception ; is an unknown
and an unknowable power, which we are
obliged to recognise as without limit in
space, and without beginning or end in
ime.
VIII.
The whole body of philosophy, or
completely-unified knowledge, Spencer
divides into two parts
:
&quot; On the one
land, the things contemplated may be
he universal truths &quot;~aTTparficiilar truths
eferred to being used simply for proof
&amp;gt;r elucidation of these universal truths.THE PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOG^ &quot;
On the other hand, setting out with the
universal truths as granted, the things
contemplated may be the particular
truths as interpreted by them. In both
cases we deal with the universal truths
;
but in the one case they are passive, ;md
in the other case active in the one case
they form the products of exploration,
and in the other case the instruments of
exploration. These divisions we may
appropriately call General Philosophy
and Special Philosophy respectively.&quot;
1
General Philosophy forms the subject-
matter of First Principles ; the remaining
nine volumes of the Synthetic series are
devoted to the task of applying the
universal truths there formulated to
the particular phenomena of Biology,
Psychology, Sociology, and Ethics.
Some of the most striking features of
Spencer s treatment of the two last-
named subjects will be dealt with in the
following chapters their more obviously
practical bearings justifying this special
consideration. The rest of the present
chapter will be devoted to the earlier
portions of the work.
The aim of the Principles of Biology
was, as Spencer himself stated in the
preface,
&quot; to set forth the general truths
of biology as illustrative of and as inter
preted by the laws of evolution.&quot; Due
notice must be taken of the phrase
&quot;the general truths of biology.&quot; To
write an exhaustive treatise on the
subject was no part of Spencer s plan,
which called only for such a co-ordina
tion and synthesis of fundamental prin
ciples as, expressed in terms of the
universal laws of evolution, and finally
affiliated upon the ultimate truth, would
present in broadest outline the science
of life. Students of these two volumes
1 First Principles, 38.
have also need to bear in mind that they
were published at a time when the whole
question of evolution was still under
fierce discussion, and when even the
scientific world itself was divided into
hostile camps over every issue involved.
Hence the special historic significance,
over and above the general philosophic
significance, of Part III., setting forth
the arguments in favour of the develop
ment-hypothesis, and dealing with the
factors of organic evolution. Beyond
this, little needs to be said by way of
introduction to the work. Attention
may, however, be directed to the law of
equilibration, and some of its more
significant bearings.
1
Life being defined as
&quot; the continuous
adjustment of internal relations to
external relations,&quot; Spencer proceeds to
show that the degree of life varies as
the correspondence varies between
organism and environment
; the highest
point being reached where the corres
pondence exhibits a maximum of com
plexity, rapidity, and length of main
tenance. Lack of correspondence
-
that is, inability on the part of an
organism to balance external actions by
internal actions, or, in other words, to
meet the demands of the environment
at every point -means death
; absolutely
perfect adjustment, on the other hand,
would be absolutely perfect life. Observe,
then, that equilibration, biologically con
sidered, expresses the tendency on the
1 The general law is worked out in full in
First Principles, Part II., chap. xxii. The
question is there raised Can the changes con
stituting evolution go on without limit ? And
the answer is, No.
&quot; The changes go on until
there is reached an equilibrium between the
forces which all parts of the aggregate are
exposed to, and the forces these parts oppose to
them.&quot; Hence, in all cases,
&quot; there is a pro
gress toward equilibrium.&quot;THE PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY 59
part of an organism to adjust itself more
and more completely to an environment
which, it must be remembered, is itself
in a state of perpetual change. Now,
such equilibration may be direct or
indirect. It is direct when the organism
responds immediately to the demands of
its surroundings. It is indirect where
variations which are in the line of greater
correspondence are gathered up, because
they favour continuance of life, and
transmitted to following generations.
When these statements are looked at
closely, a very interesting fact comes to
light. While investigating the law of
equilibration, we have at the same time
been formulating the factors of organic
evolution. For, clearly, the doctrine
of direct equilibration is the doctrine,
specially associated with the name of
Lamarck, that changes in structure are
brought about by those changes in
function which are produced by the
conditions of life
; while the doctrine of
indirect equilibration is simply Darwin s
great doctrine of natural selection, or
the survival of the fittest in the struggle
for existence.
Nor is this all. By virtue of the light
which the law of equilibration throws
upon the vexed question of population,
and, therefore, in turn, upon the whole
problem of the future of the human
race, it has also an immediate practical
interest.
This problem, with its intimate con
nection with the facts of animal fertility,
began seriously to engage the attention
of thinkers towards the close of the
eighteenth century. One remarkable
outgrowth of the generous ardour and
enthusiasm which accompanied the
earlier developments of the French Revo
lution was the strong belief in human
perfectibility which suddenly took pos
session of some of the finest minds of
the age. It seemed only necessary to
throw off the numerous political and
social shackles of the past, to get rid of
the tyrannies of kingcraft and priesrc
ro.ft
and aristocracies, and to break the fetters
of degrading forms and customs that
had been handed down from the past ;
it seemed only necessary, in a word, to
give men and women free play, and the
brightest dreams of poet and seer would
turn forthwith into still brighter realities.
Something of the intense thrill of this
great new hope we can catch in the
earlier books of Wordsworth s Prelude ;
as in the later books we come into
immediate touch with that numbing
sense of disappointment and despair
which settled down over the conscious
ness of the world when it was realised
that France had indeed failed to make
good the magnificent promises of 1789.
We know how that practical failure
brought the whole doctrine of human
progress for a time into disrepute
:
such a work as Chateaubriand s Essai
sur ks Revolutions Andennes et Modernes
being simply one indication of a wide
spread reaction in thought. Meanwhile,
expressive as it may now well seem to us
to be of this sad change from sanguine
expectation to doubt and despondency,
appeared in 1798 the first edition of one
of the world s epoch-making books
Malthus s Essay on the Principle of
Population.^ The central doctrine of
! &quot; There is nothing new but what has been
forgotten,&quot; says a clever French paradox. For
the sake of those interested in what Buckle
called the
&quot;
paternity of ideas,&quot; it may be pointed
out that, original as the work of Malthus seemed
to be, he was not without predecessors in his
own chosen field. One Townsend, in an ac
count of a journey through Spain, had already
broached the problem of the relation of human
population to the means of support ; and even6o THE PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY
that book the work, strangely enough,
of an Englishclergyman of the Establishec
Church struck a deadly blow at the
gorgeous speculations of humanitarian
dreamers. The earthly Eden which men
had declared to be at hand was now pro
nounced an impossibility. For Malthus
showed conclusively, as it seemed to
himself and to many others of his and
later times, that the world is and always
must be over-populated, and that the
pressure of humanity upon the means of
subsistence is not an accident, but a
necessity. If, therefore, it is inevitable
that human beings should increase much
more rapidly than their sustenance,
misery in one form or the other is a
necessary accompaniment of human life ;
and wholesale death by mere starvation
is only prevented by the operation of
other factors which have hitherto com
bined to prevent population from run
ning too far in advance of its material
of support. Let progressive civilisation
interfere with these factors, as it con
stantly tends to do let it decrease
wars, plagues, excessive and premature
mortality, vices of various kinds, and
enforced or voluntary celibacy and
upon the removal of these hitherto
stringent preventive checks a universal
battle for life would ensue. Hence it Is
useless to indulge in lyric enthusiasms
about the reign of plenty and the king
dom of peace and love upon earth. The
reign of plenty is a myth, the kingdom
of peace and love an airy fiction. To
all such gorgeous visions a death-blow
was given by the revelation of an ever-
he had a precursor in that great writer who
foreshadowed so many peculiarly modern ideas





his Dictionttairc Philosophique.) The subject
had also been touched by Hume and Benjamin
Franklin.
lasting and inevitable want of balance
between human population and its means
of support.
1
Malthus s book came upon the world
with the blight of disillusion. Its con
clusions were widely accepted; its
theories passed into the economist s
recognised body of thought ; the optim
ism which had characterised eighteenth-
century thought was at an end.3
Remembering this, we are in a position
to appreciate the importance of Spencer s
own contribution to the subject. A pro
found investigation of the whole question
of multiplication, asexual and sexual, sub
human and human, leads him to the con
clusion, established as usual inductively
and deductively, that, while excess of fer
tility has been and continues to be the
cause of evolution, every fresh step in that
evolution itself necessitates, in its turn, a
decline in fertility. That human popu
lation will forever continue to press
upon the means of human subsistence,
as Malthus supposed, is therefore not a
1 How pregnant were Malthus s speculations
s shown by the fact that it is in this essay of his
hat we find the starting-point of Darwin s own
development of thought the development which
presently culminated in the Origin of Species.
jiven this universal over-population, and it is
clear that wholesale destruction must be all the
time at work. As animals and plants are thus
perpetually tending to increase faster than their
means of sustenance, a struggle among them
mustresult ; and in this struggle those individuals
of every species are likely to conquer and sur
vive which are equipped for the conflict by even
the most minute variations favouring them in
gaining food and avoiding enemies. (See
Darwin s own introduction to the sixth edition
of the Origin of Species.)
3
It must not be forgotten that the Essay was
inspired by Godwin s writings, and was thus
immediately directed against the current Uto-
pianism. For its effect on the feeling of the
time, see the Preface to Shelley s anti-reactionary
poem, The Revolt of Islam.THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 6l
fact. Individuation and reproduction are
in necessary antagonism ; advance in the
former must be followed by decrease in
the latter
; and a gradual approach will
thus be made towards an equilibrium
&quot; between the number of new indi




thus not a permanent factor, as is implied
in the Malthusian view ; and pressure of
population and its accompanying evils,
instead of remaining the one problem
to be encountered all along the line of
human progress, must gradually work
itself out altogether
:
The excess of fertility has itself rendered
the process of civilisation inevitable ; and
the process of civilisation must inevitably
diminish fertility, and at last destroy its
excess. From the beginning pressure of
population has been the proximate cause
of progress. It produced the original
diffusion of the race. It compelled men
to abandon predatory habits and take to
agriculture. It led to the clearing of the
earth s surface. It forced men into the
social state ; made social organisation
inevitable ; and has developed the social
sentiments. It has stimulated to progres
sive improvements in production and to
increased skill and intelligence. It is daily
thrusting us into closer contact and more
mutually dependent relationships. And,
after having caused, as it ultimately must,
the due peopling of the globe, and the
raising of all its habitable parts into the
highest state of culture after having
brought all processes for the satisfaction
of human wants to perfection after having,
at the same time, developed the intellect
into complete competency for its work, and
the feelings into complete fitness for social
life after having done all this, the pressure
of population, as it gradually finishes its
work, must gradually bring itself to an
end.
2
Thus the curse pronounced by
Malthus is stripped of its terror, and a
way of return is opened to the older
faith in the progress of mankind. And
1
Principles of Biology, 377.
*
Ibid, 376.
it may be noted in passing that this
faculty for discovering the soul of good
ness in things which, superficially viewed,
seem entirely evil is highly characteristic
of Spencer s whole course of thought.
The doctrine of evolution so depressing
to many, and, within recent years, so
often used as the basis of a pessimistic
philosophy is by him habitually inter
preted upon the optimistic side. By its
aid, again and again, in Emerson s
picturesque phrase, he has converted
&quot;the Furies into Muses and the hells
into benefit.&quot;
IX.
Many competent critics have regarded
the Principles ofPsychology as Spencer s
greatest achievement, and not, perhaps,
without good cause. Nowhere else,
certainly, could we find a more striking
exhibition of his magnificent powers of
both analysis and synthesis, of his clear
perception of the significance of the
minutest details, of his daring sweep of
generalisation and deduction, of his firm
control over the longest and most intri
cate chains of reasoning. To the phe
nomena of no other subject, it may be
added, have evolutionary principles been
applied with more conspicuous results.
The old psychology had been purely
statical. Its subject-matter had been
the manifestations of intelligence in the
modern civilised adult ; and a hard-and-
fast line had been drawn between these
and all the manifestations of intelligence
exhibited by the subhuman world. Mind
in man was held to differ absolutely
and generically from mind in animals ;
and no study of the latter could be
resorted to in the hope of throwing light
upon the problems of the former. The
foolish antithesis of instinct and reason
s a sturdy survival of this old thought.62 THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY
This traditional course, followed unques-
tioningly from generation to generation,
and by school after school of meta
physicians, had naturally carried the
subject of psychology but little beyond
the point reached by the fantastic specu
lations of mediaeval scholasticism. Evo
lution offered the student an entirely
new standpoint. Its great principle of
the continuity of all phenomena, applied
to the problems of intelligence, showed
that all absolute distinctions, here as
elsewhere, are mere subjective illusions.
Between mind in its highest develop
ment and mind in its first dim awaken
ings no boundary can anywhere be set ;
and the complex intellect of the modern
adult, so far from being treated as a thing
unique and apart, has thus henceforth
to be regarded as the production of the
compounding and recompounding of
simpler and still simpler elements. Mind
is to be understood only in the light of
its evolution.
As in the Principles of Biology, then,
the general truths of life were interpreted
through the fundamental laws of evolu
tion, so in the Principles of Psychology
the facts and problems of mind are
elucidated in the same way. Given the
nervous shock,
1 which Spencer distin-
1 Such is the word employed by Spencer, but
he strictly means psychical shock. Anxious as
he was throughout his argument to keep the
psychical phenomena
distinct from their physical
accompaniments, it is a little curious that he
should have slipped into such an unfortunate use
of the word &quot;nervous&quot; a word that threatens
to blur the whole issue. When, by the severest
analysis, we have followed psychical action
down to its faint dawn in a simple response
to the stimulus of the environment, we are no
nearer than we were at the opening of the
inquiry to a comprehension of the passage from
nervous action to psychical action ; that passage
still remains, as Tyndall said, unthinkable. We
have not explained how sensation arises ; we do
guishes as the primordial and unresolv-
able element, or ultimate unit, of con
sciousness, the business of scientific
psychology is to follow the process of
progressive integration and differentia
tion, step by step, from reflex action,
through sensation, instinct, memory,
reason, the feelings, and the will, relating
their progressive changes at every point
with corresponding changes in the
nervous system. But more than this :
the principle of continuity further warns
us against any attempt to fix a barrier
between physiological and psychological
phenomena. The manifestations of
physical and mental activity have also
their unity of composition, for the life of
the body and mental life are species, of
which life, properly so called, is the
genus.
Though we commonly regard mental
and bodily life as distinct, it needs only
to ascend somewhat above the ordinary
point of view to see that they are but
subdivisions of life in general, and that no
line of demarcation can be drawn between
them otherwise than arbitrarily. Doubt
less, to those who persist after the popular
fashion in contemplating only the extreme
forms of the two, this assertion will appear as
incredible as the assertion that a tree arises
by imperceptible changes out of a seed,
would appear to one who had seen none of
the intermediate stages [But] it is not
more certain that, from the simple reflex
action by which the infant sucks, up to the
elaborate reasoning of the adult man, the
progress
is by daily infinitesimal steps, than
it is certain that between the automatic
actions of the lowest creatures and the
not know how it is possible. And thus, as psy
chological analysis carries us no further than the
psychical shock, it is with this, and not with the
physical side of the double process, that synthesis
must begin. (See on this point the very interest
ing note on p. 444 of vol. ii. of Fiske s Cosmic
Philosophy. Mr. Fiske ventured to change
&quot;nervous&quot; to
&quot;psychical,&quot; and adds that
Spencer authorised him to say that in so doing
he had his concurrence.)THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY
highest conscious actions of the human
race a series of actions displayed by the
various tribes of the animal kingdom may
be so placed as to render it impossible to
say of any one step in the series, Here intel
ligence begins.
1
The method of investigation that evo
lution has thus rendered possible has
achieved, along with many other splendid
triumphs, one very notable success. It
has effected a permanent compromise
between two great antagonistic schools
of psychology the experimentalist and
the transcendentalist, or the followers of
Locke on the other hand and those of
Leibnitz and Kant on the other. This
famous dispute, which antedated by
centuries the celebrated philosophers
with whose names it is now generally
associated, and which, before the rise of
the doctrine of evolution, promised to be
perennial, concerned the nature of the
human faculty.
&quot; All our knowledge is
derived from experience
&quot; was the funda
mental dictum of the empiricists.
&quot; On
the contrary,&quot; replied their opponents,
&quot; we possess ideas which transcend expe
rience which are innate.&quot; Spencer,
approaching the whole question from
the evolutionary side, saw that the contro
versy from first to last was a controversy
of partial views. The weakness of each
system was that it accepted a portion of
the truth for the entire truth. To say
that, antecedent to experience, the mind
is an absolute blank is, as he pointed
out, to ignore the essential questions,
&quot; Whence comes the power of organising
experiences? whence arise the different
degrees of that power possessed by
different races of organisms and different
individuals of the same race ?&quot;
2 But is
this to throw up the empirical case
altogether ? Not at all. The pre-estab-
1
Principles of Psychology (first edition).
*
Principles of Psychology, 208.
lished internal relations of the innateness
of which so much is made by the
idealists, if transcendent to the experi
ences of the individual, are not transcen
dent to that vast chain of ancestral expe
rience, running back through ages of
barbarism and animality to the lowest
beginnings of life, of which the present
individual is only the terminal link. The
moment the venue of discussion was
changed from the limited area of indi
vidual experience to the immeasurable
area of universal experience the ancient
difficulty vanished. What the tran
scendentalist called a priori principles
the evolutionist regards as a priori indeed
to the individual, but a posteriori to the
race ; that is, as race experiences which in
the individual appear as intuitions. We
need no longer quarrel, therefore, over the
so-called &quot;forms of thought,&quot; and the
question of relative potential intellec
tuality becomes clear. Of a surety the
doctrine of evolution is a great moderator
of philosophic discords, and, since it is
notorious that philosophic discords have
been almost as fierce and obstinate as
controversies in the theological arena, it
should receive a generous meed of the
blessing promised to peacemakers.
A word of warning must be added ere
we close these few paragraphs on the
Spencerian psychology.
A superficial reading of what has just
been written concerning the continuity
of phenomena, and the impossibility of
drawing any dividing line between
physical and psychical life, might only
too easily lead the unwary student to
conclude that Spencer s doctrines end
in materialism pure and simple. This,
indeed, is the popular view of the matter,
held to with stolid tenacity despite
continual protest and repeated disproof.
Yet on no point did Spencer endeavour64 THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY
to make himself more explicit. Already
in the concluding paragraphs of First
Principles^ had done his utmost to show
that the arguments contained in that work
lend no support whatever to either of the
current antagonistic views respecting the
ultimate nature of things.
&quot; Their impli
cations are no more materialistic than
they are spiritualistic; and no more
spiritualistic than they are materialistic,&quot;
he there asserted ; sinceour antitheticcon
ceptions of spirit and matter, necessary
as they must seem to us, are still nothing
more than symbols of the Unknown
Reality which underlies both. Develop
ing this truth more fully in the Principles
of Psychology, he thus declared himself
in the chapter on





Here we arrive at the barrier which
needs to be perpetually pointed out, alike
to those who seek materialistic explanations
of mental phenomena and to those who
are alarmed lest such explanations may be
found. This last class prove by their fear,
almost as much as the first prove by their
hope, that they believe Mind may possibly
be interpreted in terms of Matter; whereas
many whom they vituperate as materialists
are profoundly convinced that there is not
the remotest possibility of so interpreting
them. For those who, not deterred by
foregone conclusions, have pushed their
analysis to the uttermost see very clearly
that the concept we form to ourselves of
Matter is but the symbol of some form of
power absolutely and forever unknown to
us
; and a symbol which we cannot suppose
to be like the reality without involving our
selves in contradictions (First Principles,
1 6). They also see that the representa
tion of all objective activities in terms of
Motion is but a representation of them,
and not a knowledge of them ; and that we
are immediately brought to alternative
absurdities if we assume the Power mani
fested to us as Motion
fo be in itself that
which we conceive as Motion (First Princi
ples, 17). When with these conclusions,
that Matter and Motion as we think them,
are but symbolic of unknowable forms of
existence, we join the conclusion lately
reached that Mind also is unknowable, and
that the simplest form under which we can
think of its substance is but a symbol of
something that can never be rendered into
thought ; we see that the whole question is
at last nothing more than the question
whether these symbols should be expressed
in terms of those or those in terms of these
a question scarcely worth deciding, since
either answer leaves us as completely out
side of the reality as we were at first.
The battle of Spiritualism and Mate
rialism is, therefore, a battle merely of
symbols and of words.
How thoroughly unmaterialistic is
Spencer s whole view of the question
is made manifest by the paragraph im
mediately following the one from which
the above extract is taken. Here he
distinctly says, once and for all,
&quot;
that
were we compelled to choose between
the alternatives of translating mental
phenomena into physical phenomena,
or of translating physical phenomena
into mental phenomena, the latter alter
native would seem the more acceptable
of the two.&quot; He proceeds to give, in
the course of a long paragraph which
well deserves the closest attention, his
reasons for this assertion ; and conclud
ing that &quot;of the two it seems easier
to translate so-called Matter into
so-called Spirit than to translate
so-called Spirit into so-called Matter
(which latter is, indeed, wholly impos
sible),&quot; he again reminds us that, after
all, &quot;no translation can carry us beyond
our symbols.&quot; After this, only the
familiar ignorance, carelessness, and per
versity of the general religious world
can explain the fact that even to-day
Spencer s teachings are frequently de
nounced as &quot;materialistic.&quot; It is sur
prising how often the shortsightedness
of the theologians has led them to treat
with antagonism men who, if they only
knew it, should rather be reckoned




SPENCER S social and political teachings
are familiar enough in their main out
lines to readers who otherwise know
little or nothing of his works. The
most popularly written and widely cir
culated of his books the Education
alone excepted are those which deal
directly with the problems arising from
the relations of citizens to government
and to one another. In the pages of
Social Statics, The Study of Sociology, and
TheMan versus The State, these problems
in their multifarious aspects are handled
with
extraordinary force, clearness, and
felicity of illustration
; and, though first
principles are kept in view throughout,
and are shown to constitute the firm
foundation of every doctrine advanced
though in this way philosophic coherence
and consistency are given to every chain
of reasoning the popular standpoint is
that adopted ; the arguments are directed
rather to the general reader than to the
special student. Bythelargerpublic, there
fore, the individualistic principles which
form the core of all his political teach
ings are accepted or rejected without any
thought of their relation to his philo
sophic system as a whole; how they
fall into the body of his work, and
what exact place they occupy there, are
questions that seldom come up for
consideration.
This is the more natural because,
even when we have grown tired, as
Zschokke put it, of
&quot;living in the furnished
lodgings of
tradition,&quot; very few of us
have thought out for ourselves a syste-
matised theory of life. We have what
we are pleased to call our ideas (usually
more correctly to be described as our
feelings) about most things; and the
less we understand of a subject the
stronger our assertions of opinion are
likely to be. But these ideas rarely
hang together among themselves are
rarely attached to any deep underlying
principles. Their roots run down into
the emotions ; the&amp;gt; draw their nourish
ment thence; and some accident of
early education, environment, self-
interest, or class-bias, gives them, un
known to ourselves, their special form
and colour. It is curious in studying
our friends we are less likely to observe
such inconsistencies in ourselves to
find, in consequence, what a strange
umble of contradictory notions the
najority of them manage to find room
for, without for a moment seeming to
mperil thereby their self-satisfaction or
jeace of mind. The assertive radical,
Drought face to face with some novel
orm of an old question, unexpectedly
developes a rabid conservatism : the
bigoted conservative advocates on some
pecial isolated point doctrines which,
pplied to other and perhaps more
familiar issues, he would look upon with
horror. Men who are urging the world
forward in one direction are holding it
back in others; and the gospels of
yesterday and to-morrow are proclaimed
in one breath by the same preacher.
Few realise the absurdity of all this ; few66 THE SPENCERIAN SOCIOLOGY
are aware of the anarchy of thought and
incongruity of social aims to which it
must inevitably give rise; fewer still,
perhaps, understand that it is due to the
absence in most men even in those of
general intelligence and more than
average culture of a methodical habit
of mind, and the guiding power of
some great central principles, to the
touchstone of which every judgment and
opinion may be brought.
Caring nothing for the coherence of
their own ideas, most readers naturally
fail to inquire into the coherence of the
ideas of other people. Hence they are
willing to deal with that one department
of the Spencerian thought which happens
to come under their particular notice
without troubling to raise the question
of its connection with other departments.
Spencer s individualism may or may not
organically belong to and of necessity
grow out of the principles of evolution
as expounded by him
; but, while they
will discuss the individualism itself, this
is the last matter that is likely to
detain them. Hence it is precisely this
point we propose to deal with here. To
expound Spencer s social and political
views in their practical applications
would, considering how frequently and
in what popular language he himself set
them forth, be a work of supererogation ;
to discuss them would lie outside the
scope of our plan. But to show how
these views are affiliated upon the main
body of his thought will be to carry out
to the full the design of this introduc
tion.
1
1 There is the more need todo this, first, because
many otherwise loyal adherents of Spencerianism
have refused to follow their teacher into the
extremes of his political thought ; and, secondly,
because of the opinion, widely diffused among
them, that his social doctrines, espoused long
II.





grow,&quot; struck the men of his
time as singularly original and sugges
tive ; which will not surprise us when we
remember the purely mechanical theories
of social history which had stood un
challenged during the eighteenth cen
tury, and were still current when he
wrote. But, as Spencer says,
&quot;in our




that it was ever thought so signifi
cant.&quot; Not only has the principle enun
ciated in it long since passed into a
commonplace, but from the evolutionary
standpoint we all now see that it forms
but a small&quot; portion of a much larger
truth. Under all its aspects and through
all its ramifications society itself is the
result of slow and natural development,
not of artificial contrivance a growth
and not a manufacture. This means
that it must be dealt with not as a
mechanism, but as a living thing.
The comparison between society and
an individual organism had been in
stituted before Spencer s time, but in
a way too vague for it to be productive
of much result. Spencer, in taking the
matter up among his earlier studies,
endeavoured to do something more than
point out more or less fanciful analogies.
Utilising the comprehensive generalisa
tions of modern biology, he undertook
to indicate the real parallelisms.
1
before the working out of his general system,
have since been cleverly dovetailed into that
system, and form no proper part of it. As this
whole subject is a vast and complicated one for
brief treatment, I may be perhaps allowed to
record that Spencer himself expressed entire
satisfaction with my analysis of his arguments
and conclusions.
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These are four in number, and may
be summarised in succinct statement
thus :
1. Commencing as small aggregations,
both societies and individual organisms
insensibly augment in mass, in some
instances eventually reaching a bulk ten
thousand times greater than their original
size.
2. _At
first so simple in structure as to be
considered structureless, both societies and
individual organisms assume in the course
of their growth a continually increasing
complexity of structure.
3. In a society in its early undeveloped
state, as in an individual organism in its
early and undeveloped state, there exists
scarcely any mutual dependence of parts ;
in both cases the parts gradually acquire a
mutual dependence, and this becomes at
last so great that the life and activity of
each part are made possible only by the
life and activity of the rest.
4. The life and development of a society,
like the life and development of an indi
vidual organism, are independent of and
far more prolonged than the life and
development of any of its component units, who severally are born, grow, reproduce,
and die, while the body politic composed
of them survives generation after genera
tion, increasing in mass, completeness of
structure, and functional activity.
Consideration of these striking parallel
isms will reveal the fact that the most
important of them the second and third
in the above tabulation present ele
ments that bring the growth of society
directly under the general law of evolu
tion. Societies, like individual organ
isms, pass, during the course of their
development, from simplicity to com
plexity of structure, at the same time
that their various parts gradually acquire
greater and greater mutual dependence ;
in other words, the changes undergone
by them are in the direction at once of
on &quot;The Social Organism&quot; (first published in the
Westminster Review for January, 1860), were
subsequently worked out in detail in the Prin
ciples of Sociology, Part II. See also the essay
increasing heterogeneity and of increasing
unity. It may, indeed, be remarked
incidentally that no more conspicuous
illustrations of the formula of evolution
can be found than those furnished by the
study of social growth. Barbarous
tribes, lowest in the scale of development,
are nothing but loose, almost homogene
ous, aggregations of individuals and
families, living in contiguity, but hardly
at all depending one upon another.
Powers and functions are practically alike/
the only marked differences being those
which accompany difference of sex.
&quot;Every man is warrior, hunter, fisher
man, toolmaker, builder ; every woman
performs the same drudgeries
&quot;
that is,
there is as yet no specialisation of parts ;
and similarly, &quot;every family is self-
sufficing, and, save for purposes of
aggression and defence, might as well
live apart from the rest
&quot;
there is little
or no mutual dependence. Very early,
however, important changes manifest
themselves. Differentiation begins. With
the appearance of some kind of chieftain
ship arises distinction between the gov
erning and the governed; and as this
distinction grows more and more decided,
the controlling agencies themselves grad
ually break up, and in course of time
develop into the highly complex political
organisations of semi-civilised and civi
lised lands. Meanwhile the accompanying
industrial divergencies are even more
ignificant. Individuals, no longer con
tinuing to perform for themselves all the
functions necessary for the preservation
of their own lives and the lives of those
immediately connected with them, begin
to devote themselves to separate kinds
of occupation; whence arise the first
suggestions of that industrial specialisa
tion which has been carried to such anTHE SPEXCERIAN SOCIOLOGY
every year is tending to become more
marked. But one all-important fact must
never be lost sight of. These changes
along the line of ever-increasing hetero
geneity can go on step by step only in
combination with corresponding changes
along the line of ever-increasing integra
tion. The governing agency can assume
the labours and responsibilities of over
sight, guidance, and direction only by
being relieved, to a degree proportionate
to the demand of these upon it, of the
daily strain of providing for its own wants.
In this way alone can the regulative and
maintaining agencies become distinct.
Similarly with the industrial changes
themselves. As soon as any one indi
vidual limits himself to the performance
of one particular life-sustaining function,
for which he may possess unusual apti
tude, he must necessarily become
dependent upon the rest of the com
munity to the extent of the functions left
unfulfilled by him
; while he performs
certain functions in excess, and thereby
benefits others, others must also perform
functions in excess for his benefit.
Hence, it is clear that, if society is to
maintain its corporate life, no differentia
tion can take place without integration ;
increase of specialisation in social changes
is not only accompanied by increase of
mutual dependence, but is absolutely
impossible without it.
From the first stages of social growth
to the developments recorded in yester
day s newspaper, what we call progress
has everywhere been marked by the same
characteristics. All changes in the line
of advance have been changes rendering
the social structure more complex while
increasing its organic unity ; and this
double-sided movement has by this time
gone so far that we are to-day witnessing
its effects in the modified inter-relations
of the great nations of the civilised world.
The new thought of the solidarity of the
human race simply reminds us of the
application of the evolutionary principle
to the widest possible issues. For not
only are the great nations becoming more
and more completely specialised and
unified within themselves, but the civilised
world is itself slowly developing into a
vast organic whole, made up of many
such highly differentiated but mutually
dependent aggregations.
Two important aspects of the prin
ciples here indicated must now be re-
emphasised as presenting truths to which
we shall recur later on. ^ In the first
place, in the social as in the individual
organism, repetition of similar parts
implies a relatively low stage of
development, higher stages being charac
terised by the marking off of special
organs for the performance of special
functions. In the second place, the
activity of every organ being limited,
adequate performance of its special
function by each organ is incompatible
with continuance on its part to perform
other functions. That its own function
may be duly carried on, it must be
relieved by other organs of the need for
sustaining other activities. \
Having thus indicated the principal
parallelisms between societies and indi
vidual organisms, Spencer proceeds to
point out their chief differences. As
there is no necessity here for us to follow
him into his consideration and discussion
of these, we will confine ourselves to the
briefest enumeration of them. He finds
the contrasts also to be four in number :
1. Societies have no specific external
forms.
2. The living tissue whereof an individual
organism consists forms a continuous mass ;
the living elements of a society do not form
a continuous mass, but are mojc or le^sTHE SPENCER1AN SOCIOLOGY 69
widely dispersed over some portion of the
earth s surface.
3. The ultimate living- elements of an
individual organism are mostly fixed in
their relative positions ; those of the social
organism are capable of moving from
place to place.
4. In the body of an animal only a
special tissue is endowed with feeling ; in
a society all the members are endowed
with feeling.
With much ingenuity Spencer labours
to show that these obvious contrasts are
neither so fundamental nor so important
as would at first sight appear. This part
of the matter, however, does not now
concern us. But the last-named distinc
tion between the social and the individual
organism should be looked at a little
more closely, because it points to a pro
found truth of immediate moment to us
here. For what does this distinction
imply? It implies nothing less than this
that there is a radical difference
between the relations of parts and whole
in the individual organism, and the rela
tions of parts and whole in the social
organism.
While in individual bodies the welfare
of all other parts is rightly subservient to
the welfare of the nervous system, whose
pleasurable or painful activities make up
the good or ill of life ; in bodies politic the
same thing does not hold, or holds to but
a very slight extent. It is well that the
lives of all parts of an animal should be
merged in the life of the whole, because
the whole has a corporate consciousness
capable of happiness or misery. But it is
not so with a society, since its living units
do not and cannot lose individual con
sciousness, and since the community as a
whole has no corporate consciousness.
And this is an everlasting reason why the
welfares of citizens cannot rightly be sacri
ficed to some supposed benefit of the State :
but why, on the other hand, the State is to
be maintained solely for the benefit of
citizens. The corporate life must here be
subservient to the lives of the parts, instead
of the lives of the parts being subservient
to the corporate life.
1
1
&quot;The Social Organism&quot; (Essays, vol. i.).
III.
This, which at first sight might seem
to be a conclusion standing by itself, and
of no further use to us, may for present
purposes be taken as a new point of
departure. Let us examine in detail the
question of the relations of parts to
whole in the social organism.
From the earliest developments of
gregariousness to the latest extension of
governmental activity, the only ultimate
authority for the restraints exercised by
society in its corporate capacity over its
individual members is the welfare of the
individual members. The welfare of
society is the proximate end only ; the
final end is the welfare of the units of
which the society is composed. This
has been made clear by the above con
siderations. But does this mean that
the relations of the individual to the
corporate life should be or could be of a
stable or unchanging character ? From
the evolutionary standpoint such an idea
is on the face of it untenable. On the
contrary, such relations must inevitably
vary with the varying conditions of social
growth. The social organism, like all
other organisms whatsoever, must mould
the activities of its inner life in response
to outer needs. Only by adequately
meeting those needs can its existence be
maintained, and, while the ultimate end
of social organisation can never be other
than that alleged, furtherance of that
ultimate end may often be impossible,
save by temporary postponement of it to
the proximate end ; in other words, the
welfare of society may have to take pre
cedence of the welfare of the individual,
and individual life be sacrificed to social
preservation. We may put the matter
even more strongly, and state at once
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end, that of social preservation, has
habitually been of prime importance,
the claims of the individual in contra
distinction to those of the corporate body
having only gradually emerged as vital
issues. In all transitional states, indeed,
the relations of which we speak must
necessarily be relations of compromise ;
but such compromise will favour the
whole as against the parts, or the parts
as against the whole, according to the
type of social organisation the type
itself being evolved in answer to the
medium of social needs. The question
therefore arises, How do the general
conditions of any given society tend to
determine the relations of its citizens to
the State ?
The evolution of life at large, alike in
its higher and in its lower forms, has
been possible only because in the average
of cases there has throughout been a
definite connection between conduct and
consequence. But for the fact that
individuals structurally best adapted to
the conditions of their existence have
prospered by means of such fuller
adaptation, while individuals less favour
ably endowed have dropped out in the
struggle for existence, no advance in life
could ever have taken place. This law,
which, ethically enunciated, becomes the
principle that each individual ought to
receive the good and evil arising from
his own nature, is the primary law of
existence, holding good of all creatures,
and qualified in those living solitary lives
only by that
&quot; self-subordination needed
among the higher of them for the rearing
of offspring.&quot;
In non-gregarious creatures, therefore,
the only conflict is between self-subserv
ing and race-subserving activities; and
species which do not postpone in
requisite degrees the former class ol
activities to the latter will inevitably
disappear. But in gregarious creatures
another factor comes into play. Each
individual in the pursuit of his own
satisfactions must be prevented from
interfering with the similar pursuit of
their own satisfactions on the part of
others ; for in the absence of such pre
vention an associated state would be
impossible, and each individual would
lose the benefits that co-operation would
bring. The associated state, therefore,
demands, in addition to that large post
ponement of self to offspring which lies
at the bottom of all life, a constant post
ponement of self to fellows, negatively
by restraint of actions that impede, and
positively by performance of actions that
further, the fullest and most harmonious
co-operation.
Putting these two principles together,
we are able to establish an important
conclusion. The prerequisite of life in
general embodied in the first must be
qualified in the way indicated by the
second when the individual, no longer
isolated, lives in association with others
whose presence and claims necessarily
limit the range of his activities. Hence
we reach the formula of absolute justice.
1
.
1 This may be the proper place to point out a
distinctive feature in Spencer s Ethics the
separation of absolute from relative ethics.
Absolutely right conduct is conduct having no
concomitant of pain, or painful consequences,
either to self or others ; all other conduct,
though it may be relatively right, or the least
wrong possible in the circumstances, is not abso
lutely right. In the drawing up of a code of
absolute morality, therefore, we must consider
the ideal man in an ideal state of society ; and
relative morality must then aim to approximate
to this as closely as is possible under any given
conditions. In discussing the Spencerian ethics
this vital distinction must never be lost sight of.
See Data of Ethics, chap, xv., and compare thisTHE SPENCERIAN SOCIOLOGY
&quot;
Every man is free to do that which he
wills, provided he infringes not the equal
freedom of any other man.&quot;
But now we have to notice that under
certain conditions these abstract prin
ciples require still further qualification.
The ultimate authority for the existence
of the associated state is, as we have
seen, the increased welfare that all its
individual units are enabled to obtain
by means of it. This renders the pre
servation of the associated state itself of
the first importance; and when it is
imperilled, sacrifice of the individual to
secure its continuance receives strong
ethical sanction. This fact gives us the
clue for which we are in search in our
inquiry as to how the relations of citizen
to .State depend upon existing social
conditions. For the welfare of the indi
vidual can only, ethically considered,
take entire and immediate precedence of
the welfare of the community at large so
long as the community itself is not in
danger in other words, during periods
of sustained peace. During periods of
military activity or preparation that is,
when rightly or wrongly it is supposed
that the community is jeopardised from
without the individual has, to a large
extent, to be made subservient to the
State, often even to the extent of being
called upon to surrender property and
life to aid in keeping the social structure
intact.
We see, then, that in the social organ
ism the relations of parts to whole
depend upon the average activities of the
whole. So long as the community is
engaged in a struggle for existence with
antagonistic communities, its corporate
with Social Statics, Part I., chap, i., and the
article on &quot;Absolute Political Ethics&quot; (Essays,
vol. iii. ).
life has to be maintained at any cost even
at the cost of its component units ; and
societies in which this necessity is most
completely met stand, other things equal,
the best chance of preservation. Sanc
tion for the temporary postponement of
the individual to the State is thus
obtained ; but this sanction holds good
only so long as the specified conditions
continue. Just as soon as the external
struggle for existence ceases, the sanction
for the postponement of the individual
to the State can no longer be alleged,
and all qualification lapses in regard to
the principles above set forth.
IV.
Before we can appreciate the full signi
ficance of this conclusion, we must look
at the matter for a moment from a some
what different point of view.
Theoretically, three kinds of social
aggregation may be distinguished, accord
ing to the purposes which association is
intended to subserve. Men may group
themselves together (i) merely for the
sake of companionship ; (2) for combined
action against enemies, animal or human,
or both
; or (3) for better satisfaction by
means of reciprocal aid of the various
requirements of life higher as well as
lower.
1 The resulting aggregates may
1
Justice, 102. All this does not, of course,
mean that men have ever consciously banded
themselves together for any one or more of
these purposes. We have here nothing to do
with the monstrous fiction of a social contract,
which was one of the favourite theories of earlier
political speculation, from the days of Hobbes
and Locke onward, and which at the hands of its
greatest exponent, Rousseau, became charged
with immense revolutionary power. We simply
recognise that, according to obtaining conditions,
association has been naturally brought about here
in response to one kind of demand, there in
response to another.THE SPENCERIAN SOCIOLOGY
be defined respectively as non-co-opera
tive, military, and industrial.
Of the first an instance is found in the
case of the Esquimaux, who live in
groups, but who, having no external
enemies, never combine for purposes of
corporate offence and defence, and
among whom industrial co-operation has
gone no further than a division of labour
between man and wife in each separate
family. Examples of the second class
are of course very numerous, and may
be found in the purest form in &quot;hunting-
tribes at large, the activities of which
alternate between chasing animals and
going to war with one another,&quot; and in
which industrial co-operation, if exhibited
at all, is exhibited only in a very rudi
mentary way. When we come to the
third division we are met, in search for
illustrations, by the difficulty arising from
lack of material. The purely industrial
society does not yet exist in a developed
form. A few perfectly peaceful tribes
are to be found here and there in the
world like the Bodos, the Dhimals, and
the Kocchs who, never needing to
combine for aggression or defence, do
yet to some extent render mutual assist
ance in the simple activities of their
daily lives. But all advanced peoples
without exception, as well as most of
those relatively low down in the scale of
civilisation, yield examples of association
for the achievement of all the three ends
above distinguished. The desire for
social intercourse is satisfied ; life is
made easier and larger by means of
industrial co-operation ; but at the same
time there is still need for corporate
action, if not of an aggressive, then, at
any rate, of a defensive nature.
Now, the fact that ^ven the most fully
industrialised of developed societies are
still ^off-military in their constitution
introduces us to an important truth.
Antagonistic as are the military and the
industrial activities, throughout the whole
course of social evolution, from the
very beginning until now, the former
has played a main part in the develop
ment of the latter. But for war, little
advance would have been possible. War
has been essentially the consolidating
factor, and its ever-widening sweep has
in the upshot only cleared a larger area
for the play of industrial forces. Each
new integration brought about by con
quest has ultimately changed the warlike
relations formerly existing between the
communities integrated into relations of
a peaceful character; their interests,
instead of being antagonistic, become
interdependent. As this process, which
has gone on from the earliest dawn of
human history, continues, its results,
though of the same general nature, will
be on a grander scale. Eventually, war
will bring about its own destruction by
aiding in the production, throughout a
world-area, of those industrial conditions
which will render anti-industrial relations
henceforth impossible.
Recognising this fact which is indeed
one of too much significance ever to be
lost sight of we can understand how it
is that even the most highly-civilised
nations are still in a transitional state.
A factor of supreme importance in the
earlier stages of their development, war,
though of ever-decreasing importance in
their more advanced stages, has, down
to quite recent times, played a large
part in the unification of national inte
rests, which is one phase of all social
progress. Hence, we can for the time
being reach nothing better than a com
promise between the demands of military
co-operation on the one hand and the
demands of industrial co-operation onTHE SPENCERIAN SOCIOLOGY 7.3
the other. But here a further distinction
is to be made. This compromise, for
merly in favour of the military claims,
is now (in some modern countries con
siderably and in a few markedly) in
favour of the industrial claims. While
hitherto the all-important thing was to
keep up military efficiency, and industry
was valued only to the extent to which
it aided in doing this, now, on the con
trary, industrial growth is the all-impor
tant thing, and military efficiency is
valued only in so far as, by yielding
adequate protection, it furthers peaceful
co-operation. Hence, though, among
the more advanced societies, we cannot
specify any as absolutely military or
absolutely industrial, we can still divide
them according as the warlike activi
ties take precedence of the peaceful, or
the reverse, into two classes, which we
may call the military-industrial and the
industrial-military.
What, now, should we infer to be, and
do we actually find to be, the character
istic differences of these two classes of
societies? Their most salient and
fundamental points of distinction may
be briefly summarised.
1
In the military-industrial type, the
corporate life being the unit of organi
sation, we have centralised control,
despotic rule, and widely-ramified grada
tions of rank. As reflecting the average
life of the community, the religion is
one of enmity is marked by the pro
minence of stern doctrines and a vindic
tive spirit ; while the ecclesiastical system
exhibits an elaborate hierarchy closely
resembling the hierarchy of the political
system. Meanwhile, industrial activi
ties, regarded only as factors for the sus-
Principles of Sociology, 258-262. See
also the article on
&quot;
Specialised Administration.
tentation of the military system, are not
only despised as vulgar, but are more cr
less subjected to State interference and
control ; and since it is the welfare of
the State that is always held in view, the
general life of the community is dealt
with in any way that may seem to secure
higher corporate capacity. Thus the
rtgime is one of compulsory co-opera
tion. The individual belongs to the
State and exists for the State.
Over against this we may set the
leading characteristics of the industrial-
military type. The need for such cor
porate action as is called for in war
having largely lapsed, there is a relative
absence of centralised control
; demo
cratic rule gradually supersedes despotic
rule; and the old gradations of rank
slowly lose their meaning and tend to
disappear. The harsher traits of the reli
gious creed drop away, and, in answer
to the peaceful life of the society, gentler
and more humane aspects come into
relief. Along with this goes the breaking
up of the ecclesiastical as of the political
hierarchy, and the rise and spread of
nonconformity. Industrial activities, no
longer considered only as furnishing
maintenance for the State, little by little
rise in general esteem and free them
selves from State control and dicta
tion, while the individual, ceasing to
be simply a servant of the general com
munity, refuses to tolerate the inter
ference of the community in the various
pursuits of his private life. This is the
regime of voluntary co-operation. The
State exists simply for the individual.
)
It is hardly necessary to say that,
omitting the many other cases that
might be cited in illustration, the history
of civilisation during the past three or
four hundred years has shown, along
with gradual decrease in military activity,74 THE SPENCERIAN SOCIOLOGY
a distinct, though of course by no means
regular,movement away from the military-
industrial type of social organisation and
towards the industrial-military type.
This movement, though general, has
gone further in some countries than in
others ; and the contrast presented to-day
between England and America on the
one hand, and the great continental
nations of Europe on the other, is a
striking and instructive one. All this is
manifest enough; but there is another
point, equally significant in its way, that
might easily escape attention. The
metamorphosis in question goes on only
while conditions remain favourable; as
soon as they become unfavourable, a
retrograde tendency asserts itself almost
immediately. No lessons of recent
history are more weighty than those
taught by this social atavism. After
remarking, in the course of one of his
many contributions to the discussion of
this subject, that, just before the civil
war in America, industrialisation had




ation had almost disappeared, and every
thing martial had fallen into contempt,
Spencer continues :
During the late war in America Mr
Seward s boast&quot;! touch this bell, and
any man in the remotest State is a prisoner
of the Government
&quot;
(a boast which was
not an empty one, and which was by many
of the Republican party greatly applauded
shows us how rapidly, along with militan
activities, there tends to be resumed the
needful type of centralised structure, and
how there quickly grow up the correspond
ing sentiments and ideas. Our own historj
since 1815 has shown a double change o
this kind. During the thirty years peac
the militant organisation dwindled, th
military sentiment greatly decreased, th
industrial organisation rapidly developed
the assertion of the individuality of th&amp;lt;
citizen became more decided, and man&amp;gt;
restrictive and despotic regulations wer
ot rid of. Conversely, since the revival
f militant activities and structures on the
Continent our own offensive and defensive
tructures have been redeveloping ; and
he tendency towards increase of that
entralised control which accompanies such
tructures has become marked.
1
Could we do so without committing
ourselves to an unmanageable digres
sion, we might profitably consider this
subject in some of its remoter bear-
ngs. For to indicate a few points
only the marked increase in military
activity which has taken place among
ourselves during recent years has not
only brought about this increase in
centralised control and corresponding
tendency to tamper with the liberty of
the individual, but has also been neces
sarily accompanied by the revival of
many characteristics of the military type
of society excessive loyalty to rulers;
deference to authority; reassertion of
the claims of the privileged classes ;
greater activity and power of the priest
hood ; intellectual reaction all along the
line. Nor is this all. Less obvious, but
not less important, changes may mean
while be noted in the general temper of
society. The recrudescence of militarism
and the national spirit of aggression has
everywhere called into play the feelings
which properly belong to the stage of
barbarism; and the love of violence is
shown (among countless other ways) by
the immense popularity of all kinds of
literature and art which deal with deeds
of turbulence and bloodshed; by the
current mania for athleticism and the wor
ship of physical strength and prowess; and
by the re-establishment of brutal sports.
It is a truth which few people seem able
to appreciate that there is a vital relation
ship between the character of the life of
&quot;Specialised
Administration.&quot; See also
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a society and the character of the lives
of its component units ; that national
violence will be always attended by indi
vidual violence ; and that, in a word, it
is practically useless to preach the gospel
of love to the men and women of a
nation while the nation itself is living
according to the gospel of hate.
1
But now, .returning to the main line
of our argument, we have to ask : What
practical conclusions are we to draw
from the inquiries which we have insti
tuted ?
First, that the rise of individual inde
pendence of the State, and the decrease
of State meddling with the multitudinous
affairs of private life, have naturally
accompanied the gradual decline of
militancy and the slow reconstruction
of the great nations of the world upon
an industrial basis. Such has been
throughout the most noteworthy char
acteristic of social evolution.
2
Secondly,
that as, from first to last, the end to be
achieved by society in its corporate
capacity is the welfare of its units, the
ethical warrant for the coercion of the
individual by the State, derived from the
condition of war, disappears as war
itself ceases, and cannot be alleged as
holding for a condition of peace. And,
thirdly, that those who seek to reverse
the order of social evolution by re-expan
sion of the scope of State activity and
power are endeavouring to fit down
artificially a system belonging properly
1 This is a truth upon which Spencer was
never weary of insisting, and to which he re
turned in his very last book (see the essay on
&quot;
Re-Barbarisation,&quot; in Facts and Comments).
2 An interesting side-light is thrown upon
this whole question of the gradual development
of personality by such books as Sidney Lanier s
English Novel and Mr. H. M. Posnett s Com






to one type of social structure upon the
other type of social structure, which
has all along been outgrowing it are
engaged, therefore, in a retrogressive
enterprise, which is in the very nature of
things foredoomed to disaster.
1
V.
But these conclusions, important
though they are, do not represent the
whole of the case. Not only during the
course of social development does ethical
sanction for btatS: interference with the
individual gradually decliny, !;;; .
relinquishment of such interference is
seen, from the evolutionary point of
view, to be a necessary accompaniment
of the increasingly adequate performance
on the part of government of the special
functions for which it is properly respon
sible.
Here we must revert to the principle
of the physiological division of labour,
already touched upon. It has been
shown that repetition of similar parts,
whether in an individual structure or in
society, implies lowness of organisation,
evolution being everywhere characterised
by the complexity resulting from the
multiplication of different parts fulfilling
different duties. Beyond this it has
been made clear that specialisation of
function brings with it limitation of
function.
&quot; At the same time that each
part grows adapted to the particular
duty it has to discharge it grows un
it is not by accident that socialistic schemes
flourish most in a military atmosphere. In
Germany,
&quot; where militancy is most pronounced,
and where the regulation of citizens is most
elaborate, socialism is most highly developed ;
and from the head of the German military
system has now come the proposal of regimental
regulations for the working classes throughout
Europe
&quot;
(Justice, 26).76 THE SPENCERIAN SOCIOLOGY
adapted to all other duties&quot;
1 a truth
exemplified alike in biology and in poli
tical economy. The application of this
principle to the matter in hand is obvious.
&quot; The governmental part of the body
politic exemplifies this truth equally with
its other parts. In virtue of this uni
versal law, a Government cannot gain
ability to perform its special work without
losing such ability as it had to perform
other work.&quot;
2
Hence we must meet, with a more
definite answer -than has yet been given.
or implied, the question, What is the
jfk of a Government?
We have said that trie only ultimate
sanction for social organisation in any
form is the welfare of the individual
units. Co-operation secures for all a
larger and fuller life than each could
secure for himself; and the business of
the community in its corporate capacity
is to maintain the conditions which make
co-operation possible. How can it do
this? By protecting the individual in
such a way that in each case the funda
mental laws of life shall not be interfered
with ; in other words, by securing that
state of things which enables each citizen
to receive the full benefit of his character
and activities, subject only to the limita
tions necessarily imposed upon him by
the presence of fellow-citizens having like
claims.
That this, and this alone, is the true
function of the State, is proved (though
not only in this way) by the striking fact
that, whatever may have been the other
duties assumed or rejected by Govern
ments in various places and at different
1 &quot;
Representative Government : What is i
good
for?&quot; (Essays, vol. iii.).
Ibid. Compare the essay on
&quot;
Over-Legis
lati^n&quot; (Essays, vol. iii.).
imes, this duty has never been over-
ooked. The earliest and the latest
developments of social structure, differ
though they may in every other respect,
alike hold this end in view. Positive
regulation of the citizen by the com
munity has varied all the world over,
and varies still in extent, rigour, and
direction ; negative regulation has uni
formly been accepted, theoretically at
any rate, as coming directly within the
range of governmental activity.
This is clearly brought out by a com
parison of the military and industrial
types of society. We have seen that
the relation of the individual to the
community immediately depends upon
the social structure evolved in response
to average needs. Yet though, where
the activities are predominantly warlike,
the unit apparently exists for the sake of
the whole, while where the activities are
predominantly peaceful the whole clearly
exists for the sake of the unit, in each
case the ethical authority for State regu
lation, be this small or great, is ulti
mately the maintenance of the conditions
pre-requisite to peaceful co-operation.
During periods of antagonistic relations
with other communities the main busi
ness of government, therefore, is to pro
tect society from external enemies,
internal regulation being wholly subser
vient to this special end. When, with
the gradual cessation of war, this func
tion lapses, there remains still the duty
of maintaining the conditions pre
requisite to peaceful co-operation in
other ways namely, by protecting
society from internal enemies. And
now let us note the supremely important
inference. In the one case, as in the
other, ethical sanction warrants the
interference of the State with the indi
vidual so far as is necessary to achieveTHE SPENCERIAN SOCIOLOGY 77
the object here set forth, and no further.
As in the military regime no moral right
can be shown to exist for State coercion
of citizens beyond the point required
for successful resistance to antagonistic
societies, so in the industrial regime no
moral right can be shown to exist for
State coercion of citizens beyond the
point required for successful resistance
to antagonistic units ; State functions are
ethically limited to the maintenance of
strictly equitable relations among the
separate members of the community.
Thus we come round from another side
to the formula of abstract justice already
given. Every man must be held free to
do that which he wills, provided only he
infringes not the equal freedom of other
men ; and the duty of the State is to
guard each individual citizen from such
infringement. When the State itself
commits such infringement, therefore, it
not only exceeds its duty, but it becomes
actually guilty of that which it is its
immediate and express duty to prevent.
Such, then, is the proper function of
the State, and in fitting itself more com
pletely for this the State necessarily, as
we have seen, becomes less fit for any
thing else. In low, undeveloped forms
of society the essential work of protec
tion against enemies, internal and ex
ternal, is performed with extreme imper
fection, at the same time that it is
encumbered with countless other kinds
of work which do not appertain to
government at all. But with social
evolution progressive differentiation,
while gradually relieving me ruling
agency of these multitudinous extra I
duties, enables it to discharge its own
particular function with
ever-increasing
efficiency. Thus the natural tendency
is towards specialised administration
towards the production of a type of
government best adapted for the proper
work of government, and therefore least
adapted for any other sort of work
whatsoever.
This doctrine has been called by all
sorts of hard names, not only by avowed






who, while they would be horrified at
the thought of being identified with the
socialists, are constantly favouring move
ments that are socialistic under the
thinnest possible disguise. But it is safe
to say that the majority of those who are
so loud in their anathemas of Spencer s
individualism are utterly unaware that it
has anything but a negative side.
Familiar with Spencer s unmeasured
denunciation of State interference
denunciation everywhere backed up by
long arrays of facts they seem to think
that there the matter ends. But
there the matter does not end. The
truth, already implied in the above con
siderations, and now to be definitely set
forth, is simply this : that while Spencer
protests against the continual meddling
of Government with affairs that do not
concern it, he advocates at the same
time a more and more complete and
conscientious discharge on its part of
the business that properly falls within its
scope. Hitherto, and at the present
time, over-legislation, where legislation is
not wanted, has inevitably been accom
panied by under-legislation where legisla
tion is sadly called for; things are
regulated that ought to be left to take
care of themselves, and, as a necessary
consequence, other things are left to take
care of themselves that ought to be
regulated. Spencer always sought to
1 See particularly the essay on
&quot;
Representa
tive Government : What is it good for ?&quot;THE SPENCERTAN SOCIOLOGY
turn the scale to the other side curtail
ing governmental activity in one direc
tion, but expanding
it in another.




(October 2oth, 1882) there
is a passage of special interest bearing
directly upon this point.
&quot;But we
thought, Mr. Spencer,&quot; said the inter
viewer, referring to some remarks that
had just passed concerning the relation
of the individual to the community,
&quot;
you were in favour of free government
in the sense of relaxed restraints, and
letting men and things very much alone,





is a persistent mis
understanding of my opponents. Every
where, along with the reprobation of
government intrusion into various
spheres where private activities should
be left to themselves, I have contended
that in its special sphere the mainte
nance of equitable relations among
citizens governmental action should be
extended and elaborated.&quot;
How often this contention was made
by him careful study of even the more
popular of Spencer s political writings
will make clear. The question was one,
1
Reprinted in the collected edition of his
Essays, vol. iii.
indeed, to which he returned again and
again.
1 Meanwhile, as it is not our
purpose here to follow the general
doctrine that we have outlined into
details, we must rest content if we have
shown that this positive view of the
matter, so commonly lost sight of, is
nevertheless of the essence of the whole.
The object of this chapter, as stated at
the outset, has been not to expound
Spencer s social and political teachings
in their particular applications, or to
enter into any discussion of them from
so-called practical points of view, but to
indicate the principal lines of contact
between them and the body of his
thought. Enough has been said to prove
that his individualism, so far from being
artificially foisted on to the rest of his
system, as even some friendly critics
would have us believe, grows naturally
out of, and, therefore, properly belongs
to, it is an organic part of his general
doctrine of universal evolution.
1 See especially the essays, already so fre
quently referred to, on
&quot;
Representative Govern
ment,&quot; &quot;Over- Legislation,&quot; and &quot;Specialised
Administration&quot;; also &quot;Political Institutions,&quot;
passim; The Study of Sociology: Postscript;
andJustice, chap, xxv., which last compare with
Social Statics, chaps, xxi. , xxii.THE F.TmCAL SYSTEM OF SPENCER
CHAPTER V.
THE ETHICAL SYSTEM OF SPENCER
I.
HAS the doctrine of evolution modified
our conceptions of morality ? Has it in
any way helped to establish the prin
ciples of right living upon a firm, scientific
foundation ? These are questions that
meet us on the threshold of such a study
as we are to take up in the present
chapter, and they must be dealt with
before we can place Spencer s contribu
tions to ethical science in their proper
light, or understand their full signifi
cance.
The struggle of a new idea concerning
the universe with the old ideas whose
peaceful reign it disturbs almost invari
ably passes through two stages a stage
of positive antagonism and a stage of
high-handed conciliation. At the outset
it is war to the knife. Champions of
the older order rush into the lists, intent
on proving not so much that the new
thought is untrue as that it is inexpedient.
They ask the world not to examine the
evidence, but to calculate the conse
quences. If the ancient cosmology is
overthrown, and the philosophy of life
so long based upon it crumbles to pieces
as a necessary result, then, argues the
reactionist, we know what we have to
expect. The foundations of morality
will be swept away ; social disintegration
will follow; religion itself will perish. A
thousand pulpits take up the warning
cry ; the Press teems with hysterical
vaticinations ; strong voices are raised in
argument or appeal.
1 Amid all the
1
See, for example, Professor Goldwin Smith s
angry outcry and popular confusion that
ensues, the new thought holds secure its
tiny germ of life. While men work, and
wrangle, and sleep, it makes its silent
way ; and before the world realises the
vastness of the change that has been
wrought in its midst, the truth comes to
be recognised as true. Then, strangely
enough, we hear nothing more of the
disastrous consequences that were to
follow in its train. The moment for
conciliation has arrived, and the attitude
of the conservative is soon taken up.
Where is the need of all this excitement ?
he asks. We all know the thing is true
in theory; but, after all, it is only a
theory, and what difference does it make
one way or the other ? You are quite
overrating the practical importance of
the whole issue. The world is neither
better nor worse for the revelation. The
old religion is untouched, the old morality
remains just where it was before.
Through these two stages of experi
ence, no less than almost every other
great theory that science has given to
the world, the doctrine of evolution has
passed on its way to general recognition.
At first the Cassandra voices raised
against it were of the loudest and the
most persistent. The end of the moral
cosmos was at hand. Natural selection
was to give us a cold, bloodless system
of unrestrained appetite, untempered
egoism, unrelieved brutality, in place of
the benign and simple altruism of the
&amp;gt;owerful essay on &quot;Morality and Theism&quot; in
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Sermon on the Mount. The higher
feelings were to have no further play ;
every quality that had beautified the life
of saint and martyr and philanthropist
was to vanish before the new gospel of
the survival of the fittest in the universal
struggle for existence. Every one for
himself, and the weakest to the wall
that was to be the modern transliteration
of the Golden Rule, with what frightful
results to the humanity of the future it
was hardly needful to specify.
1 The
prophetic picture drawn was dire enough,
it is true; the more wonder surely (for
all this, let us remember, took place not
at the period of the Reformation, but
within the memory of men now living)
that it has so soon been all but forgotten.
For the intellectual offspring and repre
sentatives of these passionate opponents
of evolution in the early years of its
growth are anxious to have us know that
they at least are not afraid of it. Why
should they be ? It was, as they now
discover, implied in all their teaching long
before the days of Darwin and Spencer ;
and, as a matter of fact, it adds nothing,
one way or the other, to the discussion of
1 It is perhaps worth while to notice that, in
ethical speculations on the influence of the
doctrine of evolution, survival of the fittest is too
often taken to mean survival of the physically
strongest. This, for instance, is the mistake
made by Oliver Luttrel in Sir Walter Besant s
Bell of St. Paul s ; and his reasoning upon the
subject is characteristic of a widespread error in
general thought. The idea of the preservation
of altruistic instincts by the selection of the
groups in which these are strongest, and of the
development of clan-sympathies and paternal
feelings through the part these play in social
evolution, never seems to enter the popular
mind. Nor is the great fact commonly recog
nised that the qualities which ensure the survival
of a society may not be of advantage to the indi
vidual, except that indirectly he gains or suffers
with the group of which he is a unit.
the great practical questions of life. The
end of the moral cosmos at hand ? Oh,
no ; for evolution, though it may have
thrown some new light upon biology, has
nothing whatever to do with ethics.
Any attempt to work it out into practical
applications will only reveal its sterility.
Let the scientists do what they like about
it, then. We are not concerned. Our
morality is still the morality of them of
old time. Evolution has not changed it,
not even in the slightest particular.
In what sense it may be maintained
that there is a large element of truth in
this sweeping declaration, as well as
the careful qualification which it re
quires, will become clear later on.
There is one point, however, that
we may conveniently deal with at once.
It is commonly and properly said that
the whole edifice of modern science is
founded upon the datum of causation.
The belief in the uniformity of Nature
and of natural processes
is exactly that
which all our investigation
is widening,
deepening, and everywhere making more
and more secure ; and so strong is the
hold that it has already taken upon the
cultivated mind, that it is now admitted
on all sides, by those whose training in
exact methods of inquiry renders them
competent to judge, that there is no
room left for the ancient theological con
ceptions of the causeless, the lawless, the
arbitrary, in the material universe as it
stands revealed to our ken. The persis
tent tendency of all evolutionary thought
has been to emphasise this sense of the
universality of law where it was already
present, and to introduce it where it did
not exist before. In this way, as a
thoughtful writer on evolutionary morals
has well pointed out, the doctrine of
evolution has really contributed more to
ethics than to the natural sciences.THE ETHICAL SYSTEM OF SPENCER 81
These latter &quot;at least recognised before
the appearance of the theory of evolution
the element of constancy ordinarily
called law, and attempted to formulate
this constancy as a basis of thought and
action.&quot;
1 But in ethics no such sys
tematic attempt had been made, morality
being, indeed, expressly regarded as a
region outside and above the domain of
law. With the application of evolu
tionary theories to moral principles went
for the first time the emphatic assertion
that the connection of cause and effect
must be taken to hold good in moral no
less than in natural science ; that,
indeed, only on recognition of this con
nection is any science of ethics possible.
While the evolutionary theory, therefore,
only strengthened and deepened the con
ception of causation already existing in
other departments of research, it may be
said almost to have introduced that
conception into investigations on the
subject of morality. Something of what
is meant by the great change in thought
thus brought about we shall see
presently. Here we may well bear in
mind the fact that, if the doctrine of
evolution had done no more than
impregnate sociological discussion with
this principle of causation, it would have
made good its claim to have given ethics
a new basis and starting-point, since in
this way it has bridged over the wide
chasm between a merely empirical and
a truly scientific system of morality.
Meanwhile, that we have now reached
a crisis in morals is sufficiently manifest,
I think, to all who take an interest in
the larger movements of the time. Be
the influence of the theory of evolution
1 C. M. Williams, A Review of the Systems
of Ethics Founded on the Theory of Evolution,
PP- 514, 5I5-
upon ethics what it may, the most vigilant
and sagacious thinkers on every side
acknowledge that the forces most deeply
implicated in the changes that are
gradually coming over the whole of our
civilisation are carrying us to the verge
of a moral interregnum. The supremacy
of the older, theologically-derived sanc
tions of conduct is breaking down ; and
the danger, immediate and serious, is
lest they should be generally cast away
as effete and valueless before any other
sanctions are established to take their
place. At this* period of transition,
while, as Matthew Arnold put it,
&quot; the
old is out of date&quot; and &quot;the new is not
yet born, &quot;the world at large undoubtedly
stands in peril of a moral collapse.
Half-educated reformers, of more zeal
than wisdom, in their anxiety to sweep
away every vestige of what they fulminate
against as the ancient superstitions of
the race, are too apt to overlook the
solemn fact, written none the less in
letters of fire on every page of history,
that the mere destruction of restraints
and inspirations under and in virtue of
which men have developed hitherto
would mean not advance, but chaos.
It is well enough to throw aside every
husk of old doctrine ; but may we not
find ourselves sometimes in our careless
haste discarding, along with much useless
rubbish, some germs of vital truth that
the world cannot afford to be without ?*
It is perhaps worth while to pause occa-
1 The case of Lessing is here in point.
Writing to his friend Mendelssohn concerning
the rationalistic experience of his earlier years,
he confesses that in &quot;getting rid of certain
prejudices&quot; he had also deprived himself of
some things that he would have to recover.
&quot; That I have not in part done so already,&quot; he
adds, &quot;is only due to my fear lest, by degrees,
I should drag the whole rubbish into the house
again.&quot;82 THE ETHICAL SYSTEM OF SPENCER
sionally to ask ourselves such a question
as this; and to remind ourselves that
the emotions, upon which, after all,
the larger part of morality finally
depends, cannot without deadly risk be
cut loose from their old moorings and
set adrift upon the treacherous sea of
chance, at the mercy of every current
and squall. Upon the whole, when we
remember the congruity that must,
according to the evolutionary theory,
exist between the creed of a people and
their average needs, we cannot protest
too vigorously against crude experiments
and ill-advised tamperings with the
world s heritage of traditions, especially
when anything so sacred and essential
as the mainsprings of conduct are con
cerned ; we cannot too strongly dis
countenance the spirit of the rash
iconoclast who cares only to sap the
ancient foundations of moral faith, and
has no principle of guidance to offer in
exchange for what he is intent upon
snatching away. In such an emergency
the clear course is to let the work of
destruction take care of itself, and see
what can be accomplished in the far
more difficult as well as infinitely more
important task of reconstructing the
bases of morality in accordance with
the new thought and the growing
knowledge of the time. It is the posi
tive rather than the negative message
of science that it concerns us to under
stand.
Clear recognition of this momentous
fact led Spencer, while working out the
Synthetic Philosophy, to depart from the
regular outline as originally published,
and to take up the last division the
Principles of Ethics at the expense of
several intervening portions of his scheme.
In the preface, dated July, 1879, to the
Data of Eihies (Part I. of the completed
work), he thus wrote in explanation of
lis course :
I am the more anxious to indicate in out
line, if I cannot complete, this final work,
because the establishment of rules of right
conduct on a scientific basis is a pressing
need. Now that moral injunctions are
losing the authority given by their supposed
sacred origin, the secularisation of morals
is becoming imperative. Few things can
happen more disastrous than the decay and
death of a regulative system no longer fit,
before another and fitter regulative system
has grown up to replace
it. Most of those
who reject the current creed appear to
assume that the controlling agency fur
nished by it may safely be thrown aside,
and the vacancy left unfilled by any other
controlling agency. Meanwhile, those who
defend the current creed allege that, in the
absence of the guidance
it yields, no
guidance can exist : divine commandments
they think the only possible guides. Thus,
between these extreme opponents there is
a certain community. The one holds that
the gap left by disappearance of the code
of supernatural ethics need not be filled by
a code of natural ethics ; and the other
holds that it cannot be so filled. Both con
template a vacuum, which the one wishes
and the other fears. As the change which
promises or threatens to bring about this
state, desired or dreaded, is rapidly pro
gressing, those who believe that the vacuum
can be filled, and that it must be filled, are
called on to do something in pursuance of
their belief.
1
This paragraph makes Spencer s
position perfectly clear. As before
pointed out, his interests had from the
first been practical ; his earliest publica
tionsthe letters on the Proper Sphere
of Government and the more mature
work on Social Statics had dealt with
the actual problems of the day ; and the
desire to apply philosophic principles to
the questions of social growth and the
conduct of life subsequently inspired the
Synthetic System itself. Properly speak
ing, then, all his other work led up to
his Ethics; to leave that division
1 Data of Ethics, p. vi.THE ETHICAL SYSTEM OF SPENCER
untouched, therefore, would have been
to leave his whole enterprise, compre
hensive and valuable as it might have
been as a contribution to the organisation
of knowledge, in the condition of
&quot; Giotto s tower in the old Tuscan town
a magnificent effort, yet
&quot;
wanting still
the glory of the
spire.&quot;
&quot; My ultimate
purpose,&quot; he writes in the preface from
which I have just quoted, &quot;lying behind
all proximate purposes, has been that of
finding for the principles of right and
wrong, in conduct at large, a scientific
basis.&quot; Naturally, therefore, he could




extensive a preparation for fulfilling it,
would be a failure the probability of
which
&quot; he would not like to contemplate.
Hence the persistency with which, amid
much interruption from ill-health and
some disturbance from other causes, he
laboured at this portion of his task, and
the satisfaction which he expressed when
it was at length brought to completion.
II.
Properly to appreciate the place occu
pied by the work of Spencer in the
general development of ethical thought,
we must understand something of what
had been done towards the establishment
of a scientific basis of morality by writers
who had preceded him in the field.
This will bring out his relation to the
doctrines of the so-called orthodox
schools on the one hand, and to the
theories of earlier independent thinkers
on the other.
An intrinsic difference in principle has
long divided all ethical investigators, no
matter what their minor points of agree
ment or disagreement may be, into two
great hostile camps, usually known as
the intuitive or intuitional, and the
inductive or utilitarian. This funda
mental diversity of view may be traced
back dimly to the days of Greek philo
sophy, but it has acquired its immediate
importance only within comparatively
recent days. Through Cudworth, Clarke,
and Butler on the one side, and through
Hobbes, Helvetius, Bentham, and the
Mills on the other, we can follow the
main lines of divergence and antagonism
down to the time when the doctrine of
evolution entered the arena, and, offering
a hand to each of the hereditary foes,
led the way to a conciliation hitherto
undreamed of.
The main questions at issue between
the intuitionists and the utilitarians,
difficult as they may seem in solution,
may be very briefly stated. They are
the fundamental questions of the ethical
standard and the moral sense. What,
in the ultimate analysis, is the standard
or criterion of right and wrong ? And,
given that standard, how do we ourselves
distinguish between them ? Varied in
detail as were the answers given by the
intuitionists to these questions, they
agreed substantially in this that both
the criterion of right and wrong, and our
own power of distinguishing between
them, are to be sought in an innate and
divinely-implanted moral sense or con
science. The human mind was thus
regarded as possessing an ultra-experien
tial faculty of judgment concerning con
duct a faculty which is itself unresolv-
able into any simpler elements, and
beyond which there can be no appeal.
Against this view it was the mission of
utilitarianism to enteran emphatic protest.
The followers of the inductive school
refused to accept the alleged innate and
divinely-implanted moral sense as any
thing more than a myth. For them our
only test of conduct is the test furnished84 THE ETHICAL SYSTEM OF SPENCER
by experience of the results of conduct ;
and the so-called moral faculty or con
science, so far from being immediate
and simple, is itself merely the organised
registration in the modern civilised adult
of his observations of the consequences
of the actions of himself and others.
Thus, from the standpoint of the intui-
tionist, virtue or right conduct is in itself
not only a proximate, but also an ulti
mate, end ; while the utilitarian regards
it as a proximate end only ; the ultimate
end, which imparts to it its particular
quality of virtuousness or Tightness, being
some kind of utility which it is held to
subserve.
This, I think, is sufficiently clear.
But as the point is of importance, I will
supplement my own statement by a
quotation from a distinguished historian
who was himself an adherent of the in
tuitional view. The intuitional moralists,
wrote the late Mr. Lecky
1
believe that we have a natural power of
perceiving that some qualities, such as
benevolence, chastity, or veracity, are
better than others, and that we ought to
cultivate them and repress their opposites.
In other words, they contend that, by the
constitution of our nature, the notion of
right carries with it a feeling of obligation ;
that to say a course of conduct is our duty
is in itself and apart from all consequences
an intelligible and sufficient reason for
practising
it ; and that we derive the first
principles of our duties from intuition.
The utilitarian, on the contrary, denies
that we have any such natural perception.
He maintains that we have by nature abso
lutely no knowledge of merit and demerit,
of the comparative merit of our feelings
and actions, and that we derive these
notions solely from an observation of the
course of life which is conducive to human
happiness. That which makes actions
good is that they increase the happiness or
decrease the pains of mankind. That
which constitutes their demerit is their
1 History of European Morals, chap.
i.
opposite tendency. To procure the greatest
lappiness of the greatest number is there
fore the highest aim of the moralist the
supreme type and expression of virtue.
These, amid many minor points of
difference, not only helping to separate
more thoroughly the two great parties
from each other, but often breaking up
those parties themselves into sundry
more or less closely segregated clusters,
may be taken as the most salient charac
teristics of the antagonistic schools.
While they remained, in their older
forms, the only important candidates for
popular favour, the suffrages of the world
were very unequally divided between
them. Besides the rank and file of
the various religious denominations, an
overwhelming majority of the most
prominent moralists, including practi
cally all those belonging to the Chris
tian Church, strenuously maintained
the intuitionist doctrines. The tran
scendental nature of morality was the
central principle around which men of
the most diverse theological and social
views were called upon to rally ; and the
orthodox army, no matter how much its
champions might be divided among
themselves, thus presented a solid front
to the enemy. The other side was never
popular; but it made up for this by
attracting to itself some of the clearest-
headed and most original thinkers of the
1 This principle the greatest-happiness prin
ciple, as it is succinctly called is, of course, th.U
enunciated by Bentham, the man with whose
name the system of the older utilitarianism is
most intimately associated. It will be found
stated and developed in his IntroJustion to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation, first pub
lished in 1789. The principle itself has from
that time downward been the object of violent
attack at the hands of the intuitional party ; but
perhaps the keenest criticism that it has ever
been subjected to is that contained in the Data
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time, making a special appeal to men o
sceptical tendencies, as well as to those
trained in scientific methods of investiga
tion.
We need here touch upon those
aspects only of the old intuitional-utili
tarian controversy which will help us to
understand what has been gained by the
application of evolutionary principles to
ethical theory. A glance at the posi
tions respectively taken up by the two
parties on the question of the moral
sense will, for this purpose, place us at
the proper point of view.
Let us notice, then, that the diversity
of moral sentiments and ideas exhibited
by different peoples, and by the same
peoples at different stages of their
growth, is a problem for which the
intuitionistshave never yet found a satis
factory solution. We are told that there
are many religions, but only one morality.
This is true in a sense, but not by any
means in the sense intended by those by
whom the phrase is currently employed.
The statement, which indeed smacks
suggestively of the attractive humani-
tarianism of the eighteenth century,
might have passed unquestioned at
a time when sociological speculation
was so entirely untrammelled by any
reference to fact that men like Morelly
and Rousseau could discourse eloquently
of a mythical state of Nature and a
purely hypothetical barbarism, and indig
nantly ask an artificial society to contrast
man as the product of civilisation withman
in his primitive condition of freedom and
happy innocence. But what might have
done well enough in Rousseau s day will
not do in ours. Progress in ethnological
and anthropological research has given
us the real savage in place of that crea
ture of
&quot; an extinct tribe which never
existed&quot; the savage of our imagina
tion
; and instead of arguing as to
what uncivilised man might have been
and (in view of our theories) ought
to have been, we must now take him,
whether we like it or not, as he has
been and is. We have to remember
that the intuitional doctrine of the moral
sense is an inheritance from a period
when practically nothing was known of
the actual history of our race ; it was
constructed in reference to supposed
theoretic necessities, and not upon an
examination of facts
; and it would have
been surprising enough, therefore, had
it remained unshaken when growing
knowledge brought it to the test of
reality. Indeed, the only thing for the
intuitionist to do is to follow the example
of the Italian philosopher who refused
to look through a telescope for fear of
having his ideas of astronomy upset. An
inductive study of the diversities of
moral theory and practice, made pos
sible by our modern science of com
parative culture, not only destroys at once
the old theory of the substantial uni
formity of ethical ideals, but even justi
fies the assertion that there is no
crime, recognised by us as such, which
has not somewhere and at some time
found its place in the catalogue of virtues,
and no virtue which has not been
officially condemned. Even in extreme
:ases the statement will be found to hold
good. The murderous Fijian s only fear
is lest he should not be active enough in
ilaughter to win the approbation of his
gods ; with the Egyptian, lying is honour
able ; the Turkoman s code prescribes
theft. Nor when we compare civilised
nations with one another do we find the
1 &quot;
Inquiring into the pedigree of an idea is
not a bad means of roughly estimating its value
&quot;
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results less significant. Polygamy, wrong
in Europe and America, is right and
proper in China, India, and Turkey;
while infanticide, a practice thatwe hold in
utter abhorrence, was not only common
in Greece and Rome, but was even
defended by the greatest ethical teachers
of antiquity, Plato and Aristotle, who
also held views concerning the relations
of the sexes which we should look on
as revolting. On any theory of a tran
scendental God-given sense of right and
wrong, these facts present difficulties
that, but for the overwhelming influence
of preconceived ideas, would at once
have been recognised as absolutely
insuperable. An attempt has indeed
been made to turn the edge of the objec
tion by the contention that, notwithstand
ing such variations of sentiment and
conduct, some idea of right and wrong is
always present. But this assertion
practically abandons the only position in
the intuitional theory that is worth
fighting for, since, in the first place, it
allows the definite and clear-cut claim
originally put forth to lapse into one
too vague and indefinite to be of
any real service; and, in the second
place,
it introduces the elements of
education and environment the very
elements that the intuitionists are
naturally most anxious to keep out of the
account. If the conscience is, after all
that has been said for it, nothing more
than a plastic and capricious faculty,
which, instead of being a permanent,
infallible, and absolute guide, may be so
warped and distorted as to prompt here
to theft and there to murder, while in other
places theft and murder take rank among
the most heinous crimes, then what
becomes of the divine voice within us?
and wherein is the extra-experiential
moral sense one whit more sacred than
any sense that might be acquired ?
Surely the oracles of God should speak
with no uncertain sound, if they are to
make good their claim to a divine origin
and mission.
These difficulties in the intuitional
theory early presented themselves to
Spencer, though not till after he had
practically committed himself to thai-
theory in his published work. In the
division of the Principles dealing with
the Inductions of Ethics (where the
whole ground of moral divergences is
covered in considerable detail),
1 he
writes :
Though, as shown in my first work,
Social Statics, I once espoused the doctrine
of the intuitive moralists (at the outset in
full, and in later chapters with some
implied qualifications), yet it has gradually
become clear to me that the qualifications
required practically obliterate the doctrine
as enunciated by them. It has become
clear to me that if, among ourselves, the
current belief is that a man who robs
and does not repent will be eternally
damned, while an accepted proverb among
the Bilochs is that
&quot; God will not favour a
man who does not steal and rob,&quot; it is
impossible to hold that men have in
common an innate perception of right and
wrong.
2
Against the orthodox intuitionists,
therefore, the utilitarians undoubtedly
possessed a strong case, since the old
claim concerning conscience as an extra-
experiential elementof the mindcrumbled
to pieces the moment it was brought to
the touchstone of fact. But, though the
labour of destruction was easy, the labour
of construction presented perplexities
almost as great as those which the intui
tionists had found blocking their path.
It was one thing to show that the moral
faculty could not be regarded as simple,
independent, and transcendental ; it was
quite another thing to present a tenable
1
Principles of Ethics, Part II.
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hypothesis of its existence, and of the
authoritativeness itundoubtedly possesses
in the mind of the average civilised man.
Hence, even in the hands of its ablest
exponents, the utilitarian theory remained
in a crude and unsatisfactory shape.
The problem that it sought to solve,
though rightly recognised by it as a
problem within the limits of scientific
investigation, was for the time being
beyond the reach of its resources and
power. The conscience is not origina
and independent
: true ; but, then
whence and how is it derived? That
was the knotty question, to which
the intuitionists naturally demanded a
reply. Bentham, who, though not theo
retically the founder of utilitarianism,
first endeavoured to make utility the
basis of a coherent moral system, was
himself no psychologist, and never
approached the problems of ethics from
the psychological side
; but several of
his followers, notably the two Mills, saw
this vulnerable spot in his armour, and
attempted to make it good. The
following extract from the younger of
the just-named writers will probably
give, in brief, the best specimen of the
most advanced utilitarian speculation on
this important point
:
The internal sanction of duty, whatever
our standard of duty may be, is one and
the same a feeling in our own mind
; a
pain, more or less intense, attendant on
violation of duty, which in properly-culti
vated moral natures rises in the more
serious cases into shrinking from it as an
impossibility. This feeling, when disin
terested, and connecting itself with the
pure idea of duty, and not with some par
ticular form of it, or with any of the merely
accessory circumstances, is the essence of
conscience
; though in that complex pheno menon as it actually exists the simple fact
is in general all incrusted over with
collateral associations, derived from sym
pathy, from love, and still more from fear
; frum all the forms of religious feeling ; from
the recollections of childhood and of all our
past life
; from self-esteem, desire of the
esteem of others, and occasionally even
self-abasement. This extreme complica
tion is, I apprehend, the origin of the sort
of mystical character which, by a tendency
of the human mind of which there are
many other examples, is apt to be attri
buted to the idea of moral obligation, and
which leads people to believe that the idea
cannot possibly attach itself to any other
objects than those which, by a supposed
mysterious law, are found in our present
experience to excite it. Its binding force,
however, consists in the existence of a
mass of feeling which must be broken
through in order to do what violates our
standard of right, and which, if we do
nevertheless violate that standard, will
probably have to be encountered after
wards in the form of remorse. Whatever
theory we have of the nature or origin of
conscience, this is what essentially consti
tutes it.
1
In Mill s view, therefore, as in that of
the other members of his school, the
moral sense arises in each individual as
the result of his own experience of the
connection between actions and their
consequences, intrinsic and extrinsic,
immediate and remote. Observation of
the direct and indirect pains entailed by
certain evil courses of conduct, which
we thus learn to avoid altogether, or to
follow at our peril, together with the
indelible impressions left by educa
tion and various environing influences
during our early years, enter as most
considerable factors into the building up
of the complex moral sense; while an
equally important, though more subtle,
part is played by the principle of asso
ciation. Pain and wrong action, pleasure
1
Utilitarianism, chap. iii. In their analysis
of the conscience the older utilitarians do not
seem to have advanced much beyond the point
cached by Dr. David Hartley (1705-1 757), who
ntroduced into the consideration of the moral
ense the important element of association,
which he was the first to apply systematically to
he general phenomena of the mind.77//i ETHICAL SYSTEM OF SPENCER
and right action, are found in intercon
nection with striking regularity and per
sistence ; whence, in accordance with
the well-known psychological law, right
and wrong, at first regarded only from
the point of view of their consequences,
come at length to have a direct power of
appeal, and are sought or avoided, loved
or hated, for their own sakes. Mean
while, the abstract idea of Tightness and
duty is conceived as arising, like other
abstract ideas, by generalisation from
countless experiences of concrete cases
of right and duty; while the sense of
coerciveness or obligation at large is
interpreted as a result, arising imme
diately and by association, of the in
fluence exercisedupon the growing nature
by the rigid discipline and sustained
authority of the organised society in
which, and the governmental agencies
under which, the civilised individual
grows to manhood.
Now, it is hardly necessary to point
out wherein this alleged explanation,
suggestive as it doubtless is, must be
regarded as paradoxically insufficient to
meet the problem upon its most im
portant side. While recognising to the
full the power of education, environment,
and association, we still find ourselves
unable to understand how, within the
lifetime of the single individual, the idea
of virtue as a separate, independent, and
self-existent conception could ever be
generated out of and emerge from the
mere personal observation of the persis
tent connection between certain courses
of conduct and certain accompanying
results. Serious as is the objection when
thus stated, it becomes still more serious
when we remember that the specified
connection between right action and
pleasurable results can scarcely be said
to persist within the limits of our own
individual experience:; with the con
stancy and regularity that the argument
appears to demand. Could there ever
in this way arise such a conception of
absolute rectitude as that which Tenny
son embodies in the famous lines :
&quot;And because right is right, to follow right
Were wisdom in the scorn of consequence&quot;?
1
Simple or complex, innate or derived,
the moral faculty, as we find it in the
normal product of civilisation, acts, if
not with absolute uniformity, still with
an immediateness and average certainty
sufficient to make us pause before endor
sing any theory that refuses to take us
further in the matter than the individual s
organised experiences of pleasures and
pains. The issue may be dealt with on
the grounds of common sense. Accord
ing to the utilitarian hypothesis, each
infant born into the world starts abso
lutely afresh. The mind is a tabula
rasa, with no innate ideas, no intuitions
of any kind. Upon this the environment
is supposed to work; and the simple
question is, whether the organisation
and registration of personal observations,
impressions, and experiences during the
comparatively few years of childhood and
adolescence can be fairly taken to
account for all that we know of the
characteristics of the moral faculty as it
exists within ourselves in the period of
adult life ? It is surely not strange that
the intuitional school declined to answer
this question in the affirmative.
1 It may be pointed out, however, that even
this superb declaration of virtue for its own
sake does not invalidate the utilitarian stan
dard. Those who think it does so must be
required to answer the question whether they
would hold any line of action to be &quot;wisdom&quot;
which does not, at whatever cost of temporary or
personal sacrifice, tend to the good of some
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The dispute between the two opposed
theories of morals may, therefore, be
said to have reached a deadlock. Each
side had found the weak point in the
other s system, while at the same time
each failed to secure its own from
attack. And now we are in a position
to appreciate the flood of new light that
was suddenly let in upon the whole con
troversy by the rise of the doctrine of
evolution.
Notwithstanding all the profoum
differences that separated them, the twc
older schools possessed a single char
acteristic in common. Both had based
their arguments and formulated thei:
conclusions upon the conceptions o
special creation and fixed types; and
the discussion, with the full consent o.
both contending parties, had been in
this way limited in range to the experi
ences of the individual life. Could the
conscience ever have arisen after the
manner alleged, within the span of the
separate mortal career? This was the
form that the issue had taken
; and to
the question in this shape one side had
answered Yes, and the other No. Evolu
tion at once widened the issue. Behind
the individual it placed the race ; behind
civilised humanity, the ages of barbarism
and animality, out of which, through
untold centuries, we have been slowly
and painfully struggling upward into
higher developments of life. The
problem was no longer that of explaining
the fine sensitive conscience of the
modern adult Caucasian as the out
growth of a few years of personal inter
course with his environment. The
gradually-acquired experiences of count
less generations, slowly registered through
long periods of social consolidation, and
handed down from age to age as slight
but persistent modifications in the
89
nervous organisation of evolving man
these were the new factors which the
development theory introduced into the
discussion. An explanation which had
properly been condemned as absurdly
inadequate, so long as attention was
confined to the brief terms of a separate
life, assumed, immediately that account
was taken of the element of hereditary
transmission, the appearance of a rational
and complete solution of the problem.
In merging the life history of each single
generation in the life history not only of
the human race at large, but of all
sentient existence, and in postulating the
thread of continuity that, running through
almost imperceptible gradations, binds
the highest forms to the lowest, the
evolutionist at once secured a new stand
point, and escaped the obvious charge
of extravagance or specious reasoning.
In this way evolution, having, as we have
already seen, reconciled the adverse
claims of the psychological schools of
Locke and Kant, now also stepped
forward to make peace between the
hereditary foes the intuitionists and
the utilitarians. It showed that in the
interpretation of conscience each sid6
had part of the truth, and neither side
the whole truth. The moral sense, like
what we know as instinct, while innate
and extra-experiential in the individual,
.s acquired and dependent in the race.
1
1
It is only just to notice that the claim for
an original and non -derivative moral sense has
icen very differently interpreted by different
members of the older intuitional school. Kant,
or instance, by far the greatest thinker among
hem all, distinctly admits, in his Critique of
Practical Reason, that the moral imperative,
onceived by him as transcendental, is transcen-
ental only as toform. The content is derived,
n other words, it gives the general sense of
uty or obligation ; but for our knowledge of
yhat constitutes right and wrong in any particularTHE ETHICAL SYSTEM OF SPENCER
The attitude of the evolutionary
moralist, thus made clear, will be made
clearer still by the following extract from
a letter written many years ago by
Spencer to John Stuart Mill, and sub
sequently published, in part, in the Data
of Ethics:
To make my position fully understood,
it seems needful to add that, corresponding
to the fundamental propositions of a
developed moral science, there have been
and still are developing in the race certain
fundamental moral intuitions ; and that
though these moral intuitions are the results
of accumulated experiences of utility, gradu
ally organised and inherited, they have
come to be quite independent of conscious
experience. Just in the same way that I
believe the intuition of space, possessed
by any living individual, to have arisen
from organised and consolidated experi
ences of all antecedent individuals who
bequeathed to him their slowly developed
nervous organisations just as I believe
that this intuition, requiring only to be
made definite and complete by personal
experiences, has practically become a form
of thought, apparently quite independent
of experience ; so do I believe that the
experiences of utility organised and con
solidated through all past generations of
the human race have been producing
correspondingnervous modifications, which,
by continued transmission and accumula
tion, have become in us certain faculties of
moral intuition certain emotions respond
ing to right and wrong conduct, which
have no apparent basis in the individual
experiences of utility. I also hold that
just as the space intuition responds to the
exact demonstrations of geometry, and
has its rough conclusions interpreted and
verified by them, so will moral intuitions
respond to the demonstrations of moral
science, and will have their rough con
clusions interpreted and verified by them.
Careful perusal of the above extract,
while it will enable us to understand
Spencer s emphatic protest, made earlier
case we have to still to go back to experi
ence. This, of course, is a far less extravagant
demand than that made by the average intui
tionist, and, indeed, yields half the case to the
utilitarian.
in the same letter, against being classed
among the anti-utilitarians, will at the
same time indicate those important
differences which separate him from the
older school, and to which we must
revert directly. But, beyond this, it
wrings us round to a point at which we
may touch again upon a question already
referred to the question as to how far
it is true that the evolutionary theory has
introduced any new elements into our
ethical considerations. It will be seen
that it has actually discarded neither of
the two great contradictory doctrines
that it found in possession of the field
;
and in that sense, if by new we are to
understand something absolutely uncon
nected with previous investigation,
it
may be urged that nothing new has been
brought to light by its application to
the problems of morality. But a new
theory in science is seldom like a new
fashion in dress ; it is rarely more than
a modification, or adaptation, or re-inter
pretation, of some theory or theories
already accepted in whole or in part ;
and the revelation, when it comes to
shake the world, most frequently brings
nothing beyond a new attitude, a fresh
adjustment of familiar ideas, or a
sudden flash of light into some detail
hitherto unperceived. The effect of
evolution upon the older moral thought
is a case in illustration. It came not so
much to destroy as to fulfil. For it has
placed the doctrines of both the intui-
tionists and the utilitarians on a new
basis and in a new light ; it has harmo
nised their differences by showing their
partial and supplementary character;
and by promulgating a theory of the
moral sense which covers all the facts
advanced by both sides, while it avoids
the difficulties which each had found
insurmountable, it has brought the wholeTHE ETHICAL SYSTEM OF SPENCER
matter for the first time within the range
of scientific treatment.
Nor must we overlook the substantial
contribution that evolution has made to
the discussion of the perennial problem
of evil. The existence of this disturbing
r
factor in the moral universe has, more
than any other question, agitated the
human mind from the time of Job down
ward, and with the progress of knowledge
and the expansion of thought has given
rise, in systems of theology and philo
sophy, to the most ingenious hypotheses
and fantastic speculations. Evolution
enables us to read at least some meaning
and harmony into the turmoil and dis
cord of the world. Here, again, the ex
planation it offers us is not marked by
any absolute originality. Glimpses of
the truth that evil is, so to speak, nothing
but the friction due to the imperfect
adaptation of human nature to social
conditions, have from time to time been
caught by thinkers of various schools.
But their guesses and conjectures were
of no scientific value whatever, and were
at most nothing but faint adumbrations
of that interpretation which the doctrine
of evolution makes possible for us by
pointing back over the long past history
of our race, and tracing out the struggle
of the pre-social instinct with the condi
tions of social life. The modern doc
trine of human development, if it leaves
the teleology of the subject still involved
in the old mystery (since any question of
why the particular line of progress
brought about by evolution was neces
sary still remains, from the metaphysi
cal side, entirely unanswerable), at all
events replaces by a statement of Tact
and induction the nebulous theories
formerly in vogue. The patristic dogma
of the fall of man is banished to the
limbo of outgrown superstitions, along
with all the Augustinian subtleties
founded upon it; and what we have
officially called sin, so far from having
any supernatural causes or implications,
we can now recognise as an inevitable
accompaniment of the slow and painful
adjustment of the natures of men to the
circumstances and requirements of the
associated state. The old Adam within
us is the Adam of the pre-social stages
of human history the impulses of bar
barism, the unrectified egoistic emotions
of the dweller in cave and wilderness,
which will from day to day burst loose
and declare themselves, despite the long
discipline to which mankind has been
subjected through centuries of progress
ing civilisation. Every time we give
way to such impulses the old barbarian
rises within us, and temporarily reasserts
his power. Scratch the Russian, and
you will find the Tartar just beneath
so runs the proverb ; and in the great
mass of men the morality of civilisation
is as yet hardly more than skin deep.
As with the ship in Ibsen s grim and
terrible poem,
1 our modern society carries
with it a corpse in the cargo the
unbridled elemental passions, the brute
instincts, the fierce anti-social tenden
cies transmitted to us by our far-off
ancestors from the days before society and
even humanity began.
What new significance is in this way
given to the oft-repeated phrase which
describes the criminal classes as the
failures of civilisation ! They are the
representatives of the savage left over in
the midst of our more developed life
guided by the savage s predatory
1 Rhymed Epistle a. strange production, based
upon the sailor s superstitious dread of making a
voyage with a corpse on board, and written^in
answer to the question of a friend as to what is
amiss with the present ;ige.THE ETHICAL SYSTEM OF SPENCER
instincts, living in a state of natural
enmity with those about them, preying
upon their fellows, to whom they offer
nothing in return, and thus remaining
unintegrated into the great organisation
of mutual-dependent parts which con
stitutes society. The moral progress of
man, as John Fiske epigrammatically
put it, is the gradual process of
&quot; throw
ing off the brute inheritance.&quot; The law
of morality thus becomes more emphati
cally than ever the law of the higher life ;
sin is degeneration, atavism, reversion to
the pre-social or animal type ; and the
ethical ideal of evolution, in Tennyson s
language, is to
&quot; Move upward, working out the beast,




The ethical system of Spencer, then,
is hedonistic, or utilitarian, but not in
the narrow sense in which the word
&quot; utilitarian
&quot; was formerly employed.
The final criterion, as well as the ulti
mate end of universal conduct, is still
happiness, pleasure, or well-being ;
2 and
1 In AIeiiioriat)i&amp;gt; 1 1 8. Tennyson, in whose
poetry the fundamental conception of evolution
continually appears, has given expression to the
same thought in other places, notably in his
later poems, The Dawn and The Making oj
Man. Such phrases as
&quot; slaves of a four-footed
will&quot; and &quot;the ghost of the Brute that is walking
and haunting us yet
&quot; are vivid poetic renderings
of evolutionary ideas.
3 The tendency of language is almost always
towards degeneration, and it is sometimes a hard
struggle to prevent our ideas from following our
speech. It is unfortunate that the word
&quot;pleasure&quot; has come to be generally used
for the criterion and end mentioned above.
The word is objectionable on account of its con
notations ; the idea called up is too limited in
character, and has been seriously vitiated by
evil associations. Happiness, though better,
is still not wholly satisfactory. Perhaps
&quot; well-
being,&quot; with its wider sweep of meaning anc
n the last analysis that course of action,
and that course alone, is held to be right
which meets this criterion and helps to
wards achievement of this end. But
while the utilitarianism of Bentham and
the Mills was merely empirical or induc
tive, Spencer s utilitarianism is rational
or deductive. We must emphasise this
difference if we would appreciate the
full value of Spencer s ethical teaching,
considered on its scientific side.
All the old moral systems have, as we
have already intimated, been uniformly
characterised by non-recognition of the
principle of causation. Whether the
position taken was that the revealed will
of Deity is the sole ground of duty (as
maintained by the theological moralists
strictly so called), or that our knowledge
of right and wrong can come-only through
the instrumentality of a supernaturally-
given conscience (as taught by the ortho
dox intuitionists), or that distinction in
conduct arises by governmental enact
ment (as laid down in the political
systems of Hobbes and his disciples),
the implication was still the same. All
these schools, so widely separated from
one another at every other point, agree
substantially in this: that they regard
the Tightness and wrongness of actions
as qualities not necessarily inherent in
the nature of the actions themselves, but
impressed upon them by some extraneous
and independent authority. Do we know
that a certain action is wrong only
because of a divine revelation through
Scripture or conscience, or because of
legislation directed against
it ? Then the
statement implies that we could learn
the wrongness of the said action in no
other way not even by observation of
absence of historic taint, is the best word for the
purpose.93
its results; and this is tantamount to
saying that the action has not, in the
nature of things, certain invariable con
sequences. But this leads us at once
into an unforeseen dilemma. For if the
supposed wrong action does not tend
necessarily to produce certain evil con
sequences that is, if its wrongness is
not inherent, but accidental then how
are we the better off for knowing that it
is wrong ? The world might go on its
way just as well, so far as present things
are concerned, in the absence of the
supernaturally-revealed or State-given
knowledge, and all need for divine or
legislative interference forthwith dis
appears. But if, on the other hand, the
divine or legislative interference is sup
posed to be required because the welfare
of the world will be furthered by the
knowledge, then this means, if it means
anything, that the evil action does tend
to produce qertain invariable conse
quences; and if this is so, then why
cannot we study these consequences for
ourselves, and reach a knowledge of the
wrongness of the action by induction, or
deduction, or both ? Out of this logical
labyrinth there seems no way of escape;
and the whole difficulty arises from the
fact that the necessary tendency of
actions is overlooked from the fact, in
other words, that the element of causa
tion in conduct is left out of the
account.
1
Now, this weakness in older ethical
speculations is precisely what the general
nature of those speculations, and the
intellectual character of the times in
which they originated, would lead us to
expect. But we are not so fully pre
pared to find the same weakness, though
1 The line of argument adopted in this and
the following paragraphs is worked out in
detail in the Data of Ethics, chap. iv.
not in so pronounced a form, manifesting
itself in the doctrines of the utilitarian
school. Yet even in utilitarianism recog
nition of causation is far from complete.
And here we revert to a statement
already made: that the older utilitarianism
had not advanced beyond the empirical
stage in its treatment of moral pheno
mena. Its method was that of induction
only. When observations of the results
of various courses of conduct have been
made in numerous cases, and with suffi
cient care, a generalisation is possible,
and the inductive statement is reached
that certain actions do uniformly give
rise to evil results, while certain others
bring with them results of an opposite
kind. Inferences from such a generali
sation may then be taken as rules of
conduct ; since actions that have been
followed by certain consequences in the
countless cases submitted to analysis
may fairly be supposed to have in them
selves a tendency to produce those con
sequences. But here utilitarianism
stopped. The important step in advance
taken by Spencer lies in his attempt to
convert the principles of conduct thus
reached, from truths of the empirical
into truths of the rational order, by show
ing not only that, as inductively proved,
certain actions are habitually accom
panied by certain results, but also that
it may be deductively proved that in the
very nature of things these results must
along with them. Only in this way
can the element of causation be fully
recognised ; only in this way, therefore,
can we have a science of ethics properly
so called.
1
A passage in Spencer s letter to Mill,
1 For Spencer s earliest discussion (interest
ing in connection with his later arguments) of
the utilitarian system, see Social Statics ; Intro
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from which we have already quoted, wi
make the essential point in thia discus
sion sufficiently clear :
The view for which I contend is, tha
morality properly so called the science c
right conduct has for its object to deter
mine how and why certain modes of con
duct are detrimental and certain othe
modes beneficial. These good and bac
results cannot be accidental, but must be
necessary consequences of the constitution
of things j and I conceive it to be the busi
ness of moral science to deduce from the
laws of life and the conditions of existence
what kinds of action necessarily tend to
produce happiness and what kinds to pro duce unhappiness. Having done this, its
deductions are to be recognised as laws of conductj and are to be conformed to, irre
spective of a direct estimation ofhappiness
or misery.
1
Perhaps an analogy will most clearly show my meaning. During its early
stages planetary astronomy consisted of
nothing more than accumulated observa
tions respecting the positions and motions
of the sun and planets ; from which accu
mulated observations it came by and by to
be empirically predicted, with an approach
to truth, that certain of the heavenly bodies
would have certain positions at certain
times. But the modern science of plane
tary astronomy consists of deductions from
the law of gravitation deductions showing
why the celestial bodies necessarily occupy
certain places at certain times. Now the
kind of relation which thus exists between
ancient and modern astronomy is analogous
to the kind of relation which, I conceive,
exists between the expediency-morality and moral science properly so called. And
the objection which I have to the current
utilitarianism is, that it recognises no more
developed form of morality does not see
that it has reached but the initial stage of
moral science.
will admit that such sequences are parts
of a necessary order among phenomena.
But though this truth is beyond question, and though, if there are causal relations
between acts and their results, rules of
conduct can become scientific only when
they are deduced from these causal rela
tions, there continues to be entire satisfac
tion with that form of utilitarianism in
which these causal relations are practically
ignored. It is supposed that in future, as
now, utility is to be determined only by
observation of results, and that there is no
possibility of knowing by deduction from
fundamental principles what conduct must
be detrimental and what conduct must be
beneficial.
1
Reproducing this passage in the Data
of Ethics, by way of general summary of
his discussion of the utilitarian stand
point, Spencer adds :
Doubtless, if utilitarians are asked
whether it can be by mere chance that
this kind of action works evil and that
works good, they will answer, No ; they
1 The italics are mine.
Such, then, is the foundation of
Spencer s moral system, to the working
out of which through the various depart
ments of personal morals and social
relationships the remainder of the Prin
ciples of Ethics is devoted. It will be
seen that, upon the philosophic side, his
contribution possesses an importance
vhich it would be difficult to exaggerate,
since he has at least pointed the way to
a reconstruction of ethical theory upon
a naturalistic basis
; has offered an inter
pretation of moral development which
combines what was true in both the older
utilitarian and the ordinary intuitional
doctrines ; and has pushed beyond mere
mpirical hedonism to a conception of
morality in which right and wrong, while
till ultimately resolvable into terms of
he bearings of actions upon life, are dis
engaged from any narrow calculation of
results. But while the treatment of the
problems of conduct from the standpoint
of evolution has thus greatly clarified our
theory of morality, the question may
still be raised as to whether it has proved
of any practical service. Spencer s own
reply is contained in the preface to the
* Data of Ethics, 21. For a further discus
sion of the relations between expediency-morality
and moral science see the essay on Prison
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second volume of the Principles ofEthics,
and expresses some disappointment
:
The doctrine of evolution has not fur
nished guidance to the extent I had
hoped. Most of the conclusions, drawn
empirically, are such as right feelings, en
lightened by cultivated intelligence, have
already sufficed to establish. Beyond
certain general sanctions indirectly referred
to in verification, there are only here and
there conclusions evolutionary in origin
that are additional to, or different from,
those which are current.
But is this surprising ? Certainly not.
For apart altogether from the fact that
the
&quot;
right regulation of the actions of so
complex a being as man, living under
conditions so complex as those presented
by a society, evidently forms a subject-
matter unlikely to admit of definite con
clusions throughout its entire range,&quot; the
result is one which otherwise we might
have been led to expect. The evolution
of society has been possible only because
little by little the natures of men have
been moulded by association into some
thing like conformity with the demands
^f the social state, and because conduct
pra^h makes for well-being has more and
C9fire been distinguished as right conduct,
receiving the emphasis of those religious,
&quot;I ceremonial, and political codes which
have preceded the true moral code, and,
by establishing the conditions of harrno-
t nious co-operation within the evolving
r group, have in fact rendered the separate
[ development of that code possible.
Hence, the science of ethics, though it
&quot;
may in places correct, qualify, or supple-
f ment the principles of conduct otherwise
reached, will for the most part only re-
\ state those principles in a somewhat fresh
terminology, still further define their
| bearings, and interpret them more
. clearly and more emphatically by exhibit
ing their vital relationships with the evo
lution of life.
It remains but to add that affiliation of
ethical questions upon the general doc
trine of evolution leads Spencer to the
assertion of some rather striking conclu
sions concerning the future moral progress
of the race. We have seen that one of the
fundamental doctrines of the Synthetic
Philosophy is, that all things are gradually
tending towards equilibrium ; and as
this must hold true in the super-organic
no less than in the organic world, it
results that the gradual adaptation of
the natures of men to their environment
cannot cease until between natures and
environment a perfect balance has
been reached. From the very com
mencement of social life down to the
present time the tendency towards such
adjustment has been slowly going on,
and it is going on still, moulding the
characters of men and women every
where into more and more complete
harmony with the sum-total of the con
ditions under which they live. What
will be the ultimate consequence ?
&quot; The
adaptation of man s nature,&quot; Spencer
replies,
to the conditions of his existence cannot
cease until the internal forces which we
know as feelings are in equilibrium with
the external forces they encounter. And
the establishment of this equilibrium is
the arrival at a state of human nature and
social organisation such that the individual
has no desires but those which may be
satisfied without exceeding his proper
sphere of action, while society maintains
no restraints but those which the individual
voluntarily respects. The progressive ex
tension of the liberty of citizens, and the
reciprocal removal of political restrictions,
are the steps by which we advance towards
this state. And the ultimate abolition of
all limits to the freedom of each, save those
imposed by the like freedom of all, must
result from the complete equilibration
between man s desires and the conduct
necessitated by surrounding conditions.
1
First Principles
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The ethical corollary of all this, set
down though it is in terms of rigidly
scientific reasoning, is more optimistic
than the brightest dreams of revolu




equilibration of emotions and conditions
means that at length the adaptation of
men s natures to the demands of asso
ciated life will become so complete that
all sense of internal as well as of external
restraint and compulsion will entirely
disappear. Right conduct will become
instinctive and spontaneous ; duty will
always be synonymous with pleasure ;
love will, indeed, be
&quot; an unerring light
&quot;
and &quot;joy its own security,&quot; as Words
worth sang ; altruism and egoism will so
closely merge that altruism will be simply
the highest egoism ; and the interests of
the individual and of the race will be so
completely unified that the prompting
and impulses of every moment will
minister at once to the immediate and
ultimate furtherance of the one and the
widest and fullest realisation of the
other.
1
1 In regard to this adjustment of the moral
nature to the conditions of life, see especially
Social Statics, Part I., chap, ii.; Data of
Ethics, 46, 67, 96, 97 ; Inductions of Ethics,
124, 191, 192.
It is true that in the later years of his
life Spencer saw reason to qualify this
sanguine prophecy ; speaking not, as he
had once done, of the
&quot; evanescence of
evil,&quot; but more temperately of its con
tinuous diminution under the discipline
of the social state ; and, while still
believing in a &quot;good time coming,&quot;
regarding the consummation of moral
progress as, at best, very far off.
1 Yet




of the characters of men to the con
ditions of the highest possible human
existence, as the goal towards which we
are actually, if slowly, moving. The
tendency of his philosophy in this
respect, then, is distinctly encouraging.





still assures us of the
substantial reality of moral progress,
makes us, therefore, feel that our own
efforts count; and, by teaching us at
once how little can be done to help the
world forward, and yet how well wu
while it is to do that little, helps U2
combine &quot;philanthropic energy Wi
philosophic calm.
&quot;3
1 See Autobiop-aphy, I., 361 ; II., 36^.
*
Principles of Ethics, 244.
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CHAPTP:R VI.
RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF THE SPENCERIAN
PHILOSOPHY
I.
IT is a curious instance of the gra
tuitous perverseness of popular judg
ments that, because Spencer was careful
to mark out more clearly than any pre
ceding philosopher the limits within
which, from the very constitution of our
intelligence, all our knowledge must be
confined, his system should therefore
have been pronounced a system of nega
tions. Pulpits from which there never yet
issued a syllable about his positive con
tributions to thought have rung with
denunciations ofhis agnosticism; general
readers who know nothing of the light
that he has thrown upon so many of the
practical problems and philosophical
controversies of the day have their own
pronounced ideas of hisjtoctrine of the
Unknowable a doctrine~~which may,
indeed, belaid to havelaken thejjlace
oi_the old__so-called_ scientific, but
really quite unscientific
materialism,^ to
which, as we have seen, he himself gave
the death-blow, as the red rag of the
modern theological world. How strange
and wayward and purblind all this is it
is hardly needful to point out. The
development of the doctrine in qTi^T
tjon Occupies a hnnr1rprl_gnH__ts|;gnty
pages, or less__than a quarter of nnp
volume of the Synthetic senVs ff^tf
hjncilesj and the chapters devoted to
it represent but the ~cjgnng__of
&quot;the
ground for constructive work, and pro
perly form no part of the Synthetic
Systernltseif. Hence, even if we persist m treating the Absolute as a negation
which is precisely what, as we shall see,
Spencer himself emphatically refuses to
do it is none the less manifest that to
stigmatise the Synthetic Philosophy as
merely iconoclastic is fundamentally to
misconceive its whole character and
tendency.
Here we will consider the Spencerian
doctrine of the Unknowable not in
its purely metaphysical, but in its
broadly religious aspects ; and we will
approach the whole question of what we
must predict as the probable future of
religion by way of our author s specula
tions concerning religious development
in the past.
The evolutionist, it is almost super
fluous to remark, is prevented by his
general theory of things from regarding
from the popular point of view the highly
elaborated theological systems of the
world. The relatively pure theism of
modern Christianity cannot be accepted
by him as an immediate, divine revela
tion, nor can he consent to draw a hard-
and-fast line between this and other great
concrete expressions of the religious
emotion, or even between this and those
extremely low expressions of it which the
culture-history of the human race has
brought before us in such astonishing
variety. All such manifestations, what
ever may be their dissimilarities, must98 RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF THE SPENCERIAN PHILOSOPHY
for him remain manifestations differing
in degree, not in kind, from one another ;
and, like all other phenomena, they
have to be traced back into their
simplest forms and studied in the light
of their slow and gradual evolution.
The first question, therefore, to be
raised is the question of the feeling that
lies at the heart of them all the religious
emotion. As we cannot consider this,
any more than any other faculty of the
mind, as extra-experiential and innate
in the race, we have to ask, Whence
came it ? What theory can we advance
of its genesis and development ?
In seeking an answer to these ques
tions we find our way beset by many
obstacles; not because the natural
history of the phenomena involved
is generically different from the natural
history of other mental phenomena, but
because it is here especially difficult to
make sure that we understand, even
approximately, the intellectual condition
and outlook of primitive man. It is
true that the monstrous and impossible
barbarian of eighteenth-century fancy no
longer haunts and confuses our specula
tion
; it is true that we do not now
wilfully read back wholesale into the
savage mind the ideas and emotions
that belong to our more developed state ;
yet, however much we may be on our
guard, it is still hard to purge our
thought of all trace of our advanced
interpretations of tilings, and confront
the universe in the only attitude
possible to our distant progenitors
in the long ages before the beginnings
of civilisation. Till we can do this,
however till we can in a measure leave
behind us qualities and tendencies that
have become organised into the very
woof and texture of our nature we
shall continue to commit the common
mistake of accepting, as original factors
brought to light by our investigations,
elements which in reality we ourselves
have carried into our investigations with
us ; and this must inevitably, to greater
or less degree, vitiate the entire course
of our thought. Declining, then, to
follow the still fashionable practice of
using the more complex mental pheno
mena to interpret the less complex, we
must make up our minds to deal with
the whole question, not by analysis from
above downward, but by synthesis from
below upward.
1
Much valuable help in this direction
has, during the past generation, been
given by the careful and systematic study
of existing savage tribes. Here, it is
true, the difficulties are numerous
enough,
2 for the ignorance, short-sighted-
1
Principles of Sociology, i., 316.
a All these are admirably exposed and com
mented on by Lord Avebury in his Origin of
Civilisation, chap. i. Later in the same work,
dealing specifically with the religious concep
tions of savages, he writes :
&quot; Most of those who
have endeavoured to account for the various
superstitions of savage races have done so by
crediting them with a much more elaborate
system of ideas than they in reality possess.
Thus Lafitau supposes that fire was worshipped
because it so well represents cette supreme
intelligence degage de la nature, dont la puis
sance est toujours active. Again, with reference
to idols, he observes that la dopendance que
nous avons de 1 imagination et des sens ne nous
pennettant pas de voir Dieu autrement qu en
enigme, comme parle Saint Paul, a caus6 une
espece de necessite de nous le montrer sous des
images sensibles, lesquelles fussent autant de
sym boles, quinouselevassent jusqu a lui, comme
le portrait nous remet dans I id^e de celui dont
il est la peinture. Plutarch, again, supposed
that the crocodile was worshipped in Egypt
because, having no tongue, it was a type of the
Deity, who made laws for Nature of his mere
will&quot; (chap. vi. ). All this is wild enough of a
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ness, superficiality, and preconceptions
of travellers, upon whom we have almost
wholly to rely for our data, combine to
render their testimony too often of
doubtful worth, and the subjective ele
ment will persistently interpose its dis
torting influence. But the learning and
acumen of writers like Tylor and Lub-
bock have done much towards clearing
away our dangers and perplexities, and
the conclusions established by them on
many important points have enabled us
to enter much more fully than was for
merly possible into the recesses of the
savage mind. This done, it remains for
us to hold fast to the fact that the
primeval man, whose mental condition
and modes of activity we are trying to
realise, is not to be thought of as on an
intellectual equality with even the lowest
of the savage tribes whose life is now to
some extent laid open for our study. We
may use these as convenient steps in our
perilous descent, but we have to get
down far below the level of even the
wretched Bushmen, Australian aborigines,
and Fuegians, before we can commence,
by aid of the historic imagination, our
investigation of the facts of the primitive
human faculty.
1
In the experiences of creatures, then,
who, intellectually and emotionally con
sidered, differed from ourselves so radi
cally and entirely at almost every point
that it is only with the utmost difficulty
that we can place ourselves provisionally
contained in the new philosophy of early reli
gions offered to the world by Professor Max
Miiller and his followers among the comparative
mythologists ?
1 In the first part of his Principles of Sociology
Spencer has devoted a great many chapters to
an elaborate detailed study of primitive man
and his ideas. The works of Dr. E. B. Tylor
and Lord Avebury (Sir John Lubbock) should
be carefully read in connection with these.
upon their plane and in their attitude of
thought, we have to seek for the earliest
suggestions of the religious idea. But
now, first of all, how for our purpose
shall we define the religious idea ? Some
working definition, ifonly of the broadest
and most rudimentary type, is necessary
to begin with, and this definition must
pierce far enough to the root of the
matter to disentangle the idea itself from
all its historic accumulations and develop
ments. Writes Mr. Tylor
:
By requiring in this definition the belief
in a Supreme Deity and of judgment after
death, the adoration of idols or the practice
of sacrifice, or other partially-diffused doc
trines or rites, no doubt many tribes may be excluded from the catalogue of religious.
But such narrow definition has the fault of
identifying religion rather with particular
developments than with the deeper motive
which underlies them.
For which reason he very properly
concludes that &quot;it seems best to fall
back at once on this essential source,
and simply to claim, as a minimum









supernatural,&quot; when employed in this
connection, must be held free from all
their usual modern connotations, this
definition may be accepted as our
starting-point.
&quot; Belief in a being of the
kind we call supernatural,&quot;
2 with the
feeling of wonder and awe which such
belief tends to excite, is, in other words,
to be regarded as the source and nucleus
of religion. Widely as the countless
concrete theological systems of the world
may differ one from another, and from
the fantastic and incoherent superstitions
of savage tribes, in well-nigh every par
ticular, such belief in some form of
1 Primitive Culture, i. 424.
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existenceand manifestation of powerother
than those which we describe as natural,
and the emotions generated thereby, will
Ibe found invariably to distinguish and
lie at the bottom of them all. It is such
belief and feeling that alone furnish a
bond of union between bodies of thought
otherwise so dissimilar, for example, as
nineteenth-century Christianity and East
African fetichism ; and, as being the
residual qualities which fully and partly
developed theologies without exception
possess in common, they may be taken
to represent the protoplasmic germ from
which what, in a somewhat more ad
vanced sense, is specifically called reli
gion has everywhere arisen.
1
Setting out, then, from this conception,
we find ourselves confronted by two sepa
rate questions. In the first place, whence
arose the belief in a mode of existence
and power other than our own ? And,
secondly, given this belief in its crudest
form, what was the general course
1 It may be pointed out that acceptance of
this definition changes the issue in the old dis
cussion as to the universality of religion. The
discussion itself, from first to last, has been
mainly one of terminology, the various dis
putants not being in agreement with one
another, and sometimes indeed not with them
selves, in regard to what they meant by the
language employed. If we are to use the word
&quot;religion&quot; only in some higher sense than that
given it in the text, then doubtless Lord Avebury
is right in concluding that sundry savage tribes
have been and are without religion (Origin of
Civilisation, chap. vi. ). Yet it is very question
able whether any one of the tribes referred to by
him in confirmation of his statement would be
found entirely lacking in some faint sense of a
life-power other than their own. Both Spencer
(Principles of Sociology, vol. i., 146) and Dr.
Tylor (Primitive Culture, i. 425) favour the
belief that at all events no tribe that has yet
been fairly studied has proved to be absolutely
deficient in some trace of religious ideas as thus
defined.
of its early development ? The answers
given by Spencer to these questions will
be found in his ghost-theory, or theory
of the double, and in his doctrine of
ancestor worship. All sense of the
supernatural, according to his view,
may be traced back to the primitive
belief in the ghost; and all religious
systems whatsoever, arising at the outset
from such belief, have passed through
the preparatory stage of ancestor-worship
on their way to their more complex and
highly-developed forms.
II.
The hypothesis formerlyalmost univer
sally in vogue among those who sought a
natural genesis for religious ideas was
that early man was led by a sense of
wonder and awe to reverence for, and
direct personification of, the natural
objects connected with his daily life.
Sun, moon, earth, winds, sea, so mys
terious in their behaviour, so tremendous
in their power and influence, were thus
supposed to be the objects which, by
heightening of the feelings of astonish
ment and dread, gradually gave rise to
the sentiment that we call worship. But
poetical as is the theory, and congruous
as its alleged experiences unquestionably
are with the mental processes of our more
developed state, the briefest considera
tion of the actual facts of the savage
mind suffices to show its entire untena-
bility. The primitive man had neither
the emotional nor the intellectual ten
dencies requisite to produce the sup
posed chain of effects. The familiar
sights and sounds of surrounding Nature,
suggestive as they may be to the civilised
adult, aroused in him no greater feeling
of awe than they do to-day in the child
or the village clown, who watches the
rising and setting of the sun, the waxingRELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF THE SPENCERIAN PHILOSOPHY 101
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and waning of the moon, the ebbing and
flowing of the sea, without the slightest
impulse in the direction of worship.
The religious promptings of which we
ourselves are conscious as we stand
in the presence of such phenomena are
not primitive, but distinctively modern,
1
and, instead of helping, stand as
obstacles in the way of our understand
ing of the emotional attitude of early
men. So, too, with the intellectual side
of the question. The savage accepts
the natural changes that go on around
him day and night, summer and winter,
tidal ebb and flow with complete
mental indifference, and as matters of
course. He, like the ignorant and
brutal among ourselves, has no curiosity.
He does not speculate concerning them,
he asks no questions about their mean
ing, seeks for no interpretation. He
lacks, therefore, the very traits from
which any possible system of Nature-
worship would have to originate.
What, then, must we conclude ? That
Nature-worship is not the primordial
form of the religious idea, but a
developed form of it. Thus we have to
ask if our study of primitive charac
teristics, emotional and intellectual,
forbids our accepting this commonly
alleged explanation as the true one
what theory will that study enable
us to offer in its place ?
&quot;The mind of the savage,&quot; says
Spencer,
&quot; like the mind of the civilised,
proceeds by classing objects and relations
with their likes in past experience.&quot;
2
But while their minds work in the same
way, the experiences which furnish the
materials for their mental operations are
1
Any sense of a spiritual relation with Nature





entirely different being in the latter
j
case almost infinitely varied, and in]
the former extremely few and circum-f
scribed. While, therefore, the civilised
adult is able to classify both objects and
actions according to their essential like
nesses, these being often among the
least obvious of their characteristics,
conspicuous likenesses, which frequently
have nothing whatever to do with essen
tial nature, alone attract the savage
attention. A single illustration will make
this abstract statement clear. According
to testimony cited by Spencer, an
Esquimaux has been known to mistake
a piece of glass for a lump of ice. This
error arose not because the mind of the
Esquimaux did not proceed in the same
way as the mind of an educated European
namely, by classing the new object
with what most resembled it in past
experience but because, owing to his
small and superficial acquaintance with
things, this rough grouping of objects,
in virtue of their most manifest external
similarities, was the only grouping pos
sible to him.
Passing over the discussion of the
general theory of the outer world to
which these limitations must necessarily
give rise, we will concern ourselves with
their influence only in the production of
the earliest religious ideas. Consider,
then, the interpretation that must be
forced upon the mind of primitive man
by the familiar personal phenomena
of shadows, reflections, dreams. The
notion inevitably suggested by them
must be the notion of the duality of
things. Watching his shadow, the
savage becomes convinced that he is
attended by a double, sometimes present,
sometimes withdrawn. Observation of
tiis reflection in the water strengthens
this belief; and in both cases he findsevidence of the duplication not only of
his own existence, but of almost all
other existences as well. Knowing
nothing of the physical causes of these
results, he simply and naturally regards
them as appended entities which, how
ever, possess the differential characteristic
that they are visible without being
tangible.
1 Hence the initial peculiarities
of the double, or shadow, world. With
these crude ideas combine ideas arising
from the experiences of sleep. In
dreams the savage finds himself engaged
in activities similar to those of waking
life. He hunts, fishes, and feasts, fights
enemies, and goes through dangers ; and
these visionary occurrences are to him
just as real as the every-day occurrences
which they faintly or vividly resemble.
What is the inevitable result ? While
all these dream-adventures have been
taking place, his actual body, as he by-
and-by learns from others, has been
lying motionless and unresponsive.
From this grows up the notion of the
wandering double, or other-self, that
goes away for a short time in dreams,
and for longer periods in fevers, swoon-
ings, and trances ; and the identification
of this other self with the appended
entity, shown in shadow and reflection,
is almost certain to follow. In this way
developes in complete form the belief in
the double or ghost a belief which the
testimony of travellers and missionaries,
so far as it has hitherto been carefully
sifted and examined, reveals as existing
even in savage tribes among whom the
1 Chamisso s well-known story of Peter
Schlemihl the man who sold his shadow and
Lamotte-Fouque s Saint Sylvester s Night
Phantasy, in which a person loses his reflec
tion, are playful reminiscences of this primitive
belief in the actual reality of shadows and reilec-
faintest trace or suggestion of any higher
religious conception has been looked for
in vain.
This belief naturally assumes special
proportions in connection with the phe
nomenon of death. Temporarily with
drawn in sleep, fever, swoon, and trance,
the double, or other self, is held at disso
lution to take a final departure. Yet,
though now permanently detached from
the tangible bodily self, to which no
effort can recall it, it has not therefore
passed into a state of absolute non-
existence. It has vanished into the
shadow-world, carrying with it most of
its earthly characteristics, but becoming
gradually endowed none the less with
growing suggestions of superadded
power. By-and-by the surrounding
world is filled with these shadowy
doubles the belief in ghosts thus gene
rated surviving down to our own time in
the vulgar dread of dematerialised exist
ences that are supposed to haunt
&quot; the
glimpses of the moon, making night
hideous.&quot;
Observe the natural result. A savage
dreams of his dead father, brother, son.
How does he interpret such an expe
rience ? As the actual visitation of the
double or ghost of his departed relative.
No other interpretation is, indeed, pos
sible. Out of this springs the first idea
of an after-life. But this after-life, as
Lord Avebury has pointed out, is at the
outset limited and temporary ; savages
are likely to dream, for the most part,
only of the recently dead ; and when a
deceased friend is no longer dreamed
about, he is no longer thought of as still
existing.
1 Only later, along with the
&quot;Ask the negro,&quot; says M. Du Chaillu,
&quot; where is the spirit of his great-grandfather
?
He says he does not know; it is done. Ask
him about the spirit of his father or brother whoLIGIOUS ASPECTS OF THE SPENCERIAN PHILOSOPHY 103
development of larger religious ideas,
does this conception of the temporary
after-life expand into the conception of
unending after-life, or immortality.
But, meanwhile, belief in the surviving
double, or ghost, exercises remarkable
influence over the whole of savage life.
It originates, in the first place, the prac
tice of ministering to the needs and
desires of the spirit. The universal rite
of leaving provisions with the corpse
finds its explanation here ; sometimes,
where the double is thought of as
material, it is supposed to make use of
such provisions in their material form ;
sometimes the more refined conception
is that the ghost makes use only of the
spirit of the things offered. Reason is
thus also assigned for those continued
periodical oblations to the dead of which
travellers in different parts of the world
have spoken, and which frequently
persist, in more or less mutilated shapes,
in the higher stages of advancing civilisa
tion. But this is by no means all.
In these primitive observances we may
recognise the germ of all religious cere
monial. The father of the family, the
leader of the tribe, the chief of the clan
men of exceptional prowess and power
during life become after death the
objects of special attention. Their
utterances in dreams are accepted as
died yesterday, then he is full of fear and terror;
he believes it to be generally near the place
where the body has been buried, and among
many tribes the village is removed immediately
after the death of one of the inhabitants.&quot; The
same belief prevails among the Amazula Kaffirs,
as has been well shown by Mr. Callaway. They
believe that the spirits of their deceased fathers
and brothers still live, because they appear in
dreams ; by inverse reasoning, however, grand
fathers are generally regarded as having ceased
to exist. Lord Avebury, Origin of Civilisa
tion, pp. 238, 239.
commands of unusual importance; their
known wishes become the foundations
of law
; everything is done to retain their
favour and to keep them friendly.
Hence arises ancestor-worship as -\
necessary stage in religious evolution.
Little by little, along with social consoli
dation, goes consolidation of these
incipient religious ideas. The tribe is
dominated by some one man of extra
ordinary strength and character
; success
in war attends his guidance, success
within the clan follows his counsel.
Dying, he assumes a correspondingly
important position in the ghost-world
his spirit becomes the tribal god. His
grave, and the rough structure raised
around it for protection, initiate the
temple; ministrations at his resting-
place and propitiatory offerings upon
the ever-sacred spot give rise to religious
sacrifice ; appeals to him for continued
help are the first prayers ; and in the
praises of his great deeds, his courage,
and his triumphs, recited or chanted
within hearing of and to gratify his ghost,
we may find the first indications of sub
sequent temple ritual.
To show how from these germs, pari
passu with the expansion of thought and
the general evolution of the social struc
ture, there gradually grew up systems of
fetichism, idolatry, Nature-worship, and
other primitive bodies of theological
thought, with their accompanying cults ;
and still more to trace from these the
slow formation, in their first crude
embodiments, of the great concrete reli
gions of the world, would here take us
beyond our limits. All this Spencer has
done in detail, and with wonderful wealth
of illustration. The following points are
those which we have here to bear in
mind. First, that our present method I
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religious ideas, not, according to the
common mythological theory, in feelings
and speculations about the powers of
Nature which are obviously beyond the
range of undeveloped thought, but in
the savage s inevitable experiences of the
duality of his own and other existence ;
and that, consequently, all so-called primi
tive religious ideas are really not original,
but derived. Secondly, that tjjeJmmediate
and n^cessajy-outgrowth_of__the5_expe-
rienceswasjhe rise of a universal system
o7 ancestQEJEQisbifi, which in time
originated a more or less complex pan
theon of deities ancestors expanding
into gods, and mighty rulers and leaders
into gods-in-chief. Thirdly, that all
njm^np^^^ f
,
are reached by generalisatiQnJiQin_earlier
ideas, and are only possible when the
mind has attained a certain degree of
development. And, finally, that the
course of evolution here indicated is to
be held as marking out the line pursued
by every religious system in its earliest
stages in other words, that we see no
reason to regard any religion whatever
as an exception to this general rule,
because in its purified and highly elabo
rated form it may present no vestigial
reminiscences of these primitive stages
of its history.
III.
Acceptance of the doctrine of evolu
tion in its application to thought obliges
us to acknowledge that in the develop
ment of religious, as of all other ideas,
there must at every stage be a certain
congruity between the beliefs held and
the intellectual and moral character of
those holding them. If it be true, as
has been pertinently said, that &quot;an
honest God s the noblest work of man,&quot;
it is no less true that this noblest work
is only possible to noble natures in a
comparatively advanced state of civilisa
tion. An indigenous creed will always
evolve in conformity with the average
needs of a nation or tribe at any given
time, and the changes it gradually under
goes allowance being made for the
subtle influence of interaction between
belief and character will be in keeping
with the changing needs
; while where a
creed is imported ready-made from with
out it will inevitably, in so far as it
enters into the spiritual life at all, find
the level of general character and ideals
a truth never more strikingly illustrated
than in the history of proselytising Chris
tianity. And this forces us to recogni
tion of the fact, not altogether easy of
acceptance throughout the whole range
of its implications, that &quot;the religious
creeds through which mankind success
ively pass are, during the eras in which
they are severally held, the best that
could be held ; and that this is true not
only of the latest and most refined
creeds, but of all, even to the earliest
and most gross.&quot;
1
This principle becomes clearer when
we remember that early creeds are every
where closely fashioned upon the existing
social state ; and since the social state
is at every stage of its evolution the
outgrowth of average needs, the creed
itself is but the idealisation and embodi
ment of those needs, and throws the
weight of its influence where for the
time being it is most required. A
religious conception greatly beyond the
medium social demand would also be
beyond the reach of the medium intelli
gence ; though possible to one or two
in a generation,
it would be impossible
to the large majority. Hence, the ideas
1
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formed of divine affairs and divine
government are at all times reflection
of earthly affairs and earthly govern
ment : the divine ideal, in other words
is simply the projection of the particular
social ideal then in vogue. Man has al
along made God in his own image ; anc
more civilised periods, inheriting the
conceptions handed down to them from
periods less civilised, find themselves
entrusted with the task of modifying
these older conceptions to bring them
into general harmony with broader and
purer ideals. &quot;Ascribed characters of
deities,&quot; as Spencer says,
&quot; are continually
adapted and readapted to the needs of
the social state. During the militant
phase of activity the chief god is con
ceived as holding insubordination the
greatest crime
&quot;
as it is then politically
considered the greatest offence; he is
commonly regarded
as implacable in anger, as merciless in
punishment ; and any alleged attributes of
milder kinds occupy but small space in the
social consciousness. But where militancy
declines, and the harsh, despotic form of
government appropriate to it is gradually
qualified by the form appropriate to indus
trialism, the foreground of the religious
consciousness is increasingly filled with
those ascribed traits of the divine nature
which are congruous with the ethics of
peace
: divine love, divine forgiveness,
divine mercy, are now the characteristics
enlarged upon.
1
That all early religious conceptions
are absolutely anthropomorphic, both in
their positive aspects and in their
limitations, is now admitted by all
students of culture history ;. and we may
here notice, in passing, the striking
harmony of this fact with the general
theory of ancestor-worship above out
lined. Man was not only the primitive
1
Ecclesiastical Institutions (Principles of
Sociology, Part VI.), 656.
type of deity, as Dr. Tylor has said ; he
was the primitive deity; hence neces
sarily the purely manlike characteristics
of all early gods. At first scarcely more
intelligent, far-seeing, courageous, or
potent than the living savage who
ministered to his necessities, the surviving
double or ghost only gradually acquired
transcendent capacities and powers; even
the Jahveh of comparatively speaking so
advanced a people as the early Hebrews
being for a protracted .period still
markedly deficient not only in the higher
virtues, but also in the higher intellectual
qualities. Monotheism, or the concep
tion of a single, all-powerful, ever-present
deity, therefore comes at the far end of
the evolution of religious ideas; which
means, of course, that many popular
theological theories, based upon the
assumption of man s innate sense of the
divine, require fundamental modification.
But what we are most concerned to
point out here is that, as Spencer has
shown in the little essay on
&quot; The Use
of Anthropomorphism,&quot; from which we
have already quoted, anthropomorphism,
even in its crudest and grossest forms,
s had its relative justification, since it
las played an important part in the
ligher development of the race. The
savage nature, needing strong checks,
can most effectually be controlled by
:ear of the still more savage deity. The
conception must be entirely concrete to
mter as a moral motive into his action
;
and thus even the most repulsively
diabolical characteristics aid in the pro
duction and preservation of restraints,
which, not otherwise obtainable, help,
ike the iron hand and will of the earthly
despot, to prepare the way for milder
discipline. Something may in this way,
herefore, be said even for what Oliver
Wendell Holmes called the
&quot;diabology&quot;
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of mediaeval theology, and much fo
many of the harsher elements in th
popular religious teachings of our owi
day. They yield important regulative
factors in the lives of those for whon.
restraints and sanctions derived from
more abstract doctrines would have no
authority; and they could not be uni
versally swept away, even if tha
were possible, without the most disas
trous results. The only danger
i&amp;lt;
that, through the influence of natura.
religious conservatism and intellectual
vested interests, the old conceptions may
survive the period of their beneficial
activity. Then they become not aids, but
hindrances, to further progress obstacles




Recognition of the average congruity
between men s beliefs and their needs must
not blind us to the fact that all lower religious
ideas are extremely tenacious of life, and tend
to persist, with untold influences for evil, in
face of advancing civilisation. The task of
eliminating the worst features in the body of
theological doctrine remaining over from the
past is, in some respects, the most important
that each generation has to undertake
; and how
difficult it generally proves is shown by the
ever-renewed struggle between so-called hetero
doxy and so-called orthodoxy, trials for heresy, and other similar phenomena. It seems to me
that Spencer himself was inclined to overlook or
underrate this dynamic aspect of the matter,
as he was unquestionably inclined to overlook or
underrate the dynamic aspect of social evolution
in general. Meanwhile there is another thought
that may be pertinently suggested. We speak
too often of civilisation as if it were a tide
rising with something like uniformity all along
the shore. We forget that in every country, at
..-very period, stages of civilisation overlap that
there&quot; are still to be found among ourselves repre
sentatives of every epoch in the world s history,
from the age of barbarism down to our own time.
Appreciation of Jhis fact should prevent a confu
sion of issues which, sometimes overtly, sometimes
in partly disguised form, will be found to vitiate
IV.
The principle that anthropomorphism
lies at the root of all early religious
conceptions, interesting as it is for
students of
culture-history, is here
referred to not for its own sake, but
for its important implications in relation
to the higher progress of theology. For
the fact now to be recognised is, that
even the most advanced theological
systems of the world have not yet fully
outgrown this earliest universal stage.
Modern Christian theism itself, even in
its purest forms, is still anthropomorphic
theism is still substantially an attempt
to construct a philosophy of deity on the
most discussions on present-day religious affairs.
It is too often assumed to be an objection against
a high religious creed that it is not applicable
to every class of the community, and particularly
that it does not go straight home with regene
rating force to the lowest and most degraded
characters. Hence, comparisons are instituted
n all solemnity between the more refined faiths
jf cultivated thinkers and the grosser doctrines
of certain evangelical schools, and invariably in
ravour of the latter, because they have succeeded
n reaching some whom the more refined faiths
n question have never been able to touch ! All
hat needs to be said in answer to this extra-
rdinary argument is that every stage of culture,
even in the midst of developing civilisation,
must have its corresponding form of religion ;
jut that we object to regard the doctrines
hat morally prove the most influential in
ertain cases as therefore possessing the more
ssential religious vitality. The counterpart to
lie common error now referred to an error
epeated in many circles with offensive implica-
lons is the scarcely less widely-spread tendency
f well-meaning and cultivated men and women
o believe in the amelioration of the lowest classes
hrough immediate contact with high religious
deas that properly belong only to the intellectual
nd moral level of far more developed natures.
Ve can never reiterate too strongly that, in the
ature of things, no creed can resemble a patent
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basis of human qualities and human
powers.
The history of the slow and painful
advance of theology from lower to
higher forms has been throughout the
history of gradual de-anthropomorphisa-
tion.
1 One by one the distinctively
manlike characteristics have been
dropped from the conception of God,
and those remaining have been expanded
to more than manlike proportions.
These changes, it is almost needless to
say, have corresponded with the pro
gress of men towards higher social and
individual ideals, and thus we find, as
we should expect, that the passions and
proclivities first winnowed out and repu
diated are those which belong to the
stages of barbarism now left behind.
The savage trait of cannibalism does
not, in the conception of the god, long
survive the habit of cannibalism in any
tribe, and deception, fraud, and cruelty
do not continue to be predicated of
deity when truthfulness and mercy come
to be recognised as qualities appertain
ing to higher manhood.
&quot; Our doctrinal
teachers,&quot; wrote Dr. Holmes, &quot;are un
making the Deity of the Westminster
Catechism, and trying to model a new
one, with more of modern humanity,
and less of ancient barbarism, in his
composition.&quot; At the same time,
the limitations of human faculty are
broken down in the image formed of
the Divine Being. God is thought of
no longer only as very powerful, very
far-seeing, very good, .but as powerful,
far-seeing, good, in degrees altogether
transcending human possibility and
finally as infinitely so. And now
1 For this useful, if somewhat formidable-
looking, word we are indebted to the late John
Fiske.
observe that, as each new step in
advance is taken, as one by one the im
perfect moral qualities are allowed to
lapse, and the conception is ennobled
and expanded on every side, every
generation looks down upon those who
continue to cling to the outgrown ideas
with feelings of astonishment, or pity, or
disgust. The Christian theist is horrified
at the suggestion of the cannibal deity
of the Fijians ; the modern defender of
orthodoxy finds much that is repulsive
with little that is admirable in the
despotic and tyrannical God of medieval
theology; yet, throughout, the concep
tion is that of idealised humanity. Even
in the very loftiest theological teachings
this still holds true. The moral quali
ties are infinitely purified the intel
lectual qualities infinitely developed;
but the difference is one of degree only,
and not of kind. The qualities are
human qualities still.
But must we rest here ? Is anthropo
morphic theism, even in its ultimate
form, the final outcome of the religious
idea? Is man, too long accepted by
himself as TTUI/TWV ptrpov, the measure
of all things, to set himself up perma
nently as the type of Deity ? Or may
we not rather suppose, looking back
over the course of religious evolution in
the past, and humbly acknowledging
the possibility of continued evolution in
the future, that mankind may still reach
conceptions of the Absolute Reality as
much higher and purer and nobler than
the now current conceptions of Deity, as
these in their turn are higher and purer
and nobler than the superstitions of the
savage? that the purgation of the
merely human characteristics may still
continue, till at length all thought of the
manlike shall be entirely banished from
our idea of God ? that, in other words,loS RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF THE SPENCERIAN PHILOSOPHY
anthropomorphic theism, when brought
to its highest degree of purification, may
yet lead the way to religious ideas com
pared with which all thoughts of Deity
that men have hitherto entertained will
seem crude and gross P
1
We shall best approach these questions
from the negative side by considering
first of all the impossibility of continuing
to think of the noumenal existence in
any terms of human existence, no matter
how high and pure these may be.
Theologians, metaphysicians, and all
those who have in any way concerned
themselves with the ultimate problem of
the universe, have agreed to define the
First Cause of all things as both infinite
and absolute. To this, indeed, they are
driven, to avoid becoming entangled in
meshes of difficulty and self-contradic
tion from which there is no escape. But,
as a matter of fact, they escape Scylla
only to fall into Charybdis. Verbally
intelligible though their proposition may
appear, it becomes totally unintelligible
the moment we press close upon the
meanings of the words employed, and
endeavour to frame conceptions answer
ing to the phraseology. For, in the first
place, how can we think of an absolute
cause ? Absolute is that which exists
out of all relation ; while a cause can
only be conceived as such in relation to
its effect. Cancel the thought of effect,
and you cancel the thought of cause.
To speak of absolute cause, therefore, is
1 No student of early religious thought can
afford to overlook Browning s wonderfully subtle
analysis ofanthropomorphism in his Caliban upon
Setebos. Perhaps the only needful commentary
upon this extraordinary production is the motto
which the poet himself chose for it from the
Psalms, and which sufficiently indicates his
point of view :
&quot; Thou thoughtest that I was
altogether such a one as thyself.&quot;
to attempt to unite the ideas of non-
relative and relative which is mani
festly an impossibility.
&quot; We attempt,&quot;
wrote Dean Mansel, whose arguments
on this question were freely drawn upon
by Spencer, and are here reproduced
from the pages of First Principles,
to escape from this apparent contradiction
by introducing the idea of succession in
time. The Absolute exists of itself, and
afterwards becomes a Cause. But here we
are checked by the third conception, that
of the Infinite. How can the Infinite
become that which it was not from the
first? If causation is a possible mode of
existence, that which exists without causing
is not infinite; that which becomes a cause
has passed beyond its former limits.
1
To pursue this subject further would
be to commit ourselves to an unwarrant
able digression into the domain of meta
physics. Observing simply that, as here
shown, while it is impossible to think of
the First Cause as finite and relative, it
is equally impossible to frame any con
ception of it as infinite and absolute, we
will pass on to notice that, even waiving
these insuperable difficulties, others not
less formidable stare us in the face. A
large part of dogmatic theology is taken
up with the discussion of the &quot;attri
butes
&quot; of God. Yet it is easy to show
not only that the various attributes so
confidently ascribed to Deity are mutually
destructive, and therefore cannot possibly
be thought of together, but also that the
conception of none of them can be made
to combine with the conceptions of
infinite and absolute, which for the sake
of the argument we will consent for the
moment to accept.
The question of the relation of God s
moral character
&quot;
to his knowledge and
his power introduces us to a familiar
1 Limits of Religious Thought , quoted in First
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dilemma of old standing. We can think
of a man as being at once very good anc
very wise and very powerful ; but when
we attempt to carry these qualities to an
infinite degree, and at the same time
bear in mind the actual history and con
dition of the world, we find ourselves
entanghd in a problem that has already
shaken so many noble minds. Evil anc
suffering exist ; they belong, so far as we
can see, to the very texture of universa
life ; and even under the hands of the
rhapsodical Mr. Drummond, the history
of the evolution of life remains a history
of wholesale carnage and cruelty. Now,
God must have foreseen all this before the
creation of the world, or he cannot be
omniscient. But if he foresaw it, he
must have been able or not able to
prevent it. In the former case, though
all-powerful, he cannot be all-good ; in
the latter, though all-good, he cannot be
all-powerful. To think of God, then, as
at once all-wise, all-powerful, and all-
good is clearly an impossibility. Here
is the ancient stumbling-block the ever-





&quot; has ever yet enabled or ever
will enable theology to meet with a satis
factory solution. To reconcile the sin
and misery of the world with the infinite
power, goodness, and wisdom of a Deity
conceived in terms of human powers
and feelings, remains to-day, as it has
been from the first ages of monotheism,
one of the great unread and unreadable
enigmas of speculation. Here we hand
it back .to the theologians, who have
made it their own by pre-emption,
and who are indeed responsible for its
existence. Non nostrum tantas com-
ponere lites.
For the whole difficulty, let it be
understood, is not, as is too often assumed,
a difficulty created by the blasphemous
cavilling of those who refuse to accept,
in lieu of explanation, the verbal jugglery
of metaphysical special pleading. It
inheres in the very nature of anthropo
morphic theism ; and if blasphemy there
be in the matter, the charge lies, as
John Fiske very properly pointed out, at
the door of those who seek to maintain
the anthropomorphic hypothesis. Hence
the gain achieved by showing that this
hypothesis is untenable. To do this we
have to prove that, as above stated,
beyond the fact that we cannot combine
the ideas of infinite goodness, power, and
wisdom in our conception of Deity, lies
the further (less obvious but more signi




ever can possibly be thought of in con
nection with Absolute and Infinite
Existence.
To define God is to deny him, said
Spinoza ; and the veriest tyro in logic
knows that definition involves circum
scription. Yet upon definition have
theologians from time immemorial
expended their subtlest powers, with the
result that they have succeeded in pro
ducing, in Matthew Arnold s famous
phrase, nothing but a non-natural, magni
fied man. For their definitions are verbal
only they elude us the instant we
endeavour to turn them into thought.
We are told, for instance, that God is an
Infinite Personality. But if we cannot
think of an infinite cause, still more clear
.s it that we cannot think of an infinite
personality. Personality implies limita-
:ion, or it means nothing at all. To talk
of an Infinite Person, therefore, is to
alk of something that is at once infinite
.nd finite, unconditioned and con
ditioned, unlimited and limited an
mpossibility. So is it with every
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argues about the will and the purpose
of God. Mathematics, as Spinoza long
ago protested, might as well discuss the
circularity of a triangle. Will and pur
pose are attributes of the limited and
conditioned; they imply an end external
to the agent, and a desire on his part to
accomplish it. Attempt to attach these
ideas to the idea of the Absolute and
Infinite, and you will find yourself
plunged into a bottomless sea of
absurdity. How can there be an end
external to the Absolute ? and how can
the Infinite pass through states of con
sciousness, constituting the act of voli
tion? Even intelligence or conscious
ness itself is conceivable only as a
relation, and therefore the Absolute
cannot be thought of as conscious.
Intelligence demands
a conscious subject and an object of which
he is conscious. The subject is a subject
to the object ; the object is an object to
the subject ; and neither can exist by itself
as the absolute. This difficulty
may be for the moment evaded by distin
guishing between the absolute as related
to another and the absolute as related to
itself. The absolute, it may be said, may
possibly be conscious, provided it is only
conscious of itself. But this alternative is,
in ultimate analysis, no less self-destructive
than the other. For the object of con
sciousness, whether a mode of the subject s
existence or not, is either created in and
by the act of consciousness, or has an
existence independent of it. In the former
case the object depends upon the subject,
and the subject alone is the true absolute.
In the latter case the subject depends upon
the object, and the object alone is the true
absolute. Or, if we attempt a third
hypothesis, and maintain that each exists
independently of the other, we have no
absolute at all, but only a pair of relatives ;
for coexistence, whether in consciousness
or not, is itself a relation.
1
Or, to put the matter in language else
where employed by Spencer himself,
1 Mansell, quoted in First Principles, 13.
&quot;intelligence, as alone conceivable by
us, presupposes existence independent
of it and objective to it To
speak of an intelligence which exists in
the absence of such alien activities is to
use a meaningless word.&quot; Hence, the
intelligence ascribed to the Absolute
Being &quot;answers in no respect to that
which we know by the name. It is
intelligence out of which all the charac
ters constituting it have vanished.&quot;
1
The fundamental assumptions of
rationalistic theology are thus, as Dean
Mansel concludes, self-destructive. Turn
where we will, choose our vocabulary as
we may, we must inevitably commit
ourselves to endless confusion, so long
as we rest in even the highest and purest
forms of anthropomorphic theism so
long, that is, as we persist in thinking of
the ultimate reality that religion calls
God as a quasi-human entity, and
deceive ourselves into believing that we
are gaining anything like a truer and
deeper understanding of his nature by
ascribing to the Infinite and Absolute
Existence qualities and attributes that
can have no possible meaning when
taken out of connection with the finite
and conditioned. Hence it is evident
that the further progress of thought
&quot; must force men hereafter to drop the
higher anthropomorphic characters given
to the First Cause, as they have long
since dropped the lower.&quot;
2
It is only necessary to add to this part
of the argument that the impossibility,
thus made apparent, of defining the
ultimate reality in terms of human
activities means, of course, the impossi
bility of defining the ultimate reality in
any terms at all. Humanity furnishes
us with our highest conception of life.
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That the infinite universe contains forms
of existence transcending ours in incon
ceivable ways and in almost infinite
degrees is, beyond question, a rational
supposition ; but any attempt to image
such superior forms must still be circum
scribed by what we know of intelligence
in the highest manifestations in which
it has yet been revealed to us. We
cannot in the nature of things get rid of
our cwn limitations
; wander where it
will, our imagination must still be
tethered fast to our own conditions. If,
then, passing from the thought of
transcendently superior phenomenal
existences, which as phenomenal must
have a certain kinship with ourselves, to
the thought of the noumenal existence,
which as noumenal can possess none of
the characteristics of the phenomenal,
we find inevitably that our human
nature furnishes us with no kind of
standard, criterion, or point of departure ;
we are bound to realise that no standard,
criterion, or point of departure is possible
to us. If the highest that we know
leaves us without help in our effort to
conceive that which an infinitely superior
phenomenal intelligence would still be
as far from apprehending as ourselves,
then it is clear that the enterprise itself
has to be relinquished. And thus, by
noting the failure which must of necessity
follow every attempt to frame a concep
tion of the ultimate reality, we are led
round to the great truth made clear the
moment we recognise the relativity of all
our thinking the truth, namely, that all
conception of Absolute Being is for ever
beyond our grasp.
V.
Here, then, we have established certain
negative conclusions. We have seen, in
the first place, that, according to the
doctrine of evolution, we cannot regard
1 man as possessing an innate, transcen
dental sense of Deity, and that we must,
therefore, seek a natural genesis for
religious as for all other ideas. One
current hypothesis is thus overthrown.
In the second place, we have found that
the progress of religious thought has
largely consisted in the gradual elimina
tion of anthropomorphic elements from
the idea of Deity, and that this elimina
tion must go on until all human or
^uast
-huma.n attributes are entirely
expunged. Accepted theological teach
ings in regard to the personality and
character of God are thus shown to
belong to a lower stage of religious
thought a stage already partly, and
presently to be entirely, outgrown.
But, fortunately, we do not have to rest
in these emphatic repudiations of so much
that seems most sacred in our modern
heritage of thought. There is a positive
as well as a negative aspect to our whole
argument a constructive as well as des
tructive side. To this we will now turn
That larger charity, which is one of
the most striking results of evolutionary
habits of inquiry, has taught us to recog
nise not only
&quot;the soul of goodness in
things evil,&quot; but also the soul of truth in
things erroneous. We no longer discard
as absolutely and entirely without founda
tion even the strangest and most
grotesque ideas that have ever gained
foothold in the thoughts of our race.
Absurd as they may seem to the super
ficial or careless observer, the mere fact
that they have existed and have held their
own may be taken to prove that they
originally &quot;germinated out of nctual
experiences originally contained, and
perhaps still contain, some small amount
of verity.&quot;
1
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If this is true in regard to beliefs in
general, especially must it be held to be
true in regard to such beliefs as have
given evidence of unusual and persistent
vitality. It was a cheerful doctrine o;
the old theology that if a thing were
pleasant it was, therefore, certain to be
wrong; whence, by analogy, it might be
assumed that the more widespread an
idea, the less chance there would be of
its embodying any nucleus of reality.
But, from the standpoint here adopted,
this atrabilious supposition is shown to
lack foundation. For, when any belief
has become deeply embedded in human
nature, when it resists modifications of
fashion and thought, and holds its ground
in perennial strength amid all the intellec
tual and moral upheavals of the ages, we
see reason to infer that it does so because,
whatever may be its encumbrances and
adulterations of error, it contains some
core of essential truth. Now, suppose
that, recognising this trait of universality
and persistency in a given belief as/rz^a
facie evidence of its possessing a strong
basis of verity, we observe that it is not
only very general and very stable, but
also that it is a constituent element
common to many otherwise conflicting
systems of thought what is the infer
ence that we are compelled to draw ?
The inference, surely, that, generated
among different men under almost
infinitely varied conditions, caught up
by and preserved in creeds and philo
sophies having scarcely another point of
similarity, and enduring amid the most
sweeping changes and far-reaching
developments of thought, this belief
must hold some kernel of truth of
supreme importance must shoot out
some tendrils running far down into the
deepest subsoil of human life and experi
ence.
Bearing this in mind, we may revert to
a point already dealt with. In seeking
for the broadest possible definition of
the religious idea, we concluded that in
the last analysis that idea would every
where be found to depend upon the sense
of an existence other than the existence
which we describe as natural. Belief in a
mode of life and power other than our own
in a &quot;something not ourselves,&quot; the
influence of which is none the less felt
through all our existence is, therefore,
the central belief around which all con
crete forms of religion have gradually ac
cumulated ; it is the belief which all such
concrete forms, whatever may be the
diverse courses of their evolutions, con
tinue to hold in common
; it is the resi
dual element leftwhen all their differences
are cancelled and all their antagonistic
factors thrown aside. Almost if not
quite universal, and obstinately persis
tent, it is therefore the belief that, how
ever much it may be distorted or dis
guised, must be taken as embodying the
largest and most important truth. Now,
all religious systems have built upon the
foundation furnished by this belief a
theory of explanation a philosophy of
the universe; recognising one and all,
from lowest to highest, that a mystery
lies at the heart of things a mystery
from the overwhelming sense of which
there is no possibility of escape. And
what, in regard to this universal recogni
tion of the problem of the universe, has
en the course of the evolution of
religious thought ? Every stage in ad
vance has only served to bring the sense
of mystery into more conspicuous relief.
Earlier interpretations, shown by wider
cnowledge and larger outlook to be in-
ufficient, are discarded or modified ;
lypotheses framed by one generation
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untenable ; until at length the inevitable
goal of the whole movement comes
I within sight, and the most thoughtful
j
inquirers begin to realise that the mystery
/ of which all the creeds have sough t an
J explanation is a mystery for which no
explanation can ever possibly be found.
Thus, however much religious systems
may differ from one another in their
suggested solutions of the problem of
life, and from that most developed
philosophy which, conscious that every
hypothesis that ever has been or ever
can be framed concerning it is untenable,
declares theproblem itself to be insoluble,
they are at one upon the supreme point,
that the mystery is there. This is a
truth
&quot;
respecting which there is a latent
agreement among all mankind, from the
fetich-worshipper to the most stoical
critic of human creeds.&quot;
1
In endeavouring to trace the natural
history of the religious idea we throw no
discredit, then, upon that idea in its
higher developments, any more than we
throw discredit upon the moral idea in
its higher developments by following
(
. that down to its crudest forms. We
recognise, of course, that man in the
beginning was potentially religious, as
1 he was potentially intelligent, and poten
tially moral. Given this potentiality, our
business is simply with the growth of
the religious idea ; in studying which we
find, in all its changes and ramifications,
some vital germ of truth. Here, as in
the case of the moral sense, it is difficult
to see what advantage the advocates of
supernatural origin can possibly claim
over those against whose theories of a
natural origin they so fiercely protest.
Indeed, the advantage is rather on the
other side, since, as Dr. Fairbairn has
1 First Principles, 14.
pointed out, the supernaturalistic theory
implies that man must have had what
Schelling called
&quot; an original atheism of
consciousness.&quot;
Thus we have two permanent elements
in religious thought
: the belief in a
mode of life and power other than our
own, and a sense of the ultimate mys
tery of the universe
; the former of them
being used as a key to the latter. We
have seen that the inevitable tendency
of religious development is to make this
mystery more apparent. Let us now
inquire into the evolution of the other
element that idea of an existence not
our own, upon which all religious inter
pretations of the origin and meaning of
the universe have been based.
The following extract from Spencer s
Ecclesiastical Institutions ( 659) will
serve our purpose much better than any
words of our own :
Every voluntary act yields to the primi
tive man proof of a source of energy
within him. Not that he thinks about his
internal experiences ; but in these ex
periences this notion lies latent. When
producing motion in his limbs, and through them motion in othef things, he is aware
of the accompanying feeling of effort. And
this sense of effort, which is the perceived
antecedent of changes produced by him, becomes the conceived antecedent of
changes not produced by him furnishes
him with a term of thought by which to
represent the genesis of these objective
changes. At first this idea of muscular
forces as anteceding unusual events around
him carries with it the whole assemblage
of associated ideas. He thinks of the im
plied efforts as efforts exercised by beings
like himself. In course of time these
doubles of the dead, supposed to be
workers of all but the most familiar
changes, are modified in conception. Be
sides becoming less grossly material, some
of them are developed into larger per
sonalities presiding over classes of pheno mena which, being comparatively regular
in their order, suggest a belief in beings
who, while far more powerful than men,
are less variable in their modes of action.H4 RELIGIOUS, ASPECTS OF THE SPENCERIAN PHILOSOPHY
So that the idea of force as exercised by
such beings comes to be less associated
with the idea of a human ghost. Further
advances, by which minor supernatural
agents are merged in one general agent,
and by which the personality of this general
agent is rendered vague while becoming
widely extended, tend still further to dis
sociate the notion of objective force from
the force known as such in consciousness ;
and the dissociation reaches its extreme in
the thoughts of the man of science, who
interprets in terms of force not only the
visible changes of sensible bodies, but all
physical changes whatever, even up to
the undulations of the ethereal medium.
Nevertheless, this force (be it force under
that statical form by which matter resists,
or under that dynamical form distinguished
as energy) is to the last thought of in terms
of that internal energy which he is con
scious of as muscular effort. He is com
pelled to symbolise objective force in terms
of subjective force from lack of any other
symbol.
See, now, the implications. That internal
energy which in the experiences of the
primitive man was always the immediate
antecedent of changes wrought by him ;
that energy which, when interpreting
external changes, he thought of along with
those attributes of a human personality
connected with it in himself is the same
energy which, freed from anthropomorphic
accompaniments, is now figured as the
cause of all external phenomena. The last
stage reached is recognition of the truth
that force as it exists beyond consciousness
cannot be like what we know as force
within consciousness ; and that yet, as
either is capable of generating the other,
they must be different modes of the same.
Consequently, the final outcome of that
speculation commenced by the primitive
man is that the Power manifested through
out the universe distinguished as material,
is the same Power which in ourselves wells
up under the form of consciousness.
Little comment upon this passage is
called for. The sense of a mode of
life and power other than our own,
which, as we have seen, has from the
first been taken as the clue to the
arcanum of the universe, necessarily
arises under an anthropomorphic form,
and under this form continues to persist
through all the less developed stages of
thought. Meanwhile, the tendency to
de-anthropomorphisation little by little
modifies all the earlier religious concep
tions by depriving them one by one of
their human and fuasi-hum&a charac
teristics, beginning with the lower, but
gradually passing onward to the higher ;
until finally, through continuance of the
same tendency, all such characteristics
will disappear. When this has at length
taken place, there will be nothing left in
thought but the permanent and inex
pugnable sense of the power of which
all the phenomenal universe is but the
transient expression the reality that
underlies it all. Thus the conception
of the life not ourselves the life out of
which all existence arises, and by which
it is sustained just as it has been en
larging from the very beginning,
&quot; must
go on enlarging, until, by disappearance
of its limits, it becomes a consciousness
which transcends the forms of distinct
thought, though it for ever remains a
consciousness.&quot;
1
All this is surely a sufficient answer to
those who maintain that Spencer s doc
trine of the Absolute is merely a nega
tion. On the contrary, for him it is the
highest possible affirmation. Unknow- 1
able in itself, the noumenon the reality I
behind phenomena is still the founda- 1
tion of all our knowledge. Whatever {
else may be doubted, this at least can
never be called in question. It is the
one inexpugnable element in conscious
ness, left over in the last analysis as the
ultimate, inexplicable, indestructible first
principle of thought. Obliterate it, and
the whole fabric of our knowledge would
crumble to nothing.
3
1 Ecclesiastical Institutions, 658.
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VI.
To recapitulate. Stating the matter
broadly, and in the first place regarding
only its negative aspects, we have seen
that the Spencerian doctrine cuts the
ground directly from beneath all forms
of anthropomorphic theism, in which
God appears as &quot;Man s giant shadow,
hailed divine.&quot;
1 There are low and
high forms of such theism, varying all
along the line from that of the Fijian,
who pictures his gods as cannibals as
brutal and bloody as himself, to that of
so refined and subtle a thinker as Dr.





&quot; the order of affections in
Him&quot;; but, be their differences otherwise
what they may, they correspond in their
ascription to the Absolute and Infinite
Power of traits and characteristics having
.purely relative and finite connotations.
But it is now clear that even the highest
form of anthropomorphism is, philo
sophically considered, without justifica
tion.
^All our knowledge is limited to
phenomena ; and when, from dealing
with phenomena, we pass on to think or
speak of that which is not phenomenon.
bint reality, we are bound to think
speak in terms which necessarily lose
all exact meaning in thp fr
fl ,nsfrr \VJi]
j
intention, foresight, personality, purpose
we know what these signify when
applied to creatures conditioned like
ourselves
; applied to the Unconditioned,
they are empty words, having no mean
ing at all, or meanings which involve
countless absurdities and contradictions.
&quot; To think that God is, as we can think
him to be, is blasphemy
&quot; such is the
conclusion to which we are ultimately
f forced. However vast, however deep,
1 William Watson, The Unknown God.
our knowledge of the phenomenal
universe may hereafter become, it is
that phenomenal universe which must
for ever oppose an adamantine barrier to
our thought. Science may press forward
in every direction, and open up vistas of
which at present we do not even dream
;
but her ever-widening circle will only
bring us into larger touch with the
nescience that lies beyond. The
dividing line between appearance and
reality can never be passed, no matter
what achievements of insight and genius
and knowledge the future ages may hold
in store
; and for all mankind, as for us,
the eternal and ever-working power re
vealed to us only in its manifestations
must still remain beyond definition,
beyond even conception.
But happily our philosophy brings a
message of promise as well as a message
of discouragement. In his controversy
with Mr. Frederic Harrison, some years
ago, Spencer very properly called his
brilliant antagonist to task for loudly
applauding the irreparable defeat which
theology had sustained at his (Spencer s)
hands, while refusing to acknowledge
the services lie had rendered to religion
by showing the essential germ of truth
which, whatever its errors and divaga
tions, every theology contains. The
whole discussion only served to em
phasise in many minds the feeling
that it is not a little unfortunate that
Spencer should have made such promi
nent use of the word
&quot;
unknowable,&quot; not
because his meaning is not perfectly
plain to the careful student of Part I. of
First Principles, but because he has thus
left a loophole for what has been well
described as some of the dreariest
twaddle which has been given to the
world under the name of philosophical
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scholasticism. For the word
&quot; unknow
able &quot;has allowed t
assume, and to build a whole superstru c-
ture of argument upon the assumption.
that Spencer s doctrine of the Absolute
is a vacuum a mere negation of thought.
So far from this being the case, we have
shown that, fer the Spencerian. the truth
that behind all we know and can know.
eluding thought and transcending imagi
nation, there is the one Eternal Reality.
islhe corner-stone of an our
the one fact that can never- be either
may notice how in this finaTdattim of
consciousness, religion and science find
their complete and permanent reconcilia
tion^ .For the supreme and Everlasting
power__which religion calls God isthe
eternal and inscrutable energy which
science finds at the back ot its wufest
generalisations and beneath itsTcleepest
investigation! All science leadTat last
to the mystery with which all religion
begins. Science, indeed, speaks of that
mystery in language which is formal and
colourless, for its statements are purely
intellectual. But translated into the
language of the emotions, its ideas
become deeply religious.
1
It is true that all this means the inevit
able sacrifice of many of the ideas now
most deeply embedded in the current
creeds. It is true that it compels us to
look for a more and more complete pur
gation from the conception of Deity of all
human attributes ; since to speak of the
Divine will, or a Personal Creator, or an
1 To prevent misapprehension, I may add that
I do not myself rest in this somewhat blank
form of reconciliation between science and
religion. But I content myself here and in
what follows with indicating merely what
appear to me to be the immediate implications
of Spencer s own thought.
intelligent Governor of the universe, is,
from the standpoint of philosophical
exactness, scarcely more admissible than
to go back at once to the quaintly man
like images of the early Hebrew Scrip
tures. It is true that it forces us to
realise with ever-increasing vividness how
little all our feeble guessings must be
worth in face of the Great Enigma, since,
as the choice lies, not between person
ality and something lower, but between
personality and something inconceivably
higher, we are probably incalculably
further from the truth when we speak
of the Infinite and Absolute in terms
of human emotion and human intel
ligence than we should be if we at
tempted to describe human emotion
and human intelligence in terms of a
plant s functions. But all this not
withstanding, and though we are forced
to admit the futility of all the efforts of
all the theologies to formulate that which
is forever beyond formulation, we are
not therefore to suppose that we are left
without touch upon the Unseen and
Eternal, or that there is no kinship and
no communion between our spirits and
the Source and Sustainer of all things
&quot;the Power in darkness whom we
guess.&quot; Given the ultimate Reality
the great central fact of consciousness
and we are bound to conceive of that
Reality, not, indeed, as personal and
conscious in the strict meaning of these
words, but still as the power which is
manifested in personality and consrinng.
ness in ourselves ; personality and con
sciousness being modes in whjrh thP
Eternal Energy expresses itself in nc.hy
reason of the fact that we are conditioned
by that which is not ourselygs. Thus,
seeing our human necessity to give some
form to &quot;our conceptions, and our hurflan
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the highest within ourselves, we may
even allow ourselves to~ carry the ideas
of personality and consciousness with u:
in our thought oTthe ultimate Reality^anc
I hold that we are justified in so doing,
if we bear ever in mind the one supremely
important qualification that our language
does not define, but symbolise,
avoid trie danger of passing from sym
bolism, which is defensible, to definition,
which can lead to nothing but the Con
fusion of empty dogmatism, and the
ignorance which mistakes itself for
knowledge.
1
Does this seem, after all, to be offer
ing little in place of that which is taken
away ? To the present generation this
must needs perhaps be so. Men move
with difficulty from concrete image to
abstract statement. The religious pro
gress of the world has been like the
slow ascent of a man up a sheer perpen
dicular cliff every new foothold upward
has been carved out and graven deep
with infinite labour and countless tears.
The thought a little inadvance of the emo
tional grasp of each era has to that era
necessarily seemed chilling and repulsive
it has lacked the warmth, the glow, the
appealing power, which are possessed
only by ideas long steeped in the
1 For myself I go with Fiske when he says
:
&quot;
I do not hold that we are j ustified in using
such an expression as infinite personality in a
philosophical inquiry, where clearness of thought
and speech is above all things desirable. But I
do hold most emphatically that we are not
debarred from ascribing a guast-psychical nature
to the Deity simply because we can frame no
proper conception of such a nature as absolute
and infinite.&quot; It must be remembered (though
it is too often forgotten) that, unless we cease_to
think altogether, we must think anthropomor
phical^ ; and, as Dr. Martineau rightly protested,
materialism as a theory of things is quite as
anthropomorphic as the current theism.
feelings. No wonder, then, that when
his anthropomorphic error had been
proved to him, the old monk Serapion
should have cried aloud in all the agony
of his despair,
&quot; You have robbed me of
my God !&quot; No wonder that in the hour
of unspeakable craving Luther s wife
should have exclaimed against the cold
ness and hardness of her new creed.
This must necessarily be the cry of many
in every period of transition from lower
to higher thought in the future, as it has
already been the cry of many during every
such crisis in the past. Every move
ment forward out of familiar forms and
feelings has inevitably been attended by
some wrenching of the religious nature ;
and not without still further agitation and
upheaval shall we pass at length out of
anthropomorphic theism altogether into
that cosmic theism to which the long
course of religious evolution has from
the very first been slowly leading us. In
the development of thought, as Professor
Clifford pointed out, the feelings can
never quite keep pace with the intellect
a truth which throws a flood of light
upon the religious crisis of our own day.
When the existing balance between
knowledge and emotion is disturbed by
the discovery of fresh truth, the intellect
will readily adjust itself to the new con
ditions, while the emotions cling tena
ciously about the things that are being
left behind. Thus, while intellectually
we may seize and appropriate those vast
cosmical ideas which the wider know
ledge of our time is yielding us in place
of the simpler and cruder imaginings of
the past; while we may even realise
more or less clearly that these new ideas
are in themselves infinitely more im-
Dressive, more awe-inspiring, more truly
religious, than any that have been possible
to mankind hitherto; yet until theseii8 RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF THE SPENCERIAN PHILOSOPHY
ideas can grow sacred to us through
habit and association, until they can
sink down into our feelings and dwell
there, and become saturated with the
finer atmosphere of our thought, they
will be little to us but the abstractions
of philosophy. That the mass of men
will progress far in the difficult task
of thus incorporating them and making
them their own, in our time, or for
many generations to come, can hardly
be supposed. But that adjustment of
emotion to knowledge, which is a con
stant accompaniment of evolving life,
will in time vitalise and spiritualise these
new and now strange concepts of our
philosophy perhaps more rapidly than
some of us are apt to imagine.
&quot; The common problem yours, mine, every
one s,
Is not to fancy what were fair in life
Provided it could be but finding first
What may be, then find how to make it fair
Up to our means a very different thing.&quot;
And the religious problem of the race at
large is similar to this. The emotions
of each generation, adjusted to the
average knowledge of that generation,
cannot but receive a rude shock when
some new scientific revelation sweeps
away their old foundations, and thus
shatters the ancient bases of religious
faith. At such a crisis what is to be
done ? Nothing, but to accept the new
truth in all humility, and, in the firm
trust that the further evolution of
thought will presently lead to the com
plete reharmonisation of knowledge and
feeling, to set our faces resolutely
towards the light. The true religious
teacher in such a transitional period is,
therefore, not the man who enters the
battlefield of thought to fight for the
knowledge of yesterday against the
knowledge of to-day ; but rather he who,
gifted with prophetic vision, is the first
to enter sympathetically into all that
science reveals concerning the order of
the universe, and to proclaim its
religious bearings to a world that, for




light.&quot; Would that our preachers and
theologians could only thus realise their
privileges and their responsibilities, and
from the history of the many epochs of
dire struggle and confusion through
which, amid darkness and despair, men
have in the past been carried forward,
as on a tidal wave, to higher levels of
thought and feeling, could but catch
the inspiration of a larger faith in what
the future holds in store ! Meanwhile, it
is to the great poets particularly that we
have to look for help. In the following
magnificent lines of Wordsworth, for
example, we may perhaps read the
promise of a near and complete transla
tion of the religious ideas which we have
been here trying to interpret the ideas
of an Eternal Power manifesting itself
through the order of Nature, and of the
essential unity of all life out of the
language of science into the language of
the feelings the natural language, be it
ever remembered, for all religious faith
and aspiration
:
&quot; I have felt
A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts ; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man :
A motion and a spirit that impels
All thinking tilings, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things.&quot;
1
1 Lines Composed a few Miles above Tintern
Abbey, 1798. This superb passage, together
with such poems as Tennyson s Ancient Sage
and Akbars Dream, may be profitably compared
with those passages in The Task in which
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Of one thing at least we may rest
assured. As each larger thought of the
universe has at length been absorbed into
the emotions, and as from the vantage-
point then reached men have looked
back and seen their older conceptions in
all their limitations and crudity ; so will
this largest thought yet brought upon our
horizon be also emotionally appropriated;
and so, also, when this has been done,
will men realise how imperfect were all the
ideas belonging even to the highest stage
of anthropomorphism. Then, indeed,
will the religious emotions, harmonising
with a wider, truer, and deeper know
ledge of the Cosmos, and a fuller and
profounder sense of the Reality of which
the universe is but the fleeting manifes
tation, as much transcend the religious
emotions of our own day as do these the
theism of Paley and his school. Such a com
parison enables us to appreciate the real advance
that we have made towards an emotionalisation
of the new thoughts of science concerning the
universe and the final mystery of life.
religious emotions of the fetich-worship
ping savage. Nor can the future progress
of science do otherwise than strengthen
and enlarge them. As knowledge grows
&quot;from more to more,&quot; so will &quot;more of
reverence in us dwell,&quot; and the choral
harmonies of knowledge and feeling in
the time to come will be richer and
vaster than the broken music of the past.
For with every fresh exploration through
a universe which is literally pulsating
with life a universe
&quot; boundless inward
in the atom, boundless outward through
I the whole
&quot; one truth will rise into ever
i greater distinctness, and fill a larger and




the more mysterious the more they are





presence of an Infinite and Eternal
Energy, from which all things proceed.&quot;
Here Science finds with Religion the
ultimate and everlasting Fact of facts.APPENDIX
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